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Sexual Harassment in Education: A Review of Standards for
Institutional Liability Under Title IX
In late September 1996, six-year-old Johnathan Prevette kissed a
girl in his first-grade class on the cheek.1 The school's administrative
decision to punish Johnathan's amorous overture' triggered a "media
frenzy" in which commentators from Ann Landers3 to Katha Pollitt4
expressed their views on the appropriate way to handle the situation.
Some writers took the opportunity to note that while the reaction to
Johnathan's kiss may have seemed excessive, such overreaction by a
school district to an incident of sexual harassment is unusual.'
1. See First-Grader Must Remember This: A Kiss Is More Than Just a Kiss, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 25,1996, at A3.
2. See id. The principal was informed of the kiss and decided that Johnathan should
be punished under the school's sexual harassment policy. See id. His punishment took the
form of an in-school suspension in which Johnathan was barred from a coloring/ice cream
party. See id. In addition, Johnathan was warned that any more kissing would result in his
being suspended from schooL See id.
3. See Ann Landers, Ann Landers, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 1996, at F3. Landers, in
response to a letter questioning "American justice" when a six-year-old is suspended from
school for kissing a classmate on the cheek while Baltimore Oriole Roberto Alomar is
allowed to play the rest of the season after spitting in an umpire's face, asserted that "6-
year-old Johnathan Prevette should have been 'spoken to' but not punished. Six-year-olds
don't know what sexual harassment is. I recently read that the superintendent of schools
in Johnathan's district is taking steps to revise the sexual harassment code to take age into
account." Id.
4. See Katha Pollitt, Kissing & Telling, NATION, Nov. 4, 1996, at 9. The mishap
involving Johnathan was followed by another elementary-school kissing incident when
seven-year-old De'Andre Dearinge, a New York student, was suspended for five days
after he kissed a female classmate and pulled a button off her skirt. See id. Pollitt
criticized the "media frenzy" surrounding the two incidents and noted that while there was
a great deal of media attention surrounding Johnathan and De'Andre's relatively harmless
exploits, more serious incidents of sexual harassment in our schools were not given the
same attention by the media. See id. Specifically, Pollitt described two other situations
involving sexual harassment that escaped notice by the press:
In California, a jury awarded Tianna Ugarte $500,000 because her school failed
to act when she was menaced daily (including death threats) in sixth-grade;
meanwhile, the Supreme Court refused to hear the case of two Texas eighth-
graders who were regularly groped and called whores by boys on their school bus.
Id. Pollitt concluded that while Johnathan's and De'Andre's respective school districts
might have, considering the ages of the children in question, overreacted to their
situations, some action in response to the boys' behavior was appropriate. See id.
5. See Hanke Gratteau, What's in a Kiss?: Plenty: When It Leads to the Sexual
Harassment Girls Routinely Endure at School in North America, CALGARY HERALD, Oct.
16, 1996, at Al5. Gratteau noted:
The truth is, the story of Johnathan Prevette is not the norm, not by far. The
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Another commentator noted that a large part of the Johnathan
Prevette fiasco stemmed from the fact that the "proper" response on
the part of a school district-one that would not expose a school
district to potential liability-is not clear.6
Although the recent incident involving Johnathan brought the
issue of sexual harassment in education to the forefront of the
mainstream media, the issue has concerned the social science and
academic communities for several years.7 Commentators have noted
norm is that girls are harassed in school, and their harassers are rarely punished.
In a U.S. survey, 76 per cent of 1,600 middle- and high-school girls had
experienced unwanted sexual comments, jokes, gestures or looks at school ....
Sixty-five per cent had been grabbed and/or pinched. More than one in 10 had
been forced to perform a sexual act other than kissing....
At a top-notch suburban school near San Francisco, for instance, eighth-
grade girls endured boys who grabbed their buttocks and breasts in the hallways.
Girls were regularly called "slut," "bitch" and "ho.".... At another middle school
a girl told me she was the manager of the boys' basketball team until one of the
players walked up to her and, without a word, reached out and grabbed both of
her breasts.
Id. at A15. Gratteau concluded that the sympathy extended to Johnathan while the plight
of so many girls is ignored is testimony to "how entrenched the status quo really is.
[Johnathan's] tale effectively reassures us that dealing with sexual harassment-as
suspected all along-is much ado about nothing." Id. at A15; see also Liza N. Burby,
Dishonor Students; Too Often, Sexual Harassment Goes with the Territory at Schoo4 And
Most Kids Believe There's Nothing They Can Do About it, NEWSDAY, Oct. 12, 1996, at B1
(describing different situations involving sexual harassment, examining possible reasons
for its increasing prevalence in American school systems, and concluding with a call for
schools to adopt sexual harassment policies with clear guidelines that are communicated
regularly to the students); Ellen Goodman, The Truth Behind 'The Kiss,' BOSTON GLOBE,
Oct. 13, 1996, at D7 (criticizing the media furor over the school's reaction to Johnathan's
kiss and emphasizing the real problem of sexual harassment in our schools and the impact
it often has on its victims); Kathy Walt, More Than Just a Peck on the Cheek/Girls Take
Action to Stop Nightmare of Sexual Harassment in the School House, HOUS. CHRON., Oct.
13, 1996, at D1 (discussing the serious problem of sexual harassment in schools and the
controversy surrounding the school district's role in reacting to and remedying the
problem).
6. See Andrew Phillips, Kissing and Correctness: Two Little Boys Are Busted for
Bussing, MACLEAN's, Oct. 14, 1996, at 49. According to Phillips, both Johnathan's and
De'Andre's school districts reacted out of concern that the school district could face a
lawsuit if "real or perceived" sexual harassment was not properly addressed. See id.
7. See generally COMBATING SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN HIGHER EDUCATION
(Bernice Lott & Mary Ellen Reilly eds., 1996) (consisting of articles describing the
problem of sexual harassment in higher education and appropriate university policies and
procedures); ROBERT O..RIGGS Er AL., SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN HIGHER EDUCATION:
FROM CONFuCr TO COMMuNITY (1993) (describing various aspects of sexual harassment
in education and effective policies and practices for eliminating the problem); SEXUAL
HARASSMENT IN THE EDUCATIONAL ENVIRONMENT (Dan Wishnietsky ed., 1992)
(consisting of a variety of articles discussing various aspects of the issue of sexual
harassment in education); SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES: ABUSING
THE IVORY POWER (Michele A. Paludi ed., 1996) (consisting of a variety of articles
regarding sexual harassment at the post-secondary level).
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that research reveals that sexual harassment is disturbingly prevalent
in our nation's school systems.8 At least two commentators have
described the problem of sexual harassment in education as having
reached "epidemic proportions." 9  Moreover, commentators have
noted that a study by the American Association of University
Women revealed that four out of five high school students have been
the victims of sexual harassment." Studies have also shown that
sexual harassment is pervasive in education at the university level."
In addition, many researchers have described the effects of
sexual harassment in education.' Some of those effects include
physical and emotional harm, as well as the deprivation of the
opportunity for a fair education.' Sexual harassment, whether in the
8. See generally Louise Fitzgerald, The Prevalence of Sexual Harassment, in
COMBATTING SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN HIGHER EDUCATION 55 (Bernice Lott & Mary
Ellen Reilly eds., 1996) (summarizing findings of research regarding sexual harassment of
students and female faculty); Alexandra A. Bodnar, Comment, Arming Students for Battle:
Amending Title IX to Combat the Sexual Harassment of Students by Students in Primary
and Secondary School, 54 REV. L. &WOMEN'S STUD. 549,554-59 (1996) (summarizing the
findings of several studies done at the primary and secondary levels regarding the
incidence of peer sexual harassment and citing at least one study in which four out of five
students reported that they had been the target of sexual harassment); Kristin M.
Eriksson, Note, What Our Children Are Really Learning in Schook Using Title 1X to
Combat Peer Sexual Harassment, 83 GEO. LJ. 1799, 1800 n.12 (describing the results of
two studies). The first of the two studies described by Eriksson found that "81% of girls in
grades eight through eleven have experienced unwanted sexual behaviors during their
lives, and, of those who reported experiencing harassment, 58% reported experiencing
harassment 'often' or 'occasionally.'" Id. The second study found that "89% of girls
surveyed ages nine to nineteen, have received suggestive gestures, looks, comments, or
jokes, 83% have been touched, pinched, or grabbed; and 39% reported that this
harassment happened on a daily basis." Id.
9. ROBERTI. SHOOP & DEBRA L EDWARDS, HOW TO STOP SEXUAL HARASSMENT
IN OUR SCHOOLS: A HANDBOOK AND CURRiCULUM GUIDE FOR ADMINISTRATORS
AND TEACHERS 55 (1994).
10. See Bodnar, supra note 8, at 556 (citing the results of a 1993 survey sponsored by
American Association of University Women); Jill Suzanne Miller, Note, Title VI and Title
VII: Happy Together as a Resolution to Title 1K Peer Sexual Harassment Claims, 1995 U.
ILL. L. REV. 699,701 (1995) (same).
11. See, e.g., Stefanie H. Roth, Sex Discrimination 101: Developing a Title IXAnalysis
for Sexual Harassment in Education, 23 J.L. & EDUC. 459, 460-61 (noting that at least one
study has found that "between twenty and thirty percent of all female undergraduate
students reported having experienced some form of sexual harassment by the faculty and
staff of their college and universities" and that the number of women who report having
been sexually harassed increases when women are asked to report peer sexual
harassment).
12. See, e.g., SHOOP & EDWARDS, supra note 9, at 53-66 (describing physical,
psychological, behavioral, and educational consequences of sexual harassment in
education).
13. See id. at 56-57.
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workplace or in education, "devastates one's physical well-being,
emotional health, and vocational development."14  Another
commentator summarized the effect of sexual harassment in
education by stating: "Sexual harassment is more than just a moral,
legal, or financial concern. It is a concern over protecting an
atmosphere that is most conducive to our academic ideals. In a
condition of fear or emotional discomfort, academic goals cannot be
achieved."'
The past decade has also seen an increasing amount of
discussion in the legal community regarding several aspects of sexual
harassment in education. Recently, the literature has centered
around the development of sexual harassment law under Title IX of
the Education Amendments of 1972.16 One area that has received
particular attention is the set of circumstances under which an
educational institution may be monetarily liable for sexual
harassment that takes place in its schools.' A review of the
literature reveals much well-researched discussion regarding the
proper standard for institutional liability. 8 However, an analysis of
14. MICHBLEA. PALuDI & RICHARD B. BARICKMAN, ACADEMIC AND WORKPLACE
SEXUALHARASSMENT: A RESOuRCEMANUAL 27 (1991).
15. Jonathan D. Fife, Foreword to RIGGS ETAL., supra note 7, at xvi.
16. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1994). See generally Thomas M. Melsheimer et al.,
The Law of Sexual Harassment on Campus: A Work in Progress, 13 REv. LITIG. 529,535-
41 (1994) (summarizing the existing status of sexual harassment law under Title IX); Roth,
supra note 11, at 499-519 (describing how the different types of sexual harassment are
actionable under Title IX); Miller, supra note 10, at 714-22 (summarizing how Title VI and
Title VII should be used to interpret sexual harassment claims under Title IX).
17. See generally George M. Sullivan, Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment
Extends to Schools and Universities, 1992 LAB. LJ. 456 passim (describing the standard
adopted by the Supreme Court in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60
(1992)); Ellen J. Vargyas, Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools and Its Impact on
Title IX Enforcement, 19 J.C. & U.L 373 passim (1993) (describing the impact of Franklin
on sex discrimination claims brought under Title IX); Joanne Liebman Matson, Note, Civil
Rights-Sex Discrimination in Education-Compensatory Damages Available in a Title IX
Sexual Harassment Claim, Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 112 S. Ct. 1028
(1992), 15 U. ARK. Lnr ROCK L.J. 271, 291-97 (1993) (describing the impact of the
Supreme Court's decision in Franklin); Christopher T. Nixon, Note, Civil Rights Law-Title
IX-School Liability for Student-to-Student Sexual Harassment, Davis v. Monroe County
Board of Education, 74 F3d 1186 (11th Cir. 1996), 64 TENN. L. REV. 237 passim (1996)
(describing the impact of the standard of institutional liability adopted by the Eleventh
Circuit); Monica L. Sherer, Comment, No Longer Just Child's Play: School Liability Under
Title IX for Peer Sexual Harassment, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 2119, 2152-67 (1993) (describing
the standards by which a school may be held liable for peer sexual harassment).
18. See generally Carrie N. Baker, Comment, Proposed Title IX Guidelines on Sex-
Based Harassment of Students, 43 EMORY L.J. 271, 289-323 (1994) (discussing the way
Title IX should be interpreted to address sexual harassment in education effectively);
Bodnar, supra note 8, at 584-89 (suggesting how Title IX should be changed to better
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the case law reveals the reason for the confusion at the school district
level regarding the appropriate reaction to sexual harassment and a
school's potential liability. At this time, there is no definitive answer
as to the "proper" action a school district should take to avoid a
potential lawsuit.
This Comment explores the issue of sexual harassment in
education, focusing on the various rationales and standards adopted
by federal courts in formulating the appropriate standard of
institutional liability for sexual harassment in education. The
purpose of this Comment is to provide a general overview of the
standards adopted by various courts, as well as a brief summary of
the trends that have emerged. First, the Comment briefly reviews
the development of sexual harassment law9 under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.20 Second, it explores the development of
sexual harassment law under Title IX." Third, the Comment
summarizes the cases in which federal courts have addressed the
issue of institutional liability for sexual harassment in education,
identifying and discussing any trends that have emerged in the area
of institutional liability.' This Comment concludes with a summary
address sexual harassment in education); Julie Elizabeth Davis, Comment, Sexual
Harassment: Should Schools Be Held Liable for Peer Sexual Harassment Under Title IX of
the Education Amendments of 1972?, 20 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc 219, 220-21 (1996)
(describing the different standards of liability adopted by the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits
with respect to peer sexual harassment); Neera Rellan Stacy, Note, Seeking a Superior
Institutional Liability Standard Under Title IX for Teacher-Student Sexual Harassment, 71
N.Y.U. L REV. 1338, 1365-85 (1996) (advocating a standard of liability based on agency
principles for teacher-student sexual harassment).
19. See infra notes 24-45 and accompanying text
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994). Title VII makes it unlawful for "an employer
... to discriminate against any individual with respect. to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex or national origin." Id.
21. See infra notes 46-72 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 73-724 and accompanying text. It is important to note that people
who allege sexual harassment in the educational context also may file a claim in federal
court in the form of a civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). See, e.g.,
Oona R.-S. v. Santa Rosa City Schs., 890 F. Supp. 1452,1462 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (finding that
a § 1983 claim may be based on a Title IX violation). The treatment of sexual harassment
claims brought in the civil rights context is outside the scope of this Comment. For a
discussion of the issue of civil rights actions stemming from sexual harassment in
education, see generally Jeff Homer, A Student's Right to Protection from Violence and
Sexual Abuse in the School Environment, 36 S. TEX. L REV. 45 (1995) (describing the
treatment of sexual harassment claims brought by students against both employees and
fellow students under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Karen Mellencamp Davis, Note, Reading,
Writing, and Sexual Harassment: Finding a Constitutional Remedy When Schools Fail to
Address Peer Sexual Abuse, 69 IND. LJ. 1123 (1994) (describing constitutional claims that
may be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for peer sexual harassment in the educational
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of the recently proposed standards for the determination of
institutional liability for sexual harassment in education issued by the
Department of Education's Office of Civil Rights ("OCR") and the
potential impact those standards will have on existing case law.
I. A REVIEW OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW
A. Title VII
Before turning to the development of sexual harassment law
under Title IX, a brief look at sexual harassment law as it developed
under Title VII is helpful for two reasons. First, the legal theory of
sexual harassment developed in the context of Title VII.24 In 1979,
Catharine A. MacKinnon, a prominent feminist scholar, suggested
that sexual harassment constituted prohibited sex discrimination
under Title VII.' In 1980, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC") issued guidelines explicitly defining sexual
harassment as a violation of Title VII.
26
Second, a discussion of sexual harassment law under Title VII is
warranted because most federal courts that have addressed sexual
harassment claims brought under Title IX have applied the
context); Adam Michael Greenfield, Note, Annie Get Your Gun 'Cause Help Ain't Comin':
The Need for Constitutional Protection from Peer Abuse in Public Schools, 43 DUKE LJ.
588 (1993) (analyzing the application of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to sexual harassment claims
brought by students in the educational context); John W. Walters, Note, The Constitutional
Duty of Teachers to Protect Students: Employing the "Sufficient Custody" Test, 83 Ky. LJ.
229 (1994-95) (describing the standard by which a school may be liable under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 for physical abuse suffered by one of its students).
23. See infra notes 725-41 and accompanying text (discussing Office of Civil Rights
Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees, 61 Fed.
Reg. 52,172 (1996) (proposed Oct. 4,1996)).
24. See Patricia H. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1288, 1290 (N.D. Cal.
1993).
25. See CATHARIE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKNG WOMEN:
A CASE OF SEX DIScIUMINATION 4 (1979). MacKinnon defined sexual harassment as
"the unwanted imposition of sexual requirements in the context of a relationship of
unequal power." Id. at 1.
26. The EEOC currently defines sexual harassment in the following manner:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature ... when (1) submission to such conduct is
made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's
employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is
used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such
conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's
work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working
environment.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1996).
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substantive law from Title VII by analogy.' Although a few courts
have reasoned that, because Title IX was modeled after Title VI,"
the substantive law from Title VI ought to apply.' the majority of the
courts that have addressed sexual harassment claims brought under
Title IX have applied the substantive law from Title VII 0
There are two basic theories upon which a claim of sexual
harassment under Title VII may be based. The first, quid pro quo
sexual harassment, involves a proposition that makes some aspect of
employment conditional upon the granting of sexual favors.31  The
27. See, e.g., Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186, 1192 (11th Cir.
1996) (finding that the Office of Civil Rights ("OCR") relied on Title VIE[ principles in
defining proscribed behavior under Title IX).
28. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994). Title VI provides, in relevant part, that "[n]o person
in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." Id.
29. See, e.g., Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560, 1566 (N.D. Cal.
1993), rev'd 54 F.3d 1447 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that because Title IX is based upon Title
VI, it should be interpreted in a similar manner).
30. See Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 94 F.3d 463, 469 (8th Cit. 1996); Davis, 74
F.3d at 1192; Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 540 (1st Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 1044 (1996); Murray v. New York Univ. College of Dentistry, 57 F.3d
243, 249 (2d Cir. 1995); Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 897 (1st Cir.
1988); Does v. Covington County Sch. Bd. of Educ., 930 F. Supp. 554, 568 (M.D. Ala.
1996); Burrow v. Postville Community Sch. Dist., 929 F. Supp. 1193, 1204 (N.D. Iowa
1996); Pallett v. Palma, 914 F. Supp. 1018, 1024 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Pinkney v. Robinson, 913
F. Supp. 25,32 (D.D.C. 1996); Slaughter v. Waubonsee Community College, No. 94-2525C,
1995 WL 579296, at *3-*4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 1995); Bosley v. Kearney R-1 Sch. Dist., 904
F. Supp. 1006, 1022 (W.D. Mo. 1995); Kadiki v. Virginia Commonwealth Univ., 892 F.
Supp. 746, 750 (E.D. Va. 1995); Ward v. Johns Hopkins Univ., 861 F. Supp. 367, 375 (D.
Md. 1994); Saville v. Houston County Healthcare Auth., 852 F. Supp. 1512, 1521 (M.D.
Ala. 1994); Hastings v. Hancock, 842 F. Supp. 1315, 1318 (D. Kan. 1993); Patricia H. v.
Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1288, 1290 (N.D. Cal. 1993); Alexander v. Yale
Univ., 459 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D. Conn. 1977), aff'd, 631 F.2d 178 (2d Cit. 1980). But see
Bruneau v. South Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 935 F. Supp. 162, 173-74 (N.D.N.Y. 1996)
(rejecting the application of Title VII constructive notice principles to the determination
of school liability for peer sexual harassment); Leija v. Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist., 887 F.
Supp. 947, 950 (W.D. Tex. 1995), rev'd, 101 F.3d 393 (5th Cit. 1996) (noting that Title IX is
to be interpreted through the application of Title VI law); Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep.
Sch. Dist., 887 F. Supp. 140, 142 (W.D. Tex. 1995), rev'd, 106 F.3d 648 (5th Cir. 1996)
(concluding that Title IX is to be analyzed using principles from Title VI); Seamons v.
Snow, 864 F. Supp. 1111, 1117 (D. Utah 1994) (stating that the determination of liability
under Title IX should be made in a manner similar to that used in the Title VI context);
Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560, 1573 (N.D. Cal. 1993), rev'd, 54 F.3d
1447 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that Title IX is to be interpreted in a manner similar to Title
VI).
31. See Patricia H., 830 F. Supp. at 1290 (defining quid pro quo sexual harassment and
citing Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), as the first published opinion
recognizing a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim).
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second type of sexual harassment that is actionable under Title VII is
known as hostile work environment sexual harassment. In 1986, the
United States Supreme Court explicitly held that hostile work
environment sexual harassment was actionable under Title VII in
Mentor Savings Bank v. Vinson." The Court specified that in order
for a hostile work environment to be actionable under Title VII, the
harassment must be severe or pervasive enough to "alter the
conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive
working environment."'33 The Meritor Court did not, however,
expressly address how severe or pervasive the harassment had to be
to satisfy the standard. As a result, in the wake of Meritor, there has
been a great deal of discussion in the legal community regarding the
facts necessary to sustain a claim of hostile environment sexual
harassment.'
In 1993, the Supreme Court attempted to clarify the issue and
addressed the standard by which a hostile work environment should
be evaluated in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.5 The Harris Court
held that the consideration of whether an environment was hostile
enough to constitute a violation of Title VII should take "a middle
path between making actionable any conduct that is merely offensive
and requiring the conduct to cause a tangible psychological injury."
36
The Court noted that the severity of the conduct that gives rise to a
hostile work environment claim must be measured from both an
objective and a subjective perspective. 7 Finally, the Court described
32. 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986). ln support of its holding, the Court noted that EEOC
Guidelines defined actionable sexual harassment as including conduct that "has the
purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment." Id. at 65 (relying on
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (1985)).
33. Id. at 67 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)).
34. See, e.g., Victoria T. Bartels, Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson The Supreme
Court's Recognition of the Hostile Environment in Sexual Harassment Claims, 20 AKRON
L REV. 575 (1987); Sheryl A. Greene, Reevaluation of Title VII Abusive Environment
Claims Based on Sexual Harassment After Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 13 T.
MAMSHALL L. REV. 29 (1987); Shannon Murphy, Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson: What
Makes a Work Environment 'Hostile'?, 40 ARK. L REV. 857 (1987); Nancy Brown, Note,
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson: Clarifying the Standards of Hostile Working Environment
Sexual Harassment, 26 Hous. L. REV. 441 (1988); M. Jule Courtney, Note, Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson; Finally a Supreme Court Ruling on Sexual Harassment in the
Workplace: For What It's Worth, 38 MERcER L REV. 733 (1987).
35. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
36. Id. at 21.
37. See id. The Court noted that
[c]onduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile
or abusive work environment-an environment that a reasonable person would
[Vol. 752056
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the factors that should be considered in determining whether a
hostile work environment has been created."
The United States Supreme Court briefly addressed the issue of
whether an employer may be held liable for sexual harassment
perpetrated by an employee in the workplace in Meritor." The
Court began its analysis by summarizing the arguments made by the
parties regarding the appropriate standard of employer liability for
hostile work environment sexual harassment. ' The Court declined
to resolve the issue and stated: "We ... decline the parties'
invitation to issue a definitive rule on employer liability, but we do
agree with the EEOC that Congress wanted courts to look to agency
principles for guidance in this area.' 1
With the above language, the Court seemed to implicitly
endorse the standards of liability adopted by the EEOC in the
regulations pertaining to employer liability for sexual harassment.
The guidelines adopted by the EEOC set out specific standards for
employer liability for sexual harassment perpetrated by supervisors
or agents, as well as for sexual harassment perpetrated by regular
employees (co-employee harassment). 2  According to those
guidelines, an employer always is liable for sexual harassment
perpetrated by one of its supervisors.43 Additionally, the guidelines
mandate that an employer "is responsible for its acts and those of its
agents and supervisory employees with respect to sexual harassment
regardless of whether the specific acts complained of were authorized
find hostile or abusive-is beyond Title VIrs purview. likewise, if the victim
does not subjectively perceive the environment to be abusive, the conduct has not
actually altered the conditions of the victim's employment and there is no Title
VII violation.
Id. at 21-22.
38. See id at 23. The factors listed by the Court include:
[Tihe frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is
physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether
it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance. The effect on
the employee's psychological well being is, of course, relevant to determining
whether the plaintiff actually found the environment abusive. But while
psychological harm, like any other relevant factor, may be taken into account, no
single factor is required.
Id.
39. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 69-73 (1986).
40. See id. at 69-72.
41. Id. at 72. The Court specified that employers are not always liable for sexual
harassment perpetrated by supervisors but, at the same time, the employer cannot
necessarily escape liability by asserting its lack of notice. See id.
42. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c), (d) (1996).
43. See id. § 1604.11(c).
1997] 2057
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or even forbidden by the employer and regardless of whether the
employer knew or should have known of their occurrence.""
Finally, the EEOC guidelines state that with respect to co-employee
sexual harassment, "an employer is responsible for acts of sexual
harassment in the workplace where the employer (or its agents or
supervisory employees) knows or should have known of the conduct,
unless it can show that it took immediate and appropriate correctiveaction."'
B. Title IX
Title IX46 prohibits sex discrimination in federally-funded
educational programs. According to Title IX, "[n]o person in the
United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance.' 7 In order to establish a prima facie
case of discrimination under Title IX, a plaintiff must establish the
following elements: "(1) that he or she was excluded from
participation in, denied the benefits of, or subjected to discrimination
in an educational program; (2) that the program receives federal
assistance; and (3) that his or her exclusion from the program was on
the basis of sex." The OCR is responsible for enforcing the
regulations that govern the interpretation of Title IX. Specifically,
the OCR has the power to terminate an educational institution's
federal funding if the OCR's investigation of a Title IX complaint
reveals that a school has violated Title IX.50 One commentator has
44. Id.
45. Id. 1604.11(d).
46. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1994).
47. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994). At least one commentator has noted that Title IX was
enacted "to fill a gap in existing civil rights legislation." Eriksson, supra note 8, at 1803.
Title VI prohibits some forms of discrimination in federally funded institutions, but gender
is not among the protected classes. See i& In addition, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(1994), when originally enacted, specifically exempted educational institutions. See id.
48. Seamons v. Snow, 864 F. Supp. 1111, 1116 (D. Utah 1994) (citing Bougher v.
University of Pittsburgh, 713 F. Supp. 139, 143.44 (W.D. Pa. 1989), affd on other grounds,
882 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1989)).
49. See Nixon, supra note 17, at 241.42.
50. See id. at 242. Another commentator has described the role of the OCR as
follows:
Under the statute, student victims of any form of sex discrimination, including
sexual harassment, may file a written complaint with the [OCR]. If OCR
determines that a Title IX violation has occurred, it will attempt to bring the
institution into compliance through informal means. If compliance is not
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suggested, however, that this procedure is insufficient in redressing
the harm suffered by student victims of sexual harassment."'
Fortunately, there is another route open to students who are not
satisfied with the process available through the OCR. In Cannon v.
University of Chicago,52 the United States Supreme Court held that a
private individual who has been the victim of sexual harassment in a
school subject to Title IX can sue the school for a violation of the
statute." The Cannon Court acknowledged that a private right of
action was not expressly authorized by the statute.? The Court
reasoned, however, that a private cause of action could be inferred
from the statute if doing so would be in accordance with the
congressional intent behind the statute. The Court concluded that
Congress had intended for individuals to be able to bring a private
cause of action and held that the private plaintiff has a viable cause
of action against the school under Title IX 6
achieved informally, OCR may initiate administrative proceedings to terminate
federal funding or ask the Department of Justice to seek enforcement through
the courts.
Kimberly L Limbrick, Developing a Viable Cause of Action for Student Victims of Sexual
Harassment: A Look at Medical Schools, 54 MD. L REV. 601, 611 (1995) (citations
omitted).
51. See Limbrick, supra note 50, at 611-12. Ihmbrick supported her assertion with the
following reasoning-
First, the transient nature of student life and the inevitable delays in the
administrative process typically deny the victim any personal or timely benefit
from the school's eventual reform. Second, settlement or negotiation with OCR
ordinarily occurs without victim participation. Third, the punishment imposed on
the institution for noncompliance with Title IX does not compensate the victim.
Finally, the termination of government funding ultimately will harm students if
sanctioned schools are compelled by funding reductions to eliminate programs or
classes.
Id.
52. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
53. See id. at 717.
54. See id. at 683.
55. See id. at 688. The Court noted that the issue should be analyzed under the
standard set by the Court in Cori v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 688.
56. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 717. Specifically, the Court concluded:
When Congress intends private litigants to have a cause of action to support their
statutory rights, the far better course is for it to specify as much when it creates
those rights. But the Court has long recognized that under certain limited
circumstances the failure of Congress to do so is not inconsistent with an intent
on its part to have such a remedy available to the persons benefited by its
legislation. Title IX presents the atypical situation in which all of the
circumstances that the Court has previously identified as supportive of an implied
remedy are present.
Id. at 717. The first federal court to hear a sexual harassment claim brought by an
individual under Title IX was the district court in Alexander v. Yale University, 459 F.
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The case that provided the most significant impetus for the
recent increase in sexual harassment claims in the educational
context was Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools.57 The
Court's holding in Franklin allows a private plaintiff to pursue
monetary damages for a school's violation of Title IX" Christine
Franklin, a high school student in the Gwinnett County School
District, was sexually harassed from the beginning of her tenth-grade
year through her junior year by Andrew Hill, a teacher and athletic
coach employed by the high school." In addition, Franklin alleged
that the school district became aware of the sexual harassment, took
no action to stop the behavior, and discouraged her from filing a
sexual harassment claim.' As a result of the school's inaction,
Franklin filed a claim for damages in federal court, asserting that the
school was liable under Title IX 1
The Franklin decision was devoted almost entirely to the
determination of whether the implied right of action recognized in
Cannon could support a plaintiff's claim for monetary damages."
The Court began with a description of the historic procedure used by
courts to determine the appropriate remedy for violation of a legal
right." After considering how the remedy issue had been handled by
modem Supreme Court decisions, the Court concluded that "absent
clear direction to the contrary by Congress, the federal courts have
the power to award any appropriate relief in a cognizable cause of
action brought pursuant to a federal statute."4
The Court then considered whether Congress intended to limit
the application of the general rule in the enforcement of Title IX.Y
Supp. 1 (D. Conn. 1977), aff'd, 631 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1980).
57. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
58. See id. at 76.
59. See id. at 63. According to the complaint, Hill had sexually oriented conversations
with Franklin, forcibly kissed her on the mouth in the school parking lot, telephoned her at
home, and, on three occasions during her junior year, pulled her out of class and took her
to a private office where he subjected her to coercive sexual intercourse. See id.
60. See id. at 63-64.
61. See id at 63.
62. See iUL at 65-76.
63. See id at 66-68. The Court cited the general rule that "where legal rights have
been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion,
federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done." Id. at 66.
64. Id. at 70-71.
65. See a at 71-73. The Court began by pointing out that any analysis of the remedy
issue that relied on the legislative history of Title IX was misplaced because the cause of
action at issue was inferred from a Supreme Court case that was decided well after Title
IX was formally adopted by Congress. See id at 71. Therefore, any reliance on the
legislative history that took place prior to the recognition of the private cause of action
2060 [Vol. 75
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The Court first looked to amendments adopted by Congress after the
Cannon decision and concluded that Congress had legislated with
"full cognizance" of the Cannon holding.' After analyzing the
relevant legislation, the Court concluded that Congress "did not
intend to limit the remedies available in a suit brought under Title
IX.67 The Court then held that "a damages remedy is available for
an action brought to enforce Title IX."'
In spite of Franklin's rather straightforward holding, the Court's
failure to address several major issues in the area of sexual
harassment in education has created much confusion in the lower
courts. Specifically, courts have split with respect to whether a claim
for hostile environment sexual harassment can be maintained under
Title IX." Both the Franklin and Cannon cases involved students
filing claims under Title IX.70 As a result, lower courts have split
with regard to whether Title IX affords employees of educational
institutions a private right of action.71 Lower courts also have split
would not help in deciding the remedies available for such action. See id. The Court
reasoned that "[s]ince the Court in Cannon concluded that [Title IX] supported no express
right of action, it is hardly surprising that Congress also said nothing about the applicable
remedies for an implied right of action." Id. at 71.
66. Id. at 72.
67. Id. The Court cited Congress's adoption of two amendments to Title VII, pointing
out that the legislation "cannot be read except as a validation of Cannon's holding." Id.
68. Id. at 76.
69. Compare Alexander v. Yale Univ., 631 F.2d 178,183 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that a
student's claim of hostile environment sexual harassment was not actionable under Title
IX), with Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 540 (1st Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 1044 (1996) (describing the elements required to establish a prima facie
case of hostile environment sexual harassment). Several commentators have
acknowledged the Court's failure to specifically identify the claim in Franklin as one
involving hostile environment sexual harassment, but have concluded that because the
student did not allege that an educational benefit was conditioned on sexual consideration,
the claim at issue was most likely one of hostile environment sexual harassment. See
Melsheimer et al., supra note 16, at 544-45; Vargyas, supra note 17, at 378; Baker, supra
note 18, at 284, 286; Matson, supra note 17, at 294; Miller, supra note 10, at 711. Most
courts, however, have come to the conclusion that hostile environment cases can be
maintained under Title IX. See infra notes 504-08,706 and accompanying text.
70. See Franklin, 503 U.S. at 62; Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 680
(1979).
71. Compare Bowers v. Baylor Univ., 862 F. Supp. 142, 145 (W.D. Tex. 1994) (holding
that an employee can maintain a private cause of action under Title IX), with Lakoski v.
James, 66 F.3d 751, 754 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that Title VII afforded university
employee the exclusive means of relief), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 357 (1996), and Howard v.
Board of Educ. of Sycamore Community Unit Sch. Dist. No. 427, 893 F. Supp. 808, 815
(N.D. fll. 1995) (holding that Title VII preempts Title IX employment discrimination
action); see also infra notes 155-244 and accompanying text (discussing several Title IX
sexual harassment claims that have been maintained by employees of educational
institutions).
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over individual defendants' liability under Title X.12
One major issue that has caused a division in both district and
circuit courts is the proper standard for holding an educational
institution liable for the sexual harassment suffered by its employees
or students. The next section of this Comment summarizes lower
court decisions since Franklin, explores the standards of institutional
liability that have been adopted by these courts with respect to
different types of sexual harassment situations, and identifies trends
that have developed.73
II. TITLE IX CASE LAW PERTAINING TO STANDARDS FOR
INSTITUTIONAL LIABILITY
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Franklin, there has been
a marked increase in the number of sexual harassment cases filed
under Title IX 4 For the purpose of this Comment, the cases that
have been decided since Franklin are organized in the following
manner. First, the Comment discusses the cases involving quid pro
quo sexual harassment.75 Next, it considers the cases involving
72. The majority of courts that have considered the issue of individual liability have
held that individuals cannot be sued under Title IX for sexual harassment situations. See
Garza v. Galena Park Iudep. Sh. Dist., 914 F. Supp. 1437, 1438 (S.D. Tex. 1994)
(dismissing a Title IX claim against individual defendants); Seamons v. Snow, 864 F. Supp.
1111, 1116 (D. Utah 1994) (dismissing claims against individual defendants because
neither individual defendant was an "education program or activity" within the meaning of
the statute); Bustos v. Illinois Inst. of Cosmetology, No. 93-5980C, 1994 WL 710830, at *2
(N.D. Ill. Dec. 15, 1994) ("Thus, the goal of Title IX is to prevent institutional
discrimination; consequently, the implied right of action created by Title IX extends only
to institutional actors."); Slaughter v. Waubonsee Community College, No. 94-2525C, 1994
WL 663596, at *2-*3 (N.D. ]1M. Nov. 18, 1994) (dismissing action against college professor
for quid pro quo sexual harassment on basis that only institutions may be sued under Title
IX); Aurelia D. v. Monroe County Bd. of Edu, 862 F. Supp. 363, 367 (M.D. Ga. 1994),
modifted, Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186 (11th Cir 1996) (dismissing
plaintiff's claims against individuals under Title IX because only federally funded
institutions can be held liable under the statute); Saville v. Houston County Healthcare
Auth., 852 F. Supp. 1512, 1522-25 (MD. Ala. 1994) (dismissing Title IX claims against
individual through analysis of claim under Title VII law); Hastings v. Hancock, 842 F.
Supp. 1315, 1317 (D. Kan. 1993) (noting that an educational institution is the proper
defendant in a Title IX action).
73. See infra notes 140-47 and the accompanying text (discussing trends in quid pro
quo cases under Title IX); notes 225-44 (discussing trends in employee
perpetrator/employee victim hostile environment cases); notes 504-35 (discussing trends in
employee perpetrator/student victim hostile environment cases); and notes 706-25
(discussing trends in student perpetrator/student victim hostile environment cases).
74. See Leija v. Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist., 887 F. Supp. 947, 952 (W.D. Tex. 1995),
rev'd 101 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting that most lawyers, litigants, and judges did not
grasp the fall availability of Title IX remedies until the Franklin decision).
75. See infra notes 83-147 and accompanying text.
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hostile environment sexual harassment." Within the hostile
environment category, the cases are organized according to the status
of the perpetrator and the victim of the sexual harassment:
Employee Perpetrator/Employee Victim, Employee
Perpetrator/Student Victim,7" and Student Perpetrator/Student
Victim.
79
This Comment studies the standards for institutional liability for
acts of sexual harassment. For the purpose of understanding the
scope of Title X, however, it is important to note that in addition to
those listed above, an educational institution also may be liable
under Title IX for other situations involving sexual harassment. For
example, educational institutions may be sued under Title IX for
unlawful retaliation against both employees and students who report
incidents of sexual harassment."0 Moreover, several universities also
have been sued by people accused of sexual harassment who allege
that the school's handling of the sexual harassment claim violated the
due process rights of the accused." Finally, at least one university
has been sued under Title IX for allegedly creating a hostile
environment through its handling of a sexual assault claim filed with
the university by a female student.
A. Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment
1. The Claim Under Title IX
As of 1996, the only federal courts that had considered the
viability and proper standard for a claim of quid pro quo sexual
harassment under Title IX were district courts. Several of the cases
help clarify the proper standard for institutional liability under Title
76. See infra notes 148-725 and accompanying text.
77. See infra notes 155-244 and accompanying text.
78. See infra notes 245-535 and accompanying text.
79. See infra notes 536-725 and accompanying text.
80. See, e.g., Preston v. Virginia ex rel. New River Community College, 31 F.3d 203
(4th Cir. 1994); Nelson v. University of Maine Sys., 923 F. Supp. 275 (D. Me. 1996); Saville
v. Houston County Healthcare Auth., 852 F. Supp. 1512 (M. D. Ala. 1994); Ruh v.
Samerian, 816 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Wis. 1993), aff'd, 32 F.3d 570 (7th Cir. 1994).
81. See, e.g., Yusaf v. Vassar College, 35 F.3d 709 (2d Cir. 1994); Silva v. University of
New Hampshire, 888 F. Supp. 293 (D.N.H. 1994).
82. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 772 (W.D. Va.
1996).
83. See Slater v. Marshall, 906 F. Supp. 256, 260 (E.D. Pa. 1995); Kadiki v. Virginia
Commonwealth Univ., 892 F. Supp. 746, 750-52 (E.D. Va. 1995); Saville, 852 F. Supp. at
1527-29; Hastings v. Hancock, 842 F. Supp. 1315,1317-19 (D. Kan. 1993).
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IX. In one case, however, the court declined to adopt a standard.'
The following section summarizes the findings of these various courts
with respect to the proper standard of institutional liability under
Title IX for quid pro quo sexual harassment. First, the opinion of
the court that refused to adopt a standard of liability for quid pro
quo sexual harassment under Title IX is discussed, 6 followed by a
summary of the cases that expressly adopted a standard for quid pro
quo sexual harassment. '
In Slater v. Marshall," the court briefly addressed the standard
for institutional liability under Title IX for quid pro quo sexual
harassment perpetrated by a professor on a student. Linda Slater
was a student at Montgomery County Community College
("MCCC") when she was allegedly sexually harassed by Professor
Richard Marshall." The defendant, MCCC, attempted to have
Slater's complaint dismissed as containing an unactionable hostile
environment sexual harassment claim." The court, however,
acknowledged that Slater insisted that she had alleged quid pro quo
sexual harassment and concluded that the court would not
"disregard plaintiff's own theory of her claim."91  The court
concluded that Slater had adequately alleged quid pro quo
harassment and denied the defendant's motion to dismiss.'
Slater contended that MCCC would be "absolutely" liable for
the professor's actions if she satisfied the elements of quid pro quo
harassment." The court responded to her argument by stating that
the standard of liability she advocated, which was based on a First
Circuit decision, was not correct.' According to the Slater court, the
84. See Kadild, 892 F. Supp. at 751; Saville, 852 F. Supp. at 1527; Hastings, 842 F.
Supp. at 1318-20.
85. See Slater, 906 F. Supp. at 260.
86. See infra notes 88-96 and accompanying text.
87. See infra notes 97-139 and accompanying text.
88. 906 F. Supp. 256 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
89. See id. at 258.
90. See id. at 260. The court, in dicta, noted that the Third Circuit had not addressed
whether hostile environment sexual harassment was actionable under Title IX. See U at
260 n.3 (citing Bougher v. University of Pittsburgh, 882 F.2d 74, 77 (3d Cir. 1989)). The
Slater court also noted, however, that other courts had recognized that hostile environment
sexual harassment is actionable under Title IX. See id.
91. Id. at 260.
92. See ia
93. See ia at 260 n.4.
94. See id. Slater premised her argument on the First Circuit's decision in Lipsett v.
University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 901 (1st Cir. 1988), and the Supreme Court's
decision in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 70-71 (1986). See Slater, 906 F.
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First Circuit's cite of "Meritor, in dicta, for the proposition that there
is absolute liability for quid pro quo harassment, ... must be an
error."95 After concluding that Slater's theory of absolute
institutional liability for the quid pro quo sexual harassment of a
student by a professor employed by the university was not the proper
standard, the court never explained what the proper standard of
institutional liability was.96 As a result, the Slater decision merely
contributes to the considerable confusion in this area.
Fortunately, the remaining district court decisions not only
clarify the proper standard for institutional liability for a quid pro
quo sexual harassment situation, but also are consistent with one
another. In Hastings v. Hancock, the United States District Court
for the District of Kansas became the first district court to address
definitively an educational institution's potential liability resulting
from a quid pro quo sexual harassment situation between a teacher
and a student.' Juana Serda was a student of a hairstyling school
when she was subjected to sexual harassment by the school's director
and filed suit against the school under Title IX" Serda brought both
hostile environment and quid pro quo sexual harassment claims
against the school."° According to the district court, the particular
issue in the case was whether the Morrisons, the owners of the
hairstyling school, were liable under Title IX for the harassment of a
student by Hancock, the director of the school."'
The Hastings court observed that the parties had focused on the
plaintiff's claims of hostile environment harassment."° In doing so,
the court essentially avoided the question of the proper standard for
institutional liability for quid pro quo situations, but recognized that
some courts "have held that claims of quid pro quo sexual
harassment by an employee with direct supervisory authority over
the harassee lead to direct liability on the part of the employer."'"
The Hastings court then concluded that, in light of MeNtor Savings
Supp. at 260 n.4.
95. Slater, 906 F. Supp. at 260 n.4.
96. See id. at 260.
97. 842 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Kan. 1993).
98. See id. at 1318.
99. See id. at 1316. According to Serda, "she was subjected to continued unwanted
and uninvited sexual comments, questions, phone calls, and threats by Hancock." Id.
100. See id. For a discussion of the court's treatment of the hostile environment claim,
see infra notes 342-49 and accompanying text.
101. See Hastings, 842 F. Supp. at 1317.
102. See id. at 1318 n.2.
103. Id. (citing Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897,909 (11th Cir. 1982)).
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Bank v. Vinson," the same standard of institutional liability should
apply to educational institutions for both quid pro quo and hostile
environment sexual harassment.'5 The court addressed the school's
liability for both the quid pro quo and hostile environment sexual
harassment through the application of agency principles. 6
In Saville v. Houston County Healthcare Authority,"°7 Della
Saville, a student at a school of nurse anesthesia, was the target of
sexually inappropriate behavior from her supervising nurse
anesthetist, Michael Shanks." Saville claimed that Shanks
downgraded her clinical evaluations because of her response to his
inappropriate sexual behavior."z She reported one incident to her
supervisor which was subsequently reported to Shanks's
supervisor."' As a result, Shanks was counseled, given a written
warning, and told that further inappropriate behavior would result in
his termination."' In addition, Saville was assured that she would no
longer have to work directly with Shanks."' In spite of that
assurance, the director of the program refused to assign Saville to
supervisors other than Shanks, and Shanks remained one of Saville's
evaluators."' Saville eventually was dismissed from the nurse
anesthetist program because of lack of progress in her clinical
work."4 Subsequently, Saville filed suit against the school, alleging
104. 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986) (suggesting that agency principles should be used to
determine employer liability for both types of sexual harassment).
105. See Hastings, 842 F. Supp. at 1318-19 n.2. The Hastings court reasoned that the
Meritor decision established that Congress intended for courts to look to agency principles
to establish institutional liability in both quid pro quo and hostile environment cases. See
d.
106. See id at 1318-20. For a detailed discussion of the court's analysis regarding the
issue of institutional liability, see infra notes 349-54 and accompanying text.
107. 852 F. Supp. 1512 (M.D. Ala. 1994).
108. See id at 1519-20. Saville's complaint recounted incidents of sexually
inappropriate comments made to her by Shanks. See iU. at 1519. There was, however, one
particular "key" incident in Saville's complaint that involved a situation in which Shanks
grabbed Saville's buttocks in the recovery room. See iUL at 1520.
109. See idA at 1520. Saville alleged that after she informed Shanks of how upset and






114. See id at 1520-21. The court noted that it was not clear whether Saville's poor
clinical performance resulted from the hostile environment in which she was working or a
true inability to perform. See id at 1520.
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that the school's handling of her situation violated Title IX."
The Saville court considered whether the facts of the case were
sufficient for the maintenance of a quid pro quo claim and concluded
that "[w]hile this is not the classic quid pro quo case, a jury could
conclude that Shanks's poor evaluations, and ultimate discharge,
resulted from her refusal to acquiesce in Shanks's sexual innuendo
and touching.""'  Thus, the court concluded that Saville had alleged
facts sufficient to survive the school's motion for summary judgment
on the quid pro quo claim.17
In its consideration of the issue of the institution's potential
liability for the quid pro quo harassment, the Saville court applied
analogous law from Title VII" and concluded that, in order to hold
the school liable, Saville needed to prove that Shanks was an agent
of the school." As a preliminary matter, the Saville court noted that
Shanks's actions clearly were not within the scope of his
employment."' However, the court pointed out that under the
relevant Title VII law from the Eleventh Circuit, a supervisor who
was aided in the harassment by the existence of the agency
relationship may be deemed an agent for the purposes of Title VII.'
After detailing other factors to be considered in determining whether
a supervisor is an agent of an institution, the court noted that the
agency determination was ultimately a question for the finder of
fact.' With respect to the quid pro quo claim, the court stated that if
a jury found that Shanks was acting as an agent of the institution, the
115. See id. at 1521. Saville also brought a claim under Ttle IX for hostile environment
sexual harassment. For a discussion of the court's treatment of the hostile environment
claim, see infra notes 326.41 and accompanying text.
116. Saville, 852 F. Supp. at 1527.
117. See Id
118. See id. Saville also alleged that the sexual harassment she suffered constituted
unlawful employment discrimination under Title VIL See id. at 1521. The district court
noted that "the substantive standards to be applied to the claims under Title IX should be
the same as those under Title VII." Id. (citing Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864
F.2d 881, 901 (ist Cir. 1988)).
119. See i& at 1527. The court noted that in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S.
57, 72 (1986), the United States Supreme Court explained that an employer is not
"automatically liable" for the sexual harassment perpetrated by its employees, but may be
directly liable for illegal harassment perpetrated by its agents. See Saville, 852 F. Supp. at
1527.
120. See Saville, 852 F. Supp. at 1527.
121. See id. (citing Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1554, 1559 (11th Cir.
1987)).
122. See id. The court pointed out that a supervisor need not have the power to hire
and fire in order to be considered an agent of the institution. See id.
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institution would be directly liable for his acts of harassment.' 23
Another district court addressed the issue of quid pro quo
sexual harassment in the educational context in Kadiki v. Virginia
Commonwealth University." Amna Kadiki was a student at Virginia
Commonwealth University and was enrolled in a biology course
taught by Associate Professor Michael Fine.'2 As a result of
Kadiki's unsatisfactory performance on a make-up examination, Fine
requested that Kadiki review the examination with him.26  During
the meeting, which took place when the two were alone in Fine's
office, Fine sexually harassed Kadiki.l Michael Casanovas, a friend
of Kadiki, contacted Fine after the incident to defend Kadiki."
During their conversation, Fine said that he would give Kadiki an
"A" if she would speak to Fine before reporting the incident." As a
result of these incidents, Kadiki filed a quid pro quo and two other
types of sexual harassment claims under Title IX. 0 Specifically,
123. See id at 1527-29. The court noted some of the factors that supported the
conclusion that Shanks was acting as an agent of the institution:
Shanks was employed as an instructor by the institutional defendants. He
supervised and evaluated Saville's clinical work; the institutional defendants
appear to have relied on his evaluations. After Saville complained to the director
of the [nursing school] about a comment Shanks had allegedly made to her, and
stated that she did not want the director to discipline Shanks because she was
afraid it would hurt her in school, the director did not assure her that Shanks had
no authority to affect her status. Saville believed Shanks had authority over her,
and the institutional defendants appear to have held him out as having such
authority.
Id. at 1527.
124. 892 F. Supp. 746 (E.D. Va. 1995).
125. See id at 748.
126. See U
127. See UL The following facts, which were undisputed by the parties, describe the
incident in Fine's office:
Fine placed Plaintiff over his knees and spanked her repeatedly with his hand
because her score fell below a previously agreed-upon level. The parties also
agree that Fine told Plaintiff that she could retake the same examination the next
day, but that she should bring her hairbrush with her and be prepared for another
spanking if she did not achieve or exceed a certain score. Fine purportedly told
Plaintiff that her spanking would be "worse" the second time around. After the




130. See id at 749. In addition to the quid pro quo claim, Kadiki filed a hostile
environment claim. For a discussion of the hostile environment claim, see infra notes 371-
80 and accompanying text. Kadiki also filed a claim under Title IX for retaliation. See
Kadiki, 746 F. Supp. at 749. A discussion of Kadiki's retaliation claim is beyond the scope
of this Comment.
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Kadiki claimed that Fine, through the conversation with Casanovas,
offered her a grade in exchange for her delay in reporting his
behavior."1 In addition, Kadiki alleged that Fine had conditioned
her taking of the second exam on her acceptance of additional
sexually inappropriate behavior. '
The Kadiki court prefaced its analysis of the quid pro quo claim
with the observation that Title VII law would guide the substantive
analysis of the claim. 3 The court pointed out that quid pro quo
sexual harassment had been defined in the employment context by
the United States Supreme Court as a situation "where a defendant's
'[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature' are directly connected
with the plaintiff's receipt of a job or education related benefit."'
The Kadiki court then set out the elements a plaintiff must establish
to maintain a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim under Title
VII."
5
The court pointed out that the element of quid pro quo
harassment pertaining to institutional liability is automatically
satisfied when the perpetrator of the harassment is a supervisor," s
and concluded that, in the case at bar, the school was "automatically"
liable for any sexual harassment Kadiki suffered. 7 The court
131. See Kadiki, 746 F. Supp. at 749.
132. See id. Specifically, the exam was conditioned on Kadiki's acceptance of a second
spanking should she fail to perform well on the exam. See id.
133. See id. at 749-50. The court acknowledged that the United States Supreme Court
had not expressly addressed whether Title VII standards ought to apply to Title IX sexual
harassment claims. See id. at 749. However, the Kadiki court noted that it could be
inferred from the Supreme Court's decision in Franklin that principles from Title VII
should apply to Title IX actions brought by students. See id. at 750.
134. Id. at 750 (quoting Meitor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,65 (1986)).
135. The court, applying Title VII law by analogy, stated that a plaintiff must establish
that:
(1) The employee belongs to a protected group. (2) The employee was subject to
unwelcome sexual harassment. (3) The harassment complained of was based on
sex. (4) The employee's reaction to the harassment affected tangible aspects of
the employee's compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.
The acceptance or rejection of the harassment must be an express or implied
condition to the receipt of a job benefit or cause of a tangible job detriment to
create liability. Further, as in typical disparate treatment cases, the employee
must prove that she was deprived of a job benefit which she was otherwise
qualified to receive because of the employer's use of [a] prohibited criterion in
making the employment decision. (5) The employer ... knew or should have
known of the harassment and took no effective remedial action.
Id. at 751 (citing Spencer v. General Elec. Co., 894 F.2d 651, 658 (4th Cir. 1990)).
136. See id.
137. See id. at 752.
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reasoned that "a professor is authorized by his educational employer
to design the curriculum and manage the classroom .... Given these
job characteristics, a professor is analogous to a work place
supervisor, and knowledge of any quid pro quo harassment of a
student by a professor should be imputed to his employer." ''  In
essence, the Kadiki case stands for the proposition that when a
professor, in the course of his or her professional responsibilities,
engages in quid pro quo harassment, the university that employs that
professor will be liable. 9
2. Trends for Quid Pro Quo Under Title IX
It is rather easy to discern the trend in the federal courts that
have addressed the appropriate standard of institutional liability
under Title IX for a student's experience of quid pro quo sexual
harassment by a teacher. The Slater court limited its holding to the
observation that a university is not "absolutely" liable for a teacher's
acts of sexual harassment."' However, that district court did not
define the circumstances under which there might be institutional
liability for a situation involving a professor's quid pro. quo
harassment of a student. It may be meaningful that the Slater court
did not criticize the applicability of agency principles to the
determination of institutional liability for quid pro quo sexual
harassment. As the following summary of the remaining cases
demonstrates, no court has held that an educational institution
should always be liable for quid pro quo sexual harassment
perpetrated by one of its employees. Thus, it is possible to reconcile
the Slater opinion with those of the other district courts that
explicitly have addressed the issue of institutional liability for quid
pro quo sexual harassment.
The remaining district courts adopted similar standards with
respect to an institution's liability for a student's experience of quid
pro quo sexual harassment perpetrated by a teacher. The district
138. Id. The court added that the knowledge may be imputed only if the harassment
occurred as part of the professor's professional responsibilities. See id.
139. See id.
140. See Slater v. Marshall, 906 F. Supp. 256, 260 n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1995). It is interesting
that the Slater court relied upon the First Circuit's decision in Lipsett v University of Puerto
Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 901 (1st Cir. 1988), where the Lipset court cited Merntor Savings Bank
v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 70-71 (1986), for the proposition that an employer bears absolute
liability for quid pro quo sexual harassment perpetrated by an employee. See Slater, 906 F.
Supp at 260 n.4. A closer reading of the Lipset case reveals that the First Circuit also
recognized that an employer's liability for situations such as the one in Slater do not always
result in a finding of employer liability. See Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 900.
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court in Hastings concluded that the school's liability for the quid
pro quo sexual harassment should be resolved through the
application of agency principles. 1 The district courts in Saville and
Kadiki concluded that if the perpetrator of the quid pro quo
harassment qualifies as a "supervisor" of the student victim, then the
school is automatically liable for the harassment.'42
Under the holdings of the above courts, a school's liability for
quid pro quo sexual harassment is determined through the
application of agency principles.43 By applying the applicable law of
agency to the student/teacher scenario, a school will be automatically
liable for a teacher's quid pro quo sexual harassment of a student if
the harassment occurs within the scope of the harasser's teaching
duties.1' In addition, even if the quid pro quo harassment takes
place outside the scope of the harasser's teaching duties, the school
may still be liable if the harasser was aided by apparent authority.'45
Therefore, according to the above cases, in a case of quid pro quo
sexual harassment perpetrated by an employee, a school almost
always will be liable for the harassment unless the school successfully
argues that the employee was acting outside the scope of his
authority and was not aided in the harassment by apparent authority.
In considering whether agency principles supply the appropriate
standard for the determination of an educational institution's liability
for quid pro quo sexual harassment, it is important to recognize that,
because of the nature of a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim, the
perpetrator of the harassment will most likely be in an agency
relationship with the school. In other words, quid pro quo
harassment involves a situation in which an educational benefit has
been made conditional on the granting of a sexual favor. 46 In order
to be in a position to grant an educational benefit to a student, the
perpetrator of the harassment must be someone to whom the
educational institution has granted some authority, or at least some
appearance of authority. Because of the idea that some kind of
141. See Hastings v. Hancock, 842F. Supp. 1315,1318-20 (D. Kan. 1993).
142. See Kadiki, 892 F. Supp. at 751; Saville v. Houston County Healthcare Auth., 852
F. Supp. 1512,1528-29 (M.D. Ala. 1994).
143. These principles are summarized in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
(1958). One section of the Restatement pertains to the standards under which an
employer may be held liable for the acts of her employees. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY § 219 (1958).
144. See U § 219(1).
145. See id. § 219(2)(d).
146. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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agency relationship must exist for the quid pro quo harassment to be
possible, it seems equitable to apply agency principles to the
determination of whether an educational institution ought to be
liable for the actions taken by the person to whom it entrusted
authority.'47
B. Hostile Environment
A claim for hostile environment sexual harassment can develop
in a number of contexts. For the purposes of this Comment, the
hostile environment claims are categorized by the types of
individuals involved in the claim.' The first category includes cases
that consist of sexual harassment claims that have been brought
under Title IX in the employment context (i.e.,
employee/employee). 4 The second category consists of student
victims of hostile environments created because of the actions of an
employee of the school." Many of these cases involve situations in
which teacher/student sexual abuse has occurred."1  The final
category consists of cases where peer sexual harassment allegedly has
created a hostile educational environment."2 Within each category,
147. In addition, commentators have endorsed the application of agency principles to
the determination of institutional liability in the educational context. See Roth, supra note
11, at 513; Stacy, supra note 18, at 1341.
148. At least one court has noted that hostile environment claims should be categorized
by the type of individuals involved in the harassment. See Leija v. Canutillo Indep. Sch.
Dist., 887 F. Supp. 947, 951 (W.D. Tex. 1995), rev'd, 101 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1996).
149. See infra notes 155-244 and accompanying text. These claims involve cases in
which an employee of an educational institution alleges that a hostile environment has
been created because of the actions of another employee at the school.
150. See infra notes 245-535 and accompanying text.
151. Because the abuser rarely conditions the sexual acts on an educational benefit,
these situations do not amount to quid pro quo harassment. Instead, the claims are often
treated as hostile environment sexual harassment claims. See, e.g., Does v. Covington
County Sch. Bd. of Educ., 930 F. Supp. 554, 568 (LD. Ala. 1996) (finding that sexual
abuse by a teacher is a form of sex discrimination under Title IX). But even in the cases
where the facts would seem to satisfy the standard for quid pro quo sexual harassment,
students may choose to bring a claim for hostile environment sexual harassment. See, e.g.,
Slaughter v. Waubonsee Community College, No. 94-2525C, 1996 WL 579296, at *3 (N.D.
IMI. Nov. 18, 1994); see also Pinkney v. Robinson, 913 F. Supp. 25, 28 (D.D.C. 1996)
(describing a university employee's claim of hostile environment sexual harassment when
the facts seem to be sufficient for the maintenance of a claim of quid pro quo sexual
harassment). But see Bolon v. Rolla Pub. Schs., 917 F. Supp. 1423, 1429 n.3 (E.D. Mo.
1996) ("Sexual intercourse between high school students and their teachers does not
appear to fit at all into the "hostile environment" category. A teenaged student's
susceptibility to coercion by an adult role model inherently contains the elements of 'quid
pro quo' activity .... ).
152. See infra notes 536-725 and accompanying text.
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the courts have split with regard to the proper standard for
institutional liability.' Moreover, further complicating the issue, the
courts have often split with regard to whether hostile environment
sexual harassment is even a viable cause of action under Title IX.'
The different conclusions the courts have reached with respect to the
viability of hostile environment claims will also be discussed.
1. Employer Perpetrator/Employee Victim
Few federal courts have addressed the problem of hostile
environment sexual harassment in the educational context when
both the perpetrator and the victim of the harassment are employees
of the educational institution5' All of the courts that have
considered claims in this context have recognized, at least implicitly,
the viability of the claim. 6 A review of those decisions reveals three
different standards for institutional liability.
a. Standards of Liability
(1) Negligence
Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico' is the only decision by a
circuit court of appeals that has addressed the issue of institutional
liability for hostile environment sexual harassment under Title IX in
the employment context. Annabelle Lipsett was a resident at the
medical school at the University of Puerto Rico when she was
subjected to sexual harassment." The harassment constituted both
153. See infra notes 225-44,504-35,706-25 and accompanying text.
154. See infra notes 505-08,706 and accompanying text.
155. See, e.g., Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988);
Pinkney, 913 F. Supp. at 25; Howard v. Board of Educ., 876 F. Supp. 959 (N.D. Ill. 1995);
Ward v. Johns Hopkins Univ., 861 F. Supp. 367 (D. Md. 1994).
156. The issue in all of the cases discussed below is the appropriate standard of liability
for a hostile environment sexual harassment claim brought under Title IX. None of the
cases explicitly addresses the viability of such claims. However, the various courts'
analysis of school liability under the cause of action stands as implicit recognition of the
fact that such claims are actionable.
157. 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988).
158. See Id. at 887-88, 891. The plaintiff alleged the following specific incidents of
harassment:
[Tihe barrage of commentary by ... [other residents] ... that women in general,
and the plaintiff in particular, should not be surgeons; the pointed threats made
by [one resident] to other residents and to the plaintiff herself that he would drive
her out of the Program; the repeated and unwelcome sexual advances made to
the plaintiff by [senior residents]; the hostile behavior directed against the
plaintiff by these men once it became clear to them that she would not accede to
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quid pro quo and hostile environment sexual harassment, but the
court's discussion of the proper standard for institutional liability
pertained primarily to Lipsett's claim of hostile environment sexual
harassment."'
Before considering the merits of Lipsett's claims, the court
stated that it would use the law developed under Title VII to analyze
Lipsett's claims under Title IX. 06 In justification of that application,
the Lipsett court noted that the only guidance the United States
Supreme Court had offered with respect to the interpretation of Title
IX was that it should be given "'a sweep as broad as its
language.' """ The court also noted that other circuit courts had
applied Title VII law to the interpretation of various issues under
Title IX. 62 Finally, the court reasoned that the application of the
substantive law from Title VII to sexual harassment issues arising
under Title IX was in conformity with the legislative history of Title
IX.'6 The court specified, however, that Title VII ought to apply to
sexual harassment situations arising under Title IX only in the
context of employment discrimination.
6 4
After summarizing the relevant sexual harassment law under
their demands; the degrading pinups-including the Playboy centerfolds, the
sexually explicit drawing of the plaintiff's body, and the list containing sexually
charged nicknames of the female residents-plastered on the walls of the male
residents' rest facility; and finally, the plaintiff's particular nickname,
"Selastraga," which translated literally means, "she swallows them."
Id. at 903.
159. See id. at 899-901.
160. See id at 896.
161. Id. (quoting North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512,521 (1982)).
162. See id. at 896-97 (citing Mabry v. State Bd. of Community Colleges and
Occupational Educ, 813 F.2d 311, 316 n.6 (10th Cir. 1987); O'Connor v. Peru State
College, 781 F.2d 632, 642 n.8 (8th Cir. 1986); Nagel v. Avon Bd. of Educ., 575 F. Supp.
105,106 (D. Conn. 1983)).
163. See id. at 897. The court summarized the relevant portion of the legislative
history:
One of the single most important pieces of legislation which has prompted the
cause of equal employment opportunity is Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964... Title VII, however, specifically excludes educational institutions from its
terms. [Title IX] would remove that exemption and bring those in education
under the equal employment provision.
Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 92-554, at 51-52 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2462,
2512).
164. See ia The court reasoned that the "[plaintiff here was both an employee and a
student in the program .... We have no difficulty extending the Title VII standard to
discriminatory employment by a supervisor in this mixed employment-training context."
Id.
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Title VIEI,' the court turned to the issue of institutional liability.' 66 In
its analysis, the court relied primarily on the Supreme Court's
decision in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson.'67 According to the
Lipsett court, the determination of institutional liability should not
be made with strict adherence to agency principles."8 Instead, the
Lipsett court emphasized that the harassing acts of employees do not
always result in employer liability.'69 The Lipsett court ultimately
adopted the following standard of institutional liability for hostile
environment sexual harassment under Title IX in the employment
context:
[A]n educational institution is liable upon a finding of
hostile environment sexual harassment perpetrated by its
supervisors upon employees if an official representing that
institution knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care,
should have known, of the harassment's occurrence, unless
that official can show that he or she took appropriate steps
to halt it. ... [T]his standard also applies to situations in
which the hostile environment harassment is perpetrated by
the plaintiff's coworkers.'
After applying the above standard to the facts at bar, the Lipsett
court concluded that the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged a prima
facie case of hostile environment sexual harassment. Additionally,
according to the court, the facts were sufficient to support a finding
that the defendant institution had actual or constructive notice of the
harassment to survive the defendant's motion to dismiss.'
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland
adopted a standard similar to that of Lipsett in Ward v. Johns
Hopkins University. 72 Theresa Cusimano and Beth Ward were
employees of Johns Hopkins University at the Center for Social
Organization of Schools.73 Cusimano and Ward both claimed that
165. See i& at 897-98.
166. See id at 899-901.
167. See id. at 900-01 (discussing Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986)).
168. See hd. The Lipsen court emphasized the language in the Meritor opinion where
the Court instructed that "Congress wanted courts to look to agency principles for
guidance in this area." See i4. at 900 (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72). According to the
Lipsen court, the most important aspect of the Meritor decision was that it declined to
adopt a standard under which the employer is always automatically liable for the
harassment perpetrated by its employees. See i. at 900-01.
169. See id at 901.
170. Id. (citations omitted).
171. See id at 905-07, 914-15.
172. 861 F. Supp. 367 (D. Md. 1994).
173. See i& at 369.
2075
2076 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75
Mark Christian, another employee of Johns Hopkins University,
sexually harassed them. 74 Neither Ward nor Cusimano had received
a copy of the university's sexual harassment policy and no supervisor
in their office had ever received training in sexual harassment.17"
Both Cusimano and Ward brought claims for hostile environment
sexual harassment under Title IX.176
As a preliminary matter, the Ward court summarized the
applicable Fourth Circuit law pertaining to hostile environment
sexual harassment under Title VII.1r Next, the court considered
whether the Title VII standard ought to apply to hostile environment
sexual harassment claims brought under Title IX.178 Addressing the
defendant's argument that Title VII standards should not apply to
the Title IX issue at bar,79 the court noted the persuasive support for
174. See id. at 370. Cusimano, a college graduate who was employed full-time by the
university, alleged that "every time she encountered him, Christian touched her in some
way." Id. In addition, Christian visited Cusimano at her apartment where he revealed to
her that he had a gun. See i4 Cusimano alleged that she told one of her supervisors that
she was uncomfortable with Christian because he behaved toward her in what she
perceived to be a sexually inappropriate manner. See id. She did not, however, inform any
supervisors of Christian's visit to her apartment. See id.
Ward, who was a college student employed temporarily in the office for the summer,
claimed that Christian sexually harassed her during her first three weeks of employment.
See id. at 371. The conduct Ward complained of included Christian's leering at her,
commenting to other male students about her, and repeatedly asking her to go on dates.
See id. Ward also complained that Christian kissed her twice. See id. Ward complained to
her mother, Barbara McHugh, who also worked in the office. See id. McHugh
subsequently spoke with the Associate Director of CSOS about Christian's inappropriate
behavior. See id. The director discussed the allegations with Christian, who inquired
whether it was Ward or Cusimano who had made the complaints. See id,
175. See id at 372.
176. See id, at 369. Ward also alleged that the sexual harassment she suffered violated
Title VII. See id
177. See id. at 372-74. Specifically, the court considered whether the Fourth Circuit
standard regarding the analysis of a hostile environment sexual harassment claim was
consistent with the standard adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Harris v.
Forklift Systems, lnc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993). See Ward, 861 F. Supp. at 373-74. For a
description of the Harris standard, see supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text. The
Ward court ultimately concluded that the standard in the Fourth Circuit was consistent
with that adopted by the Supreme Court. See Ward, 861 F. Supp. at 373-74 (citing Paroline
v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100,104-05 (4th Cir. 1989)).
178. See Ward, 861 F. Supp. at 374-75.
179. See id. at 374. The court dismissed the defendant's reliance on Bougher v.
University of Pittsburgh, 713 F. Supp. 139 (W.D. Pa.), affd on other grounds, 882 F.2d 74
(3d Cir. 1989). See Ward, 864 F. Supp. at 374. The Ward court pointed out that while the
district court in Bougher had held that Title VII standards should not apply to Title IX
sexual harassment actions, the Third Circuit declined to adopt that portion of the lower
court's holding. See Ward, 861 F. Supp. at 374. In addition, the Ward court noted that the
Bougher decision could be distinguished from the case at bar because Bougher had
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the proposition that Title VII substantive law ought to apply to
sexual harassment claims under Title IX.' The court also pointed
out that the legislative history of Title IX supported the application
of the substantive law from Title VII .. and concluded that "[i]n light
of the cases discussed, the legislative history and the Supreme
Court's directive to give Title IX 'a sweep as broad as its language,'
the Court determines that Plaintiffs' Title IX claims are
appropriately analyzed under the standards applicable to cases
brought under Title VII."" After analyzing the plaintiffs' prima
facie cases under the relevant standard, the court found that both
Cusimano and Ward satisfied the standard and thus could survive
the defendant's motion for summary judgment."
The Ward court then turned to a discussion of the proper
standard for institutional liability." The court pointed out that in
order to find an employer liable under Title VII for the harassing
actions of one of its employees, the plaintiff must show that the
employer had actual or constructive knowledge of the hostile
environment and failed to take prompt and adequate action in
response to the situation.' The Ward court reasoned that in order
to satisfy the standard for institutional liability in the educational
context, the plaintiff must first show that the university knew or
should have known of the harassment.' The court ultimately
involved a student victim of sexual harassment, while Ward involved employee victims.
See id.
180. See Ward, 861 F. Supp. at 374 (discussing Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864
F.2d 881, 899-901 (1st Cir. 1988), and Mabry v. State Board of Education, 813 F.2d 311, 316
(10th Cir. 1987)).
181. See Ward, 861 F. Supp. at 375. The Court quoted the same relevant legislative
history cited by the Lipsett court. See supra note 163.
182. Ward, 861 F. Supp. at 375 (quoting North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512,
521 (1982)).
183. See id. at 375-77. In describing the standard to be applied to the plaintiffs' claims,
the Ward court summarized the controlling standard from Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879
F.2d 100,104-05 (4th Cir. 1989). See Ward, 861 F. Supp. at 375-77. In order to succeed on
a hostile environment claim, a plaintiff in the Fourth Circuit must establish the following
elements: "(1) that the conduct in question was unwelcome, (2) that the harassment was
based on sex, (3) that the harassment was sufficiently pervasive or severe to create an
abusive working environment, and (4) that some basis exists for imputing liability to the
employer." Id. at 375 (quoting Paroline, 879 F.2d at 104-05).
184. See Ward, 861 F. Supp. at 376-77.
185. See id. at 376 (citing Paroline, 879 F.2d at 106).
186. See id. The Ward court acknowledged that there was precedent in the Title IX
context for the idea that a university may be deemed to have constructive knowledge of
the harassment if any university official knew of the harassment, unless the official could
show that he or she took steps appropriate to halt the behavior. See id. (quoting Lipsett v.
University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 898-901 (1st Cir. 1988)).
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concluded that the university's actual or constructive knowledge of
the harassment and whether the university took appropriate action
in response to the complaints were genuinely disputed facts in the
case.17
(2) Direct Knowledge of or Paricipation in Hostile Environment
In Howard v. Board of Education of Sycamore Community
School District No. 427,'8 the District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois adopted a different standard for institutional liability than
that adopted by the Lipsett and Ward courts. Karol K. Howard was
chair of the music department and band director for Sycamore High
School.'" While employed by the school, Howard was the victim of
sexual harassment.'" Howard complained of the harassing behavior
to officials at the school, but in spite of her complaints, the harassing
behavior was never addressed by the school.1 9' Instead, the board of
education eventually forced Howard to resign from her position."
As a result of the school's inaction, Howard filed a complaint against
the school board for several violations of Title IX.'9
The Howard court never explicitly identified Howard's claim as
one alleging a hostile environment. However, because the complaint
did not allege that any condition of her employment was contingent
on her granting sexual favors, it seems as though her claim was one
of hostile environment sexual harassment. The bulk of the court's
opinion with respect to the Title IX sexual harassment claim
concerned the proper standard for determining whether the
institution should be liable for the harassment suffered by Howard.
19
According to the court, the determination of institutional liability
187. See id. at 377.
188. 876 F. Supp. 959 (N.D. M. 1995).
189. See id. at 964.
190. See id. Sexually offensive notes referring to Howard were posted. See iU. In
addition, Howard witnessed sexually offensive comments about female students made by a
male teacher as well as by male students. See id
191. Both Jeffrey Welcker, the principal of the high school, and Julie Wheeler, the
executive director of business at the high school, were informed of the harassing behavior.
See id Neither official made any effort to correct the hostile environment once they were
informed of the complaints. See id. In fact, Welcker told Howard that if she did not stop
complaining about the harassing behavior, "heads would roll." Id.
192. See id
193. See id Howard's complaint also included several allegations of violations of Title
VII. See id at 964-65. Howard's allegations under Title IX were against the Board. See
id. at 965. Her claims included sex discrimination, sexual harassment, and retaliatory
discharge. See id. This Comment discusses only the sexual harassment claim.
194. See id. at 973-75.
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consisted of one issue: "whether plaintiff need allege under Title IX
that the Board knew of, or participated in, the alleged acts of sexual
... harassment ... beyond merely alleging that Welcker, the high
school principal, was involved in and knew of the discriminatory
conduct."''
The Howard court began its analysis by rejecting the
proposition that agency principles, typically applied in sexual
harassment situations under Title VII, should apply to the
determination of institutional liability in Title IX cases."6  In
reaching this decision, the court relied primarily on Floyd v.
Waiters,'9' another district court case."8 At the same time, the court
dismissed as unpersuasive the holdings of one court of appeals and
several other district courts." The Howard court's reasoning for
why Title VII standards for institutional liability should not be
imported to consideration of the same issue under Title IX echoed
the reasoning of the Floyd court.' According to the Howard court,
Congress explicitly defined "employer" in Title VII as including any
"agent" of an employer."1 That language, the Howard court noted,
is conspicuously absent from Title IX. This court will not
read into Title IX language expressly included in Title VII,
but left out of Title IX. When Congress enacted Title IX, it
expressly revoked the former exclusion in Title VII that
prohibited Title VII claims from being brought against an
educational institution. Had Congress desired to expressly
incorporate the agency language of Title VII into Title IX,
it very easily could have done so then or since.z2
195. Id. at 974. The school board argued that in order to succeed, Howard must show
that the board harbored some intent to discriminate. See ida at 966. In addition, the board
argued that in order to satisfy that standard, Howard had to show that the board had actual
knowledge of the harassing conduct of its employees. See id. Finally, the school board
argued that they could not be vicariously liable for the actions of their employees unless
Howard could show that the school board knew of the actions. See iaL
196. See id. at 974.
197. 831 F. Supp. 867 (M.D. Ga. 1993). For a discussion regarding why the Howard
court's reliance on the Floyd decision is misplaced, see infra note 387 (describing how
Floyd can be fundamentally distinguished from the facts of Howard).
198. See Howard, 876 F. Supp. at 974.
199. See id. (dismissing the reasoning of the courts in iUpsett v. University of Puerto
Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 899-901 (1st Cir. 1988); Hastings v. Hancock, 842 F. Supp. 1315, 1318
(D. Kan. 1993); Patricia H. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1288, 1292 (N.D.
Cal. 1993)).
200. See id.
201. See id. (citing Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,72 (1986)).
202. Id.
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Thus, the Howard court concluded that agency principles do not
apply to the determination of institutional liability in hostile
environment sexual harassment claims in the educational context."°
Instead, according to the court, in order to hold an educational
institution liable for sexual harassment, a plaintiff must show that the
school had direct knowledge of or participated in the conduct of the
harassing employee."' As a result of its holding with respect to
institutional liability, the court dismissed Howard's Title IX claim
against the school board but gave her leave to amend the complaint
to fulfill the adopted standard.2" Finally, the court cautioned
Howard that Welcker's position as principal was not enough to
satisfy the pleading requirement of showing that the school board
had knowledge of or was directly involved in the harassing
behavior."6
(3) Lack ofActual or Constructive Knowledge and an Effective
Complaint Procedure in Place
A third standard for institutional liability was adopted by the
Federal District Court for the District of Columbia in Pinkney v.
Robinson.2" Ivy J. Pinkney was William J. Robinson's confidential
executive secretary from September 8, 1989, through November 26,
1991.2" Robinson was Dean of the District of Columbia School of
Law.2 During that time, Robinson sexually harassed Pinkney.1 °
The reason for Pinkney's termination on August 27, 1991, was in
dispute, and Pinkney subsequently filed a complaint with the EEOC
alleging that Robinson's actions violated Title VII.211 After receiving
a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, Pinkney filed a complaint in
203. See id.
204. See id. Again, the Howard court cited Floyd v. Waiters, 831 F. Supp. 867 (M.D.
Ga. 1993), as persuasive authority. See Howard, 876 F. Supp. at 974.
205. See Howard, 876 F. Supp. at 974 ("Thus, this court finds that absent allegations
that the Board knew of, or was directly involved in, any of the alleged discriminatory
conduct... [,] plaintiff cannot maintain a claim against the Board under Title IX.").
206. See ida at 974-75 n.10.
207. 913 F. Supp. 25 (D.D.C. 1996).
208. See id at 27.
209. See id.
210. See id. According to Pinkney, Robinson "engaged in a repeated and consistent
pattern of sexual harassment [that] included explicit remarks and innuendo, fondling his
sexual organs in Ms. Pinkney's presence, offensive and unwanted touching, and other
harassing and degrading acts." Id. (citations omitted).
211. See U Pinkney alleged that she was fired for refusing to submit to Robinson's
advances. See iU. According to Robinson, Pinkney was fired because of her poor
performance. See ad
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district court which included an allegation that the sexual harassment
violated Title IX2
The court began by noting that the central argument raised by
the defendant on the motion for summary judgment was that
Pinkney had failed to allege facts sufficient to support a finding of
institutional liability.2" The defendants argued that in order for
institutional liability to exist, a plaintiff must show that the school
had actual or constructive knowledge of the harassment.214  The
defendants pointed out that Pinkney did not dispute the fact that she
did not notify anyone at the school of Robinson's misconduct until
well after her departure.2  Pinkney, in response, argued that giving
notice to the educational institution was not necessary for a Title IX
action for sexual harassment, 16 and that the defendants should be
liable based on agency principles.
21 7
The Pinkney court began its analysis of the proper standard for
institutional liability under Title IX by considering whether the
substantive law from Title VII ought to apply by analogy. 218 The
court observed that the Supreme Court had never explicitly
212. See id. at 28. For the purposes of this Comment, only the Title IX claim will be
discussed. Because of Pinkney's allegation that she was terminated because of her refusal
to submit to Robinson's sexual advances, it would seem as though she had a viable claim of
quid pro quo harassment. See id. at 27. The court's opinion, however, contained only a
discussion of Pinkney's claim for hostile environment sexual harassment. See i& at 31-34.
213. See id at 31.
214. See id.
215. See id.
216. See id Pinkney relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), pointing out that the Supreme Court had rejected the premise
that an employer can escape liability by using its lack of notice of the harassment. See
Pinkney, 913 F. Supp. at 31 (citing Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72). In addition, Pinkney pointed
to Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988), in which the First
Circuit had held that
"an educational institution is liable upon a finding of hostile environment sexual
harassment perpetrated by its supervisors upon employees if an official
representing that institution knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care, should
have known of the harassment's occurrence, unless that official can show that he
or she took appropriate steps to stop it."
Pinkney, 913 F. Supp. at 31-32 (quoting Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 901).
217. See Pinkney, 913 F. Supp. at 32.
218. See i The court cited a number of cases that supported the contention that Title
VII substantive law should apply to the situation at bar. See id (citing Murray v. New
York College of Dentistry, 57 F.3d 243, 248 (2d Cir. 1995); Preston v. Commonwealth of
Virginia ex rel. New River Community College, 31 F.3d 203, 206 (4th Cir. 1994); Roberts
v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 832 (10th Cir. 1993); Lipsett, 864 F.2d at
896-98; Mabry v. State Bd. of Community Colleges & Occupational Educ., 813 F.2d 311,
316 (10th Cir. 1987); O'Conner v. Peru State College, 781 F.2d 632, 642 n.8 (8th Cir.
1986)).
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addressed the issue 9 and concluded:
Even though the Supreme Court has not expressly reached
the question whether the remedies under Title IX are
equivalent to those of Title VII, both the legislative history
underlying Title IX and the EEOC's employment
discrimination guidelines lead this Court to conclude that,
at least in the employment context, the same rules should
apply to determine liability."
The Pinkney court ultimately adopted the following standard for
determining institutional liability:
[Flor an employer to avoid liability for its supervisor's
sexual harassment creating a hostile work environment, an
employer must not only show that it lacked actual or
constructive knowledge of the harassment, but the
employer must demonstrate that it has an effective and
responsive system ("energetic measures") in place at the
time of the alleged harassment and that this system was one
of which the victim knew or should have known and which
he or she could have relied upon for a prompt and effective
remedy."
After applying the standard to the case at bar, the court
concluded that deciding the issue on a motion for summary judgment
was inappropriate.m  According to the court, the defendants'
evidence failed to establish several facts necessary to escape
institutional liability, including that they had taken energetic
measures to discourage the sexual harassment, that there was a
system in place that Pinkney could have utilized to redress the
behavior she experienced, or that Pinkney knew or should have
known of such a system.' Consequently, the court denied the
defendants' motion for summary judgment. '
219. See id.
220. Id. According to the court, the legislative history of Title IX supported the idea
that it was meant to be Title VII's analogue for discrimination in education. See id. at 32
(citing RR. REP. No. 92-554, at 51-52 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2462, 2512).
In addition, the court noted that both the Supreme Court and the Department of Justice
have emphasized that Title VII case law and EEOC guidelines are to be given great
weight in construing the law of Title IX. See hi (citing Mentor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57,66-72 (1986); 28 C.F.R. § 42.604 (1995)).
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b. Trends in Employee Perpetrator/Employee Victim Case Law
Little consistency exists among the courts that have addressed
the appropriate standard for institutional liability for hostile
environment sexual harassment under Title IX in the employment
context. Three different standards of institutional liability arose
from the single circuit court of appeals and the three district court
decisions. Arguably, the most difficult standard for a plaintiff to
meet was adopted by the district court in Howard v. Board of
Education of Sycamore Community School District No. 427.'
According to the Howard court, in order for a plaintiff to prove that
the school should be liable for hostile environment sexual
harassment, the plaintiff must show that the school had actual
knowledge of the harassment or directly participated in it. 6 The
most disturbing implication from the Howard court's standard of
liability stemmed from the court's apparent dismissal of the
relevance of the fact that school officials had been informed by the
plaintiff of the harassment.' The practical implication from the
Howard decision is that a school may effectively ignore the hostile
environment sexual harassment suffered by its employees and escape
liability. According to the standard applied by the Howard court,
even if the school has actual knowledge of the harassment, it will
escape liability so long as it refrains from "participating" in the
harassment.
On the other hand, the standard for institutional liability
adopted by the court in Pinkney v. Robinsonm is arguably the easiest
for a plaintiff to satisfy. It seems that under the Pinkney standard,
once a plaintiff successfully alleges that the actions of her supervisor
have created a prima facie case of hostile environment sexual
harassment under Title IX, the burden shifts to the school to
demonstrate why there should not be institutional liability.'
However, the Pinkney court did assert that the issue of institutional
liability under Title IX should be resolved through application of
agency principles." Therefore, the holding of Pinkney is
225. 876 F. Supp. 959 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
226. See i at 974.
227. See id. at 964.
228. 913 F. Supp. 25 (D.D.C. 1996).
229. See id. at 34. The court seemed to assert that if a school is to escape institutional
liability, it must show that it lacked both actual and constructive knowledge of the
harassment and that it had an effective system for addressing sexual harassment in place.
See id.
230. See id. at 33-35.
1997] 2083
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
presumably limited to hostile environment sexual harassment
perpetrated by a supervisor and experienced by an employee."1 The
specific standard for institutional liability for a hostile environment
created by a co-employee may differ. 2
Finally, the standard for institutional liability adopted by the
First Circuit in Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico 33 and by the
district court in Ward v. Johns Hopkins University' seems to take a
middle ground between the standards adopted by the Pinkney and
Howard courts. According to Lipsett and Ward courts, an
educational institution will be liable for hostile environment sexual
harassment under Title IX if a plaintiff can show that the school had
actual or constructive notice of the harassment and the school failed
to take appropriate action to remedy the harassment.s Upon close
examination, the standards adopted by the courts appear to differ
slightly. According to the Lipsett court, once a plaintiff establishes
the existence of the hostile environment and the school's actual or
constructive knowledge of the harassment, the burden shifts to the
school to show that appropriate steps were taken to remedy the
harassment. "6 In comparison, under the Ward standard, the plaintiff
must demonstrate the existence of the hostile environment, the
school's actual or constructive knowledge of the harassment, and
that the school failed to take appropriate steps to remedy the
environment. 7 Therefore, a plaintiff under the Ward standard faces
a slightly higher burden.
231. See id. at 33-34. The court emphasized that agency principles should not be
strictly applied to every situation involving sexual harassment, and noted that under the
relevant law for the District of Columbia Circuit, "where a supervisor wields his or her
power as a supervisor, power which arises from the existence of the agency relation,
employer liability is appropriate even if the employer lacked actual or constructive
knowledge of the harassment." Id. at 34 (discussing Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1397
(D.C. Cir. 1995), and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) (1958)).
232. It would arguably be more difficult to contend that a co-employee's harassing
actions should result in institutional liability through the application of agency principles.
It is unlikely that an employee is acting within the scope of employment when committing
the harassing acts. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1958).
Additionally, it may be difficult to argue that a co-employee was aided in the harassment
by apparent authority. See id § 219(2)(d).
233. 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988).
234. 861 F. Supp. 367 (D. Md. 1994).
235. See Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 901; Ward, 861 F. Supp. at 376.
236. See Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 901 ("[A]n educational institution is liable ... if an official
representing that institution knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care, should have
known, of the harassment's occurrence, unless that official can show that he or she took
appropriate steps to halt it." (emphasis added)).
237. See Ward, 861 F. Supp. at 376.
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One possible explanation for the lack of clarity in sexual
harassment law under Title IX may be directly related to the
confusion in the analogous area under Title VII. This section of this
Comment has pertained to standards of institutional liability adopted
by courts considering hostile environment sexual harassment in
education when the claims have occurred in the employment
context."8 The majority of the courts considering Title IX claims
turned to the analogous standards under Title VII for guidance. 9
The application of the law of Title VII to sexual harassment claims
brought by employees in the Title IX context is appropriate because
failing to apply the Title VII standards would essentially treat
plaintiff employees differently simply because they work in an
educational environment. The legislative history of Title IX
supports the idea that it was meant to give those in education the
same protection as provided by Title VII to those in employment
outside the educational context.20 Therefore, especially in the
educational employment context, the substantive law from Title VII
should be applied to sexual harassment claims brought by employees
under Title IX.
However, the decision to apply the substantive law of Title VII
to hostile environment sexual harassment claims brought under Title
IX does not offer a definitive answer to the appropriate standard for
institutional liability. The United States Supreme Court refused to
adopt a particular standard of employer liability in Meritor Savings
Bank v. Vinson.41 The Court's refusal to guide this area of the law
has resulted in a great deal of commentary in the legal community.2
238. See supra notes 155-224 and accompanying text.
239. See Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 897; Pinkney v. Robinson, 913 F. Supp. 25, 32 (D.D.C.
1996); Ward, 861 F. Supp. at 372-74. But see Howard v. Board of Educ. of Sycamore
Community Sch. Dist. No. 427, 876 F. Supp. 959, 974 (N.D. ll. 1995) (rejecting the
application of agency principles from Title VII to the determination of institutional
liability under Title IX).
240. See supra notes 163,181,220.
241. 477 U.S. 57, 69-72 (1986). For a discussion of this aspect of the Meritor decision,
see supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
242. See generally David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Exacerbating the Exasperating: Title
VII Liability of Employers for Sexual Harassment Committed by Their Supervisors, 81
CORNELL L. REv. 66 (1995) (exploring the problems that arise when agency law is applied
to hostile environment sexual harassment situations and the development of the law of
employer liability under Title VII); Ronald Turner, Title VII and Hostile Environment
Sexual Harassment: Mislabeling the Standard of Employer Liability, 71 U. DET. MERCY L
REv. 817 (1994) (discussing the confusion regarding the issue of employer liability under
Title VII and clarifying the appropriate standard to be applied in hostile environment
cases); Laura E. Fitz Randolph, Note, Title VII-Employer Liability for Sexual
Harassment, 64 GEO. WASH. . REv. 1168 (1996) (discussing the standard of employer
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Because of the lack of a definitive standard in this area of Title VII
jurisprudence, and subsequent cloudiness in the development of
Title IX law, a school district interested in ascertaining its potential
liability for hostile environment sexual harassment suffered by and
perpetrated by school employees should turn to the relevant Title
VII law in its Circuit.24 As this summary of cases has
demonstrated,' it is likely that some form of agency law will be
applied to the determination of institutional liability.
2. Employee Perpetrator/Student Victim
This Comment considers more sexual harassment cases in this
context than in the other categories. Many of the cases involve
either sexual relationships between teachers and students at the
secondary level' s or teacher/student sexual abuse at the elementary
level.2 " This section discusses these cases in the following manner:
first, the cases that have explicitly addressed the viability of hostile
environment sexual harassment claims are discussed;47 then cases
addressing the appropriate standard for imputing liability for the
employee's actions to the school are analyzed, according to the
standard adopted."8
a. Viability of the Claim
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California was the first federal court to address substantively the
viability of a hostile environment claim under Title IX in the
teacher/student context in Patricia H. v. Berkeley Unified School
liability for hostile environment sexual harassment adopted by the District of Columbia
Circuit); Glen Allen Staszewski, Note, Using Agency Principles for Guidance in Finding
Employer Liability for a Supervisor's Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment, 48
VAND. L REV. 1057 (1995) (advocating the application of agency principles to the
determination of hostile environment sexual harassment perpetrated by a supervisor in the
employment context).
243. For a review of the standard for employer liability adopted by each circuit court
for hostile environment sexual harassment perpetrated by supervisors, see Frederick J.
Lewis & Thomas L Henderson, Employer Liability for "Hostile Work Environment"
Sexual Harassment Created by Supervisors: The Search for an Appropriate Standard, 25 U.
MEM. L REV. 667, 687-726 (1995).
244. See supra notes 225-37 and accompanying text.
245. See, e.g., Nelson v. Almont Community Schs., 931 F. Supp. 1345, 1347-52 (E.D.
Mich. 1996) (concerning a sexual relationship between a seventeen-year-old student and
his English teacher).
246. See, e.g., Does v. Covington County Sch. Bd. of Educ., 930 F. Supp. 554, 560-65
(LD. Ala. 1996) (concerning sexual abuse of male third-graders by their teacher).
247. See infra notes 249-314 and accompanying text.
248. See infra notes 315-503 and accompanying text.
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District.9 Patricia H., the mother of Jackie H. and Rebecca H., was
involved in a romantic relationship with Charles Hamilton, who was
employed by her children's school district as a band teacher.250
During a trip taken by Patricia H. and Hamilton, Jackie H., age
twelve, was allegedly sexually molested by Hamilton.' Jackie H.'s
allegations were reported to the police and the superintendent of the
school district. 2 Rebecca H., age ten, also alleged that she had been
sexually molested by Hamilton. 3 Patricia H. alleged that Hamilton's
presence at the same school as her daughters created a hostile
educational environment?"' The primary issue considered by the
court was whether a cause of action for hostile environment sexual
harassment could be maintained under Title IX'
Because the issue before the court presented a novel question,
the court reasoned that other civil rights laws provided the most
appropriate precedent for guidance 6 and concluded that Title VII
principles should apply to the Title IX sexual harassment issue at
bar.' The court recognized, however, that other courts applying
Title VII law to sexual harassment under Title IX had split in regard
249. 830 F. Supp. 1288 (N.D. Cal. 1993). The analysis of the court in Patricia H.
actually went further than the determination of whether a hostile environment sexual
harassment claim was viable under Title IX, as the court adopted a standard for
institutional liability. See id. at 1297. The case, however, is included in this section of this
Comment regarding the viability of hostile environment sexual harassment claims because
of the detail with which the Patricia H. court treated the issue. If the decision had been
included in the section of this Comment concerning the categories of liability described in
the remaining subsections, it would have been included in the "negligence" section. See
infra notes 362-433 and accompanying text.
250. See Patricia H., 830 F. Supp. at 1293.
251. See id. at 1294. The court stated that Jackie H. told her mother that "while at
Lake Tahoe, Hamilton forced her to handle his genitals and made lewd and lascivious
remarks to her, and that in the second week of January 1988, when the family was back in
Berkeley, Hamilton climbed into bed with her while naked and rubbed against her." Id.
252. See id.
253. See id. at 1295.
254. See id. at 1296.
255. See id. at 1289.
256. See id. at 1289-93. The court noted that the law developed under Title VI had
been considered persuasive authority by at least one court because Title IX was patterned
after Title VI. See id. at 1290 (citing Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694
(1979)). The Patricia H. court noted, however, that because most case law regarding sex
discrimination has been developed under Title VII, most federal courts have concluded
that Title VII is the more appropriate law to use in construing sex discrimination claims
under Title IX. See i& (citing iUpsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 896 (1st
Cir. 1988); Mabry v. State Bd. of Community Colleges & Occupational Educ., 813 F.2d
311, 316 (10th Cir. 1987); Moire v. Temple Univ. Sch. of Med., 613 F. Supp. 1360, 1366-67
n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1985), aff'd mem., 800 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986)).
257. See id. at 1292.
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to the role and extent of the applicability of the Title VII law. 8 In
fact, one specific area of division had been whether a hostile
environment sexual harassment claim could be maintained under
Title IX.2s
In deciding the viability issue, the Patricia H. court ultimately
was persuaded by the Supreme Court's decision in Franklin v.
Gwinnett County Public Schools.26 The court noted that in Franklin,
neither the court of appeals nor the Supreme Court had identified
the claim at issue as either quid pro quo or hostile environment
sexual harassment;.1 however, the Supreme Court had
acknowledged that a student should have at least the same
protection in education as an employee has in his or her place of
employment.26 Thus, the court concluded that one could infer from
the Franklin decision that Title IX does permit a claim of hostile
environment sexual harassment and adopted that conclusion as its
holding."'
The Patricia H. court analyzed the hostile environment claim
through the application of the relevant Title VII law from its
jurisdiction.2 64 The court also recognized that "the age of the
victim(s), the frequency, duration, repetition, location, severity, and
scope of the acts of harassment; [and] the nature of context of the
incidents" should be considered in evaluating whether a hostile
258. See id. at 1290-93.
259. See id. at 1291. The court noted that the First Circuit had recognized that a hostile
environment claim was a viable cause of action under Title IX. See i. (citing Lipsett, 864
F.2d at 898-901). The court also pointed out that the only court which had held that a
hostile environment claim could not be maintained under Title IX was the district court in
Bougher v. University of Pisburgh, 713 F. Supp. 139, 145 (W.D. Pa. 1989), aff'd on other
grounds, 882 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1989). The Third Circuit, however, in reviewing the decision,
decided the case on a statute of limitations issue and refused to adopt the holding of the
lower court with respect to the hostile environment claim. See Patricia H., 830 F. Supp. at
1291 (citing Bougher v. University of Pittsburgh, 882 F.2d 74, 77 (3d Cir. 1989)).
260. See Patricia H., 830 F. Supp. at 1291-92 (citing Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub.
Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992)).
261. See id. at 1292.
262. See id.
263. See id. at 1293. The court noted that because Franklin did not involve a situation
in which an educational benefit was made conditional on the granting of sexual favors, the
facts in Franklin created a hostile environment claim. See id. at 1292.
264. See i. at 1296-97 (citing Mllison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878-81 (9th Cir. 1991)).
In Ellison, the Ninth Circuit recognized that the mere presence of an employee who had
engaged in harassing conduct might create an actionable hostile work environment. See
Ellison, 924 F.2d at 883. The Ellison case was also the first federal case to hold that the
severity of the harassing conduct should be considered from the perspective of a
reasonable victim-in that case, a reasonable woman. See id. at 880.
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environment existed.2' Adopting a "reasonable victim" standard for
the purpose of determining whether a hostile environment existed,2 '
the court held that it was unable to determine, as a matter of law,
whether such an environment existed in the present case.267
Finally, the Patricia H. court did, very briefly, address the
standard for institutional liability for the hostile environment. 2 8 The
court stated that the school district could be found liable if it "failed
265. Patricia H., 830 F. Supp. at 1296.
266. See id. ("Like the Ninth Circuit and the [Office of Civil Rights], this Court adopts
the perspective of a 'reasonable victim' to determine whether, as a matter of law, plaintiffs
have stated a claim under Title IX."). In Ellison, the Ninth Circuit supported its decision
to adopt the reasonable victim standard by reasoning: "If we only examined whether a
reasonable person would engage in allegedly harassing conduct, we would run the risk of
reinforcing the prevailing level of discrimination. Harassers could continue to harass
merely because a particular discriminatory practice was common, and victims of
harassment would have no remedy." Ellison, 924 F.2d at 878. In addition, the Ellison
court pointed out that a sex-blind "reasonable person" standard tended to be male-biased
and ignored the experience of women. See id. at 879. A number of other circuit courts
have followed the Ninth Circuit in adopting a reasonable victim standard for hostile
environment sexual harassment causes of action. See, e.g., King v. Frazier, 77 F.3d 1361,
1363 (Fed. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 62 (1996); Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d
1522, 1527 (9th Cir. 1995); Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., 989 F.2d 959, 964 (8th Cir.
1993); Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482-83 (3d Cir. 1990). The
adoption of the "reasonable woman" standard for the consideration of hostile environment
claims has been controversial and has fostered a great deal of debate in the legal
community. See generally Edward Cerasia, II, Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.: An
Objective Standar4 but Whose Perspective?, 10 LAB. LAW. 253, 262-64 (1994) (discussing
the Harris Court's use of the reasonable person standard and questioning whether lower
courts will interpret it as rejecting or accepting a reasonable woman standard); Gillian K.
Hadfield, Rational Womemn A Test for Sex-Based Harassment, 83 CAL. L REv. 1151,
1175-89 (1995) (presenting a "rational woman test" that relies upon an economic analysis
of what factors distort women's employment choices unequally); Sharon J. Bittner, Note,
The Reasonable Woman Standard After Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.: The Debate Rages
On, 16 WoMEN's RTs. L. REP. 127, 135-37 (1994) (arguing that the reasonable woman
standard should not be adopted); Deborah B. Goldberg, Note, The Road to Equality: The
Application of the Reasonable Woman Standard in Sexual Harassment Cases, 2 CARD ozo
WOMEN'S L.J. 195, 200-13 (1995) (discussing the reasonable woman standard, its future,
and its merits); Kathryn R. McKinley, Comment, Changing Our Perspective: Should
Washington Adopt the Reasonable Victim Standard of Viewing Hostile Environment
Claims?, 30 GONZ. L. REV. 315, 331-41 (1994-95) (discussing the reasonable victim
standard and advocating its adoption in Washington).
267. See Patricia H., 803 F. Supp. at 1297. ("The question, whether a reasonable
female student of Jackie H's age, having experienced the harassment she alleges, would
find Hamilton's mere presence at BHS created a hostile environment, is one for the
jury."). The court added that summary judgment was not sought with respect to Rebecca
H.'s claim and therefore was not addressed by the court. See id. at 1297 n.15.
268. See id. at 1297. The court noted that "P]iability of the BUSD defendants is
conditioned on both a finding of hostile environment and their knowing failure to act." Id.
(emphasis added).
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to take reasonable steps to aid Jackie H. and Rebecca H.,, 269 but did
not specify whether liability for the school's failure to act was
conditional on the school's constructive or actual knowledge of the
harassment."0 The court noted that under the relevant law from
Title VII, an employer could be liable for a hostile environment "if it
fails to take 'immediate and appropriate' action 'reasonably
calculated' to remedy the harm complained of."' ' The Patricia H.
court held that the question of institutional liability-i.e., whether
the school had reacted appropriately to Patricia H.'s complaints-
should be resolved by ajury. 2
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois was the next court to consider the viability of a hostile
environment sexual harassment claim in Bustos v. Illinois Institute of
CosmetologyY3 Joann Bustos, Kimberly Listowski, and Claudia
Whelen were students at the Illinois Institute of Cosmetology when
Charles Cross, the president and principal owner, allegedly subjected
them to a hostile educational environment. 4 The court held that
Title VII principles should be used to analyze the plaintiff's hostile
environment claim under Title IX.7 Applying the Title VII
standard from Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 6 the court concluded
that there were questions of material fact with regard to whether a
hostile environment had been created by Cross's conduct.'m
Although the court recognized the viability of a hostile environment
claim under Title IX, it did not reach the issue of institutional
liability.271
A year later, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania implicitly recognized the viability of hostile
environment sexual harassment under Title IX when it allowed the
269. Id.
270. See iL
271. Id. (quoting Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872,881 (9th Cir. 1991)).
272. See id.
273. No. 93-5980C, 1994 WL710830 (N.D. ill. Dec. 15,1994).
274. See id. at *1.
275. See id. at *2 (citing Patricia H., 830 F. Supp. at 1290).
276. 510 U.S. 17,21-22 (1993).
277. See Bustos, 1994 WL 710830, at *2-*3 (discussing application of factors from
Harris, 510 U.S. at 23, to the facts of the present case). For a description of the Harris
standard, see supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text. According to the Bustos court,
"[t]he number and variety of the allegations, coupled with defendants' assertion that the
conduct in question was innocuous, incidental and at worst flirtatious, indicate that there
are questions of material fact which are in dispute." Bustos, 1994 WL 710830, at *3.
278. See Bustos, 1994 WL 710830, at *3.
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plaintiff to amend his complaint to include a claim against the school
under Title IX for the sexual abuse he suffered at the hands of his
teacher in Doe v. Methacton School District.' The court cited
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools70 in support of the
proposition that the plaintiff must prove discriminatory intent in
order to obtain damages under Title IX. In addition, the court
reasoned that "the Supreme Court appears to impose liability on the
school district under agency principles for intentional sex
discrimination by its agent, the teacher, who was not even a party to
the action." m In allowing the amended complaint, the court stated
that the facts at bar supported a viable cause of action against the
school district.'s
The First Circuit was the first court of appeals to endorse the
viability of a hostile environment sexual harassment claim in the
Title IX context for a hostile environment created by an employee of
the school in Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Productions, Inc.' In
Brown, two fifteen-year-old students, Jason P. Metsiti and Shannon
Silva, filed suit under Title IX alleging that a hostile environment
had been created through the school's sponsorship of an assembly
consisting of an AIDS awareness program.' Jason and Shannon
alleged that the assembly contained sexually explicit monologues and
involved minors in sexually explicit skits. 2 The plaintiffs also
alleged that in the weeks following the assembly, many students
279. No. 94-0244,1995 WL 549089 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 12,1995).
280. 504 U.S. 60,74-75 (1992).
281. See Methacton Sch. Dist., 1995 WL 549089, at *2.
282. Id. at *1.
283. See id.
284. 68 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1044 (1996).
285. See i. at 529.
286. See i. The complaint specified that the woman running the assembly:
1) told the students that they were going to have a "group sexual experience, with
audience participation"; 2) used profane, lewd, and lascivious language to
describe body parts and excretory functions; 3) advocated and approved oral sex,
masturbation, homosexual activity, and condom use during promiscuous
premarital sex; 4) simulated masturbation; 5) characterized the loose pants worn
by one minor as "erection wear"; 6) referred to being in "deep sh-" after anal
sex; 7) had a male minor lick an oversized condom with her, after which she had a
female minor pull it over the male minor's entire head and blow it up; 8)
encouraged a male minor to display his "orgasm face" with her for the camera; 9)
informed a male minor that he was not having enough orgasms; 10) closely
inspected a minor and told him he had a "nice butt"; and 11) made eighteen
references to orgasms, six references to male genitals, and eight references to
female genitals.
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mimicked some of the assembly's sexually explicit routines, which
exacerbated the harassment suffered by the plaintiffs.' Jason and
Shannon alleged that the school-sponsored assembly created a
sexually hostile educational environment for which the school district
should be liable.2
The Brown court began its analysis by stating, without offering
its reasoning, that the substantive law from Title VII should apply to
the analysis of the plaintiffs' sexual harassment claims under Title
IX'2 The court summarized the elements required to establish a
prima facie case of hostile environment sexual harassment 0 and
recognized that the standard set out by the Supreme Court in Harris
v. Forklift Systems, Inc. should apply to the facts of the case at bar."
After applying that standard, the court concluded that the facts
alleged were weak with respect to, every one of the Harris factors.
As a result of its findings, the court held that the plaintiffs' claims for
violations of Title IX should fail and affirmed the district court's
motion to dismiss.' Because the Brown court held that the plaintiffs
failed to establish the existence of a hostile environment, it never
reached the issue of the appropriate standard for institutional
287. See id.
288. See id. at 539-40.
289. See id. at 540 (citing Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 73-75
(1992); Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 899 (1st Cir. 1988)).
290. According to the Brown court, the establishment of a hostile environment sexual
harassment claim under Title IX required that the plaintiff show:
(i) that he/she is a member of a protected class; (ii) that he/she was subject to
unwelcome sexual harassment; (iii) that the harassment was based on sex; (iv)
that the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the
conditions of plaintiff's education and create an abusive educational
environment; and (v) that some basis for employer liability has been established.
Id.
291. See ad Specifically, the court summarized the factors to be considered in
measuring whether an environment is "hostile," discussed the level of harm that must be
suffered by the plaintiff, and stated that the factors must be viewed both objectively and
subjectively. See id. For a description of these aspects of the Harris standard, see supra
notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
292. See Brown, 68 F.3d at 540. First, the court noted that the offensive behavior
occurred only once. See iU. at 540-41. The court stated that a one-time episode was not
necessarily per se insufficient in sustaining a hostile environment claim, but the frequency
of the behavior was one factor affecting the determination of whether the offensive action
was severe or pervasive. See id. at 541 n.3. Second, the court determined that the actions
which took place during the assembly were not objectively severe enough to create a
hostile environment. See id at 541. Third, the court pointed out that the actions during
the assembly were not threatening or humiliating. See id. Finally, the court concluded that
the assembly did not sufficiently alter the plaintiffs' educational environment. See id.
293. See id. at 529, 541.
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liability.
In S.B.L. v. Evans, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit considered the appropriate standard of institutional
liability for the sexual abuse a student suffered at the hands of a
teacher.' While James Evans was a teacher of a combined fifth and
sixth-grade class, he was convicted of sexually assaulting S.B.L. and
B.D.C., two students in his class?296 S.B.L. and B.D.C. subsequently
filed a lawsuit in federal district court against the school district
alleging that the school had violated Title IX'9 The Eighth Circuit
heard the case for the narrow purpose of setting the appropriate
standard of liability for such situations."
The S.B.L. court ultimately avoided resolving the issue. After
noting that institutional liability under Title IX was clearly an issue
upon which judicial opinions have differed wildly,' and that the
parties had presented four different legal theories upon which
institutional liability under Title IX may be premised, ° the court
concluded that the factual issues of the case had not been adequately
developed to permit the determination of the appropriate standard
of liability.'O As a result, the Eighth Circuit's decision in S.B.L.
stands for little more than the fact that these claims are viable in the
Title IX context."
The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Alabama is the most recent federal court to recognize explicitly the
viability of hostile environment sexual harassment claims under Title
IX in Does v. Covington County School Board of Education.3  The
district court did not, however, adopt a definitive standard of
institutional liability for hostile environment sexual harassment
294. 80 F.3d 307 (8th Cir. 1996).
295. See iUL at 308-11.
296. See id. at 308.
297. See iU.
298. The district court noted that the Eighth Circuit had never addressed the issue of
institutional liability under Title IX. See iU at 309. In addition, the district court
recognized that lower courts were split with regard to the proper standard for such
situations. See iU As a result, the district court certified the question of institutional
liability under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1994), which permits a higher court to address a
specific issue when it involves "'controlling question[s] of law as to which there [are]
substantial ground[s] for difference of opinion."' S.B.L., 80 F.3d at 309, 311 (quoting 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b)).
299. See S.B.L., 80 F.3d at 311.
300. See id.
301. See U4
302. See id (declining to state the standard for institutional liability in abstract terms).
303. 930 F. Supp. 554 (MUD. Ala. 1996).
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claims under Title X. The plaintiffs, male students of Michael
Smith, a male third-grade teacher, alleged that they had been
sexually abused by the teacher for periods of one year or more."
The plaintiffs also alleged that the school district knew or should
have known of Mr. Smith's propensity to engage in such behavior."
Finally, the plaintiffs alleged that the school failed to investigate
complaints filed by the students or to provide counseling to the
students who had been victimized."' The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit
alleging that the school had violated Title IX"
As a preliminary matter, the court recognized that sexual
harassment qualified as prohibited sexual discrimination in violation
of Title IX and characterized the claim brought by the plaintiffs as
a hostile environment claim."° The court used the test set out by the
Eleventh Circuit in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education31 to
analyze the plaintiff's claims. 11  Summarizing the prima facie
elements of a hostile environment claim,312 the court concluded that
the plaintiffs could not satisfy the standard without alleging specific
304. See id. at 560-61. The plaintiffs alleged that the acts of abuse took place in the
classroom, on school outings, in school buses, and in the teacher's home. See id. at 561.
305. See id. The stepmother of at least one of the children stated in her deposition that
she personally went to the principal and voiced her concerns that her stepson was being
sexually abused by Smith. See id. In addition, one of the members of the Board of
Trustees of the elementary school voiced his concerns to the principal that Smith exhibited
inappropriate behavior toward the boys in his classroom. See id. at 563.
306. See id. at 564.
307. See id. at 560.
308. See id. at 567-68. The court cited Davis v. Monroe County Board of Educatlion, 74
F.3d 1186, 1193 (11th Cir. 1996), in support of its conclusion that sexual harassment was
actionable under Title IX. See Covington County Sch. Bd. of Educ., 930 F. Supp. at 567.
The court acknowledged that the facts in Davis were different than those in the present
case because Davis involved peer sexual harassment. See id. The court reasoned,
however, that "the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning applies equally, or with even greater
force, when the harasser is a teacher." Id. at 567.
309. See Covington County Sch. Bd. of Educ., 930 F. Supp. at 568.
310. 74 F.3d 1186 (lth Cir. 1996). For a discussion of the Eleventh Circuit's decision
in Davis, see infra notes 652-76 and accompanying text.
311. See Covington County Sch. Bd. of Educ., 930 F. Supp. at 568-70 (discussing the
standard adopted by the Eleventh Circuit in Davis, 74 F.3d at 1190).
312. The court found that in order to maintain a claim for hostile environment sexual
harassment, a plaintiff must establish:
"(1) that [he] is a member of a protected group; (2) that [he] was subject to
unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) that the harassment was based on sex; (4) that
the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the conditions
of [his] education and create an abusive educational environment; and (5) that
some basis for institutional liability has been established."
Id. at 568 (quoting Davis, 74 F.3d at 1194).
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acts of abuse."
Notwithstanding its finding that the plaintiffs failed to establish
a prima facie case of sexual harassment, the Covington County court
stated that in order for the school to be liable for the teacher's
conduct, the plaintiffs must provide evidence that either the
superintendent of the school or individual board members had
notice, either actual or constructive, that the harassment was
occurring. 4 Other courts have recognized the viability of a Title IX
cause of action in this context and have developed a number of
standards for considering those claims.
b. Standards of Liability
(1) Strict Liability
In Bolon v. Rolla Public Schools,3  the court adopted strict
liability as the appropriate standard for institutional liability for
situations involving a sexual relationship between a teacher and a
student.316 The plaintiff was a sixteen-year-old student in Daniel
Heitert's class when the two began a sexual relationship.17 The
relationship continued for approximately five months until the
plaintiff's parents discovered the relationship and informed school
officials."
The court acknowledged that the standard for imputed liability
313. See id. at 568-69. Specifically, the court found that the plaintiffs failed to meet the
second, third, and fourth elements of hostile environment sexual harassment. The court,
however, granted the plaintiffs leave to amend the complaint to meet the standard adopted
by the court. See id. at 569.
314. See id. at 570. The court directed the plaintiffs to submit a brief regarding whether
a constructive notice standard was appropriate for situations involving the sexual abuse of
students by a teacher. See id. In addition, the court pointed out that one possible theory of
constructive notice might result from the pervasiveness of the abusive acts themselves.
See i The court noted that in at least one Eleventh Circuit decision, pervasive
harassment gave rise to an inference of constructive knowledge. See id. (citing Henson v.
City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 905 (11th Cir. 1982)).
315. 917 F. Supp. 1423 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
316. See id. at 1427-29. The United States District Court for the Western District of
Texas was actually the first court to adopt a standard of strict liability for the
determination of institutional liability for situations involving teacher-student sexual
abuse, but the Fifth Circuit overruled the case and the strict liability standard. See Leija v.
Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist., 887 F. Supp. 947, 954-55 (W.D. Tex. 1995), rev'd, 101 F.3d 393,
400 (5th Cir. 1996). For a discussion of the standard adopted by the Fifth Circuit, see infra
notes 444-88 and accompanying text.
317. See Bolon, 917 F. Supp. at 1427. After the relationship began, Heitert informed
the plaintiff that she need not "worry about her grade in his class." Id.
318. See id.
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under Title IX for situations like the one in Bolon was not clear."9
After summarizing and categorizing the different standards adopted
by other courts,' 20 the court turned to the Supreme Court decision in
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools321 for guidance and
concluded that the proper standard for institutional liability under
Title IX was one in which
intentional discrimination by teachers is imputed to the
school district under the principles of respondeat superior,
regardless of whether the intentional discrimination is the
creation of a hostile environment, the demand for sexual
favors, the removal of females from the classroom, or any
other intentional discrimination based on sex in violation of
Title IX?"
The court clarified the above standard by describing it as one of strict
liability" and offered numerous public policies that supported the
adoption of such a standard.' Having stated the standard, the court
denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment, reasoning
that there were material issues of fact in dispute.3
(2) Agency Principles or Negligence
In Saville v. Houston County Healthcare Authority,'2' the district
court held that institutional liability could be determined through the
application of agency principles or by showing that the school had
319. See id.
320. See icL The court stated that the different approaches for the determination of
institutional liability have included:
(1) the agency principles contained in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 219(2)(b) (1958) (essentially a negligence or recklessness standard); (2)
knowledge or direct involvement by the school district; (3) the Title VII
standards of employer liability in sexual harassment cases (i.e., "knew or should
have known" for hostile environment and strict liability for quid pro quo
harassment); and (4) strict liability.
Id. (citations omitted).
321. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
322. Bolon, 917 F. Supp. at 1427-28.
323. See iU at 1428.
324. See id. at 1428-29. First, the court noted that the Supreme Court had held that
Title IX was to be given" 'a sweep as broad as its language."' Id. at 1428 (quoting North
Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512,521 (1982)). Second, the court emphasized that
children's mandatory school attendance supports the notion that schools have a high duty
to protect the interests of children. See id Finally, the court concluded that any standard
other than strict liability would frustrate the purpose of Title IX. See id. at 1429.
325. See id. at 1429.
326. 852 F. Supp. 1512 (M.D. Ala. 1994). For a discussion of the facts of Saville, see
supra notes 107-15 and accompanying text.
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knowledge of the harassment and failed to react appropriately 32
The Saville court first concluded that Title VII substantive standards
should apply to the Title IX sexual harassment claims3" and then
analyzed the plaintiff's claim using the relevant Title VII law from
the Eleventh Circuit." In addition, the court incorporated the
standard for the consideration of the severity of the environment
adopted by the Supreme Court in Harris.33 After applying the
relevant standard, the court concluded that the evidence presented
by Saville established a prima facie case of hostile environment
sexual harassment.3 '
In keeping with its reasoning that Title VII principles ought to
apply to the consideration of Title IX sexual harassment, the Saville
court initially applied agency principles to the determination of
institutional liability.332 The court noted that while the institution
was not "automatically liable" for the harassment perpetrated by one
of its employees,' 3 it may be held directly liable for the harassing
actions of one of its agents. 34  The court concluded that the
institution could be liable for the harassment if Saville established
that Shanks, her supervisor, was an agent of the institution.3' The
327. See Saville, 852 F. Supp at 1527-28. Saville also brought a quid pro quo sexual
harassment claim. See id. at 1528. For a discussion of the court's analysis of the quid pro
quo claim, see supra notes 116-23 and accompanying text. Saville filed claims under both
Title VII and Title IX. See Saville, 852 F. Supp. at 1519.
328. See Saville, 852 F. Supp. at 1521. The court offered little detail as to the basis for
its conclusion and merely pointed out that the defendants argued that Title VII should
apply and that Saville did not dispute the argument. See id.
329. See d. at 1526. The court stated that in order for a plaintiff to establish a prima
facie case of hostile environment sexual harassment, the plaintiff must prove:
(1) that the employee belongs to a protected group; (2) that the employee was
subject to "unwelcome" sexual harassment; (3) that the harassment complained
of was based on sex; and (4) that the harassment complained of affected a "term,
condition, or privilege" of employment in that it was sufficiently severe or
pervasive "to alter the conditions of the [victim's] employment and create an
abusive working environment."
Id. (quoting Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1554, 1557 (11th Cir. 1987)).
330. See d. at 1526 (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)). The
court summarized the Harris standard, noting that in order to determine whether a hostile
environment has been created, all the circumstances of the situation must be considered.
See d. For a description of the Harris standard, see supra notes 35-38 and accompanying
text.
331. See Saville, 852 F. Supp. at 1526.
332. See d. at 1527-28.
333. Id. at 1527 (citing Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,72 (1986)).
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court specified that in order to successfully argue that Shanks was an
agent of the school, Saville needed only to establish that Shanks was
aided in the harassment by the existence of an agency relationship
with the institution.3 6 The court concluded that whether Shanks was
an agent of the institution was a question to be resolved by the
factfinder 3 7
In addition to the possibility that institutional liability might
flow from agency principles, the Saville court noted another possible
avenue of institutional liability: the institution may be indirectly
liable for Shanks's actions.33 That is, once the institution had notice
of the harassment, the school could be liable for failing to take
prompt, remedial, effective action to remedy the situation."3 The
court noted that whether the institution could be found liable under
an indirect liability standard should be determined by the
factfinder. °  With these determinations, the court denied the
defendant's motion for summary judgment."'
(3) Agency Principles Only
The first federal court to limit its discussion of institutional
liability under Title IX for hostile environment sexual harassment to
agency principles was the district court in Hastings v. Hancock. 2 In
addition to the quid pro quo claim discussed in the previous
section,'3 Hastings brought a claim for hostile environment sexual
harassment? First, the Hastings court determined that Title VII
ought to guide the court in considering the school's potential
liability 5 and concluded that agency principles ought to be utilized
336. See iL
337. See adL
338. See ad. at 1528.
339. See id. According to the court, if the institutional defendants failed to redress
effectively the harassment situation of which they had knowledge, they could be found to
be "indirectly" liable for Shanks's action. See i
340. See id.
341. See id
342. 842 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Kan. 1993). For a discussion of the facts of Hastings, see
supra note 99 and accompanying text.
343. See supra notes 97-106 and accompanying text.
344. See Hastings, 842 F. Supp. at 1318-19.
345. See iL at 1318. The court noted that the Tenth Circuit had held in another case
that the law from Title VII ought to apply by analogy to the consideration of sex
discrimination claims brought under Title IX. See id at 1318 (citing Mabry v. State Bd. of
Community Colleges & Occupational _duc., 813 F.2d 311, 317 (10th Cir. 1987)).
However, the Hastings court did not find the Tenth Circuit ruling on Mabry definitive on
the issue because Mabry could be distinguished because it involved employment-related
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to analyze the institution's liability for an employee's actions that
created the hostile environment.6 The primary issue addressed by
the Hastings court was whether the harasser had been aided by an
agency relationship with the school4m7  The court noted that
according to the law of the Tenth Circuit, the mere existence of
employment is not a sufficient reason to impute liability for the
employee's conduct to the institution.' In the present case,
however, the court concluded that it was likely that Hancock's
relationship with the school would satisfy one of the agency theories
of liability 49
The Hastings court also recognized, under the applicable agency
law, an additional theory of institutional liability through which the
plaintiff might pursue the school."5 Specifically, the court noted that
in many Title VII cases courts have held the employer directly liable
for the harassing actions of a supervisor who has direct authority
over the victim of the harassment.35' According to the Hastings
court, the theory of direct liability is "an alternative interpretation of
the agency rules set forth in Restatement (Second) of Agency
§ 219(2)(d)." 2 When a theory of direct liability is applicable, that is,
discrimination. See id. at 1318. After reviewing cases from two other federal district
courts that had considered the issue, the Hastings court concluded that Title VII should
apply to the case at bar. See id. (citing Floyd v. Waiters, 831 F. Supp. 867, 876 (M.D. Ga.
1993); Patricia H. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1288, 1291 (N.D. Cal.
1993)).
346. See id The court summarized the relevant provisions of the RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF AGENcY § 219 (1958), which provided three different bases for employer
liability under the Title VII law in the Tenth Circuit. See Hastings, 842 F. Supp at 1318-19
(citing Hirschfeld v. New Mexico Corrections Dep't., 916 F.2d 572, 576 (10th Cir. 1990);
Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1417-18 (10th Cir. 1987)). According to the
Hastings court, the three potential bases of employer liability were: "(1) Section 219(1)
Acting within the scope of employment; (2) Section 219(2)(b) Employer Negligence or
Recklessness; and (3) § 219(2)(d) Authority or Agency Relationship Aiding Harasser."
Id. at 1319.
347. See Hastings, 842 F. Supp. at 1319. The plaintiff contended that the harasser was
aided in accomplishing the harassment through his position of authority at the school. See
id.
348. See id. at 1319-20. The court stated that "it would be too broad a reading of
section 219(2)(d) for a court to hold that an employee was aided in accomplishing the tort
in that he would not have been there but for his job." Id.
349. See id. at 1320. According to the court, "[t]he cosmetology licenses in the
Morrisons' name enabled Hancock to operate the school. At the very least, there is a
genuine issue of material fact as to the extent Hancock was aided in accomplishing the
harassment of plaintiff by his relationship with the school and the Morrisons." Id.
350. See id
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when the perpetrator of the harassment is in a "supervisor" position
at the institution, the institution cannot defend itself from liability
with the claim that it lacked notice of the harassment.53 The court
concluded that a theory of direct liability also provided the plaintiff
with a viable argument for institutional liability.
3-
The Sixth Circuit adopted a similar standard of liability for
teacher-student sexual abuse in Doe v. Claiborne County,
Tennessee.55 Jane Doe, a fourteen-year-old high school student,
entered into a sexual relationship with Jeffrey Davis, a physical
education teacher and baseball coach at a middle school.56  Doe
subsequently sued the county and the school board, alleging that the
school had violated Title IX "on the grounds that Davis was an agent
of the School Board and his conduct created a hostile environment
for Doe."3
The Sixth Circuit preceded its discussion of the proper standard
for institutional liability under Title IX with the observation that
many courts have used Title VII standards in resolving sexual
harassment claims brought under Title IX."s In addition, according
to the Claiborne County court, the practice of applying Title VII
principles to Title IX sexual harassment claims was implicitly
approved by the United States Supreme Court in Franklin.9
Finally, according to the Sixth Circuit, both Title IX's legislative
history and statements by the OCR supported the use of agency
353. See id.
354. See id. According to the court, "Hancock had complete authority over the school
and its students, presumably including authority over graduation, student financial aid, and
grades. Therefore, this alternative 'delegation of authority' interpretation of section
219(d)(2) could also provide a basis for liability on the part of the school, and the
Morrisons as its owners." Id.
355. 103 F.3d 495 (6th Cir. 1996).
356. See id. at 500. As scorekeeper for the boys' baseball team during the spring of
1991, Doe traveled with the team for games. See id. at 501. It was during the bus trips that
Davis began "systematically abusing and harassing Doe." Id. In the fall of 1992, Davis
invited Doe to be the scorekeeper for the boys' basketball team. See id. Davis also began
to call Doe repeatedly at home, and continued to sexually abuse her on the bus on the way
to basketball games. See id. In the spring of 1992, Davis took Doe to a friend's trailer and
had sex with her. See id. Davis's sexual abuse of Doe ended "when two of her aunts
discovered her in Davis's home while his wife was away at the hospital giving birth to their
child." Id.
357. Id. at 503.
358. See ia at 514 (citing Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186 (11th Cir.
1996); Murray v. New York Univ. College of Dentistry, 57 F.3d 243 (2d Cir. 1995); Preston
v. Virginia ex rel. New River Community College, 31 F.3d 203 (4th Cir. 1994); Lipsett v.
University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988)).
359. See i (citing Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1993)).
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principles for the determination of institutional liability under Title
IX.6 The court concluded that "[t]here is ample authority to
support our conclusion that Title VII agency principles apply to
resolve discrimination claims brought under Title IX."61
(4) Negligence
In Deborah 0. v. Lake Central School Corp.,.62 the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit became the first federal court to
adopt a negligence standard to impute liability to a school for a
student's experience of hostile environment sexual harassment
perpetrated by an employee of the school." Deborah 0. was a
seventeen-year-old student and band member at her high school
when she had a sexual encounter with the band director, Matthew
Barmore 6" The parties offered different interpretations as to their
sexual relationship. As a result of the relationship, Deborah 0.
filed suit against the school for sexual harassment under Title Dc. 66
As a preliminary matter, the court noted that in order to
maintain her claim under Title IX, Deborah 0. had to show that the
educational institution intentionally discriminated against her on the
basis of her sex 67 Without offering its reasoning, the Deborah 0.
court seemed to apply a negligence standard to the issue of
institutional liability under Title IX.? Further, the court reasoned
that such a standard could be met only if Deborah 0. could show
that the school "knew or should have known about the harassment
and yet failed to take appropriate remedial action. ,369 After
reviewing the facts of the case, the court found that no basis existed
for concluding that the school knew or should have known of the
360. See id.
361. Id.
362. 61 F.3d 905 (Table) (text of opinion available in No. 94-3804, 1995 WL 431414
(7th Cir. July 21, 1995)).
363. See id. at *2.
364. See id. at *1.
365. See id Barmore contended that the relationship was consensual. Deborah 0.
claimed that Barmore "stalked, sexually harassed, and raped" her. Id.
366. See id
367. See iU at *3 (citing Cannon v. University of Chicago, 648 F.2d 1104, 1109 (7th Cir.
1981)).
368. See hi (discussing and relying on Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72
(1986), for the proposition that "employers are not automatically liable for the sexual
harassment of their employees").
369. Id. (citing Saxton v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 10 F.3d 526,535 (7th Cir. 1993)).
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harassment in time to take appropriate remedial action.3 70
In Kadiki v. Virginia Commonwealth University,'7' the district
court effectively adopted a negligence standard for institutional
liability for situations in which a hostile environment resulted from
sexual harassment perpetrated by a professor.7 ' After determining
that Title VII principles should apply to Kadiki's Title IX sexual
harassment claims, 73 the court noted that, in the Fourth Circuit, the
consideration of a hostile environment required a two-step
analysis.374 The first step concerned the establishment of the hostile
environment itself.375 In order to satisfy the second prong of the
analysis, the plaintiff must show that the employer knew or should
have known of the hostile environment and failed to take
appropriate action to remedy it.76
The Kadiki court applied the analysis to the facts and expressed
its doubt that Kadiki had satisfied the first prong of the analysis--the
establishment of the hostile environment claim.3' The court
ultimately concluded that summary judgment for the defendant was
more appropriately granted because of the application of the second
prong of the analysis-the standard for institutional liability.37"
According to the court, the action taken by the school in response to
Kadiki's complaint protected the school from liability:3  "Because
Defendant took 'prompt and remedial action' with respect [to] any
conduct that involved Plaintiff, Plaintiff cannot prevail on her theory
370. See id. at *3-*4 ("The School Corporation did not have notice that Barmore was
sexually harassing [Deborah] 0. (supposing, of course, that she could show that the facts
demonstrate actionable harassment) in time to have done anything about it.").
371. 892 F. Supp. 746 (E.D. Va. 1995). For a discussion of the facts of Kadiki, see supra
notes 124-32 and accompanying text. The student in Kadild also alleged quid pro quo
sexual harassment. See Kadiki, 892 F. Supp. at 750-52. For a discussion of Kadiki's quid
pro quo claim, see supra notes 133-39 and accompanying text.
372. See Kadiki, 892 F. Supp. at 753.
373. See ia at 750. For a description of the court's reasoning, see supra note 133 and
accompanying text.
374. See Kadiki, 892 F. Supp. at 753.
375. See iU According to the court, a plaintiff must allege that discriminatory behavior
severe enough to alter the conditions of the educational environment existed and created
an abusive atmosphere. See id. (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21
(1993)).
376. See id. (citing Swentek v. USAIR, Inc., 830 F.2d 552,558 (4th Cir. 1987)).
377. See id The court expressed doubt that the one incident that was the subject of
Kadiki's complaint constituted "pervasive" behavior creating a hostile environment. See
i
378. See i.
379. See ia The court noted that the situation was investigated immediately by the
school and a variety of sanctions were imposed on the professor. See ia
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of hostile environment harassment."'
Still another court adopted a negligence standard for the
purpose of imputing liability for a hostile environment created by a
professor in Slaughter v. Waubonsee Community College."' Sarah
Slaughter was a student at the Waubonsee Community College when
she was sexually harassed by her English teacher, Michael
O'Gorman.38 During a meeting with O'Gorman, he offered to
increase Slaughter's final grade in exchange for sexual favors.3 The
Slaughter court began its analysis with the observation that the
Supreme Court had not addressed the issue of institutional liability
in Franklin, the only case the Court had decided that involved a
sexual harassment claim brought under Title IX.? After making
that observation, the court turned to the findings of two other district
courts for guidance.3 6 However, the court's reliance on those cases
was misguided because each case could be distinguished from the
present facts in a fundamental way.
The court initially noted that Title VII standards should apply to
380. Id. (quoting Swemek, 830 F.2d at 558).
381. No. 94-2525C, 1995 WL 579296, at *1 (N.D. 111. Sept. 29, 1995). As the facts of
Slaughter demonstrate, it seems as though the plaintiff had a viable claim of quid pro quo
sexual harassment. For an unstated reason, however, the court did not treat Slaughter's
claim as one of quid pro quo harassment. See Id. at *3.
382. See id. at *1.
383. See U4.
384. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60,75 (1992).
385. See Slaughter, 1995 WL579296, at *2.
386. See id. (citing Howard v. Board of Educ. of Sycamore Community Unit Sch. Dist.
No. 427, 876 F. Supp. 959, 974 (N.D. Ill. 1995); Floyd v. Waiters, 831 F. Supp. 867, 876
(M.D. Ga. 1993)).
387. The student in Floyd was sexually abused by a security guard and brought a claim
against the school district alleging that the school had violated her civil rights. See Floyd,
831 F. Supp. at 869-70. The Floyd court discussed the school's potential liability under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1988), not under Title IX. See Floyd, 831 F. Supp. at 870-74. Therefore,
the court's reliance on the case to determine the proper standard for institutional liability
under Title IX is misplaced.
In Howard, a former employee of a high school sued the Board of Education for sex
discrimination, sexual harassment, and retaliatory discharge under Title VII and Title IX.
See Howard, 876 F. Supp. at 964-65. The Howard court relied upon the same rationale as
the Floyd court in rejecting the application of agency principles used in Title VII liability
to Title IX sexual harassment situations. See id. at 974. The Howard court concluded that
"absent allegations that the Board knew of, or was directly involved in, any of the alleged
discriminatory conduct in [plaintiffs allegations], plaintiff cannot maintain a claim against
the Board under Title IX." Id. at 974 (footnote omitted). In addition, the Howard court
involved sexual harassment in the employment context, not between a teacher and a
student. See id. at 964. For a discussion of the Howard court's reasoning, see supra notes
194-206 and accompanying text.
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the analysis of Slaughter's sexual harassment claim under Title IX
and then summarized the standard for the analysis of a hostile
environment claim in accordance with the Supreme Court's decision
in Harris.3 69 After applying the standard to Slaughter's case, the
court concluded that the facts of the plaintiff's case failed the
objective prong of the test."9 The court noted that a single isolated
act "rarely supports a hostile environment claim."39'
Notwithstanding its conclusion that Slaughter failed to establish
a prima facie case of hostile environment sexual harassment,39 the
court addressed the potential application of agency principles to the
consideration of institutional liability for a hostile environment claim
under Title IX23 The court concluded that the only way Slaughter
could succeed in arguing that the school should be liable for the
harassment would be to show that the school had some knowledge of
the hostile environment and failed to act appropriately in response
to the situation.' Slaughter failed to allege that the school had any
knowledge of O'Gorman's actions.3' Also, the court noted that the
plaintiff did not demonstrate that the school failed to take proper
action upon receiving notice of the harassment.96  The court
ultimately granted summary judgment to the defendant?3
The Eastern District of Michigan also effectively adopted a
negligence standard for the purpose of determining a school's
liability for a sexual relationship between a teacher and a student in
Nelson v. Almont Community Schools.'- Tad Nelson had a sexual
388. See Slaughter, 1995 WL 579296, at *2.
389. See id. at *3 (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 US. 17, 23 (1993)). For a
description of the Harris standard, see supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
390. See Slaughter, 1995 WL 579296, at *3. The court noted that while it was clear that
the plaintiff subjectively perceived the environment as hostile, the factors did not
objectively create a hostile environment. See id The court reasoned that "the conduct
happened once, and only once, there was no physical threat or humiliation, it happened at
the end of the school year, and plaintiff had no reason to see or work with O'Gorman
again.... Such conduct does not rise to the level of pervasive harassment ...." Id.
391. Id. at "4.
392. See iU at *3.
393. See idL at *2.
394. See id at *2, *4.
395. See id. at *3. The premise of Slaughter's argument for the school's liability was
that the school "should have been aware of O'Gorman's propensity to commit the alleged
acts because of its knowledge of O'Gorman's prior actions." Id. at *3. The court rejected
her argument, reasoning that no facts alleged supported the conclusion that the school
knew of or participated in the discriminatory acts. See id
396. See iU at *4.
397. See id. at *5.
398. 931 F. Supp. 1345 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
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relationship with his English teacher, Jean Schohl, for approximately
six months.3" The only information the high school principal, Steven
Zott, received regarding the relationship between Nelson and Schohl
was several nominations of the two for Snowcoming King and
Queen, which the principal assumed were a practical joke, and a
report by a chaperon at the Snowcoming dance that Nelson and
Schohl danced together.4" Zott discovered the relationship when he
was informed of it by Nelson's parents, who found journals, notes,
and cards detailing the relationship in Nelson's room. 1  Zott
subsequently suspended Schohl and commenced an investigation.'
Schohl resigned from the school district before her tenure charges
were heard by the school board.4 03 Nelson subsequently brought an
action against the school alleging a violation of Title IX.'
The Nelson court noted that the substantive law from Title VH
should apply to the analysis of the establishment of the prima facie
elements of Nelson's sexual harassment claim under Title IX.' It
then categorized Nelson's claim as one of hostile environment sexual
harassment6 and summarized the elements of a prima facie case.'
399. See id at 1347.
400. See id at 1349.
401. See id. at 1350.
402. See id. Through the investigation, Zott learned that several faculty members had
observed questionable behavior between Schohl and Nelson. See id. In addition, Zott
discovered that five years before Zott came to the school district, Schohl had been
involved in a sexual relationship with another student. See id. at 1351.
403. See id.
404. See id.
405. See id. at 1356. According to the court, "Franklin v. Gwinnett teaches that to
establish a prima facie case of sexual harassment under Title IX, the substantive law of
Title VET is applicable." Id.
406. See id The court noted that Nelson's claim was not for quid pro quo sexual
harassment because it did not involve a demand for sexual consideration in return for an
educational benefit. See id. Additionally, Nelson stipulated that the case did not involve
quid pro quo harassment and instead premised his claim on the only other cognizable
cause of action under Title V--a hostile environment theory. See id.
407. See id. According to the court, a plaintiff in Nelson's situation had to prove that:
(1) he or she was a member of a protected class; (2) he or she was subjected to
unwelcome sexual harassment in the form of sexual advances, requests for sexual
favors, or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature; (3) the harassment
complained of was based on sex; (4) the charged sexual harassment had the effect
of unreasonably interfering with the plaintiff's education and creating an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive educational environment that affected seriously
the psychological well-being of the plaintiff; and (5) some basis for institutional
liability.
Id. at 1357 (footnote omitted) (citing Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186,
1194 (11th Cir. 1996); Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 619-621 (6th Cir. 1986)).
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In addressing the issue of the school's liability, the Nelson court
noted that other courts had adopted various standards since 1992.408
After categorizing those standards, the court held that a "Title VI"
standard of intentional discrimination was the proper standard under
which a school may be found liable for the intentional harassment of
one of its students by a teacher.1 The court clarified its adopted
standard by stating that in order for a school to be liable for sexual
harassment resulting from the actions of a teacher, a plaintiff must
establish:
(A) a showing of direct involvement of the school district in
the discrimination, or (B) a showing of (1) actual or
constructive knowledge on the part of the district of the
sexual harassment of a student and (2) that the school failed
to take immediate appropriate action reasonably calculated
to prevent or stop the harassment.4 n
The Nelson court applied the standard to the present case and
determined that because no evidence existed that the school
participated in Nelson's harassment, the school could be liable only
if the evidence suggested that the school had actual or constructive
knowledge of the harassment and failed to react appropriately.
412
The court ultimately held that there were several issues of fact with
respect to both the establishment of a prima facie case of hostile
environment sexual harassment and the issue of liability that needed
to be resolved by a jury.4' As a result, the defendant's motion for
summary judgment was denied.4
The Eighth Circuit most recently adopted a negligence standard
in Kinman v. Omaha Public School District,4 s a case involving a
sexual relationship between Janet Kinman and her female teacher,
408. See id. at 1355.
409. The Nelson court summarized the standards adopted by other courts as including
standards derived from agency principles, Title VII (a "'knew or should have known'"
standard for hostile environment claims and strict liability for quid pro quo claims), Title
VI (requiring a showing of intentional discrimination by the school), and strict liability.
See iU.
410. See id.
411. Id. The court explained that "'[t]he school's failure to take appropriate action
[...] could be circumstantial evidence of intent to discriminate.'" Id. at 1355 (quoting
Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560,1576 (N.D. Cal. 1993)).
412. See id. at 1356. The court noted that a plaintiff may be able to establish that a
school had knowledge of the harassment by proving that he or she complained to a school
administrator or by showing the pervasiveness of the behavior. See aL
413. See Ui at 1357.
414. See ad at 1358.
415. 94 F.3d 463 (8th Cir. 1996).
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Sheryl McDougall.416 McDougall was Kinman's English teacher
during Kinman's sophomore year, which encompassed the fall of
1987 and the spring of 1988.17 Although questionable behavior took
place between McDougall and Kinman during Kinman's junior
year,41 their sexual relationship did not actually begin until the
summer between Kinman's junior and senior years, and it continued
until the November of Kinman's senior year.
The issue of the school's notice of the relationship between
Kinman and McDougall was sharply disputed in the case.4'2  During
Kinman's sophomore year, McDougall received an evaluation in
which she was criticized for planning to attend a concert with
Kinman. 21 Robert Whitehouse, a school official, and Susan Paar, the
school's guidance counselor, received reports from students during
the fall of 1989 that Kinman and McDougall were involved in a
sexual relationship.4 2 Other employees of the school also expressed
concern about the relationship between Kinman and McDougall
during that time period.4' Finally, during that fall, after she ended
the relationship with McDougall, Kinman told her mother of the
relationship.4' After Kinman's mother reported Kinman's
allegations to the school, school officials began an investigation but
took no official action against McDougall at that time.4 Two years
after Kinman graduated, Kinman's mother claimed that the
relationship had been ongoing and that she had proof of the
416. See hA at 465. A full discussion of the viability of a claim involving same-sex
sexual harassment under Title IX is outside the scope of this Comment The Eighth
Circuit, however, did emphasize that the appropriate question for determining whether a
sexual harassment violation had occurred was whether a plaintiff was subjected to
behavior because of her sex. See ih at 468. The court pointed out that McDougall sought
out Kinman because Kinman was a woman, and males in Kinman's class were not
subjected to similar behavior. See hA The court concluded that Kinman had been harassed
on the basis of her sex. See i.
417. See hA at 465.
418. During her sophomore year, while still a student in McDougall's English class,
Kinman wrote McDougall a note "stating that she liked her but that she (Kinman) was not
gay." Id. at 465. During Kinman's junior year, McDougall questioned Kinman about the
childhood abuse she had suffered and invited Kinman to attend an Alcoholics Anonymous
(AA) meeting. See hi Kinman did not find out that it was a gay AA meeting until she was
there. See id.
419. See hi
420. See id. at 465-66.
421. See hA at 466.
422. See Ud
423. See Ud
424. See id. at 465.
425. See Ud at 465-66.
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relationship in McDougall's journal-incriminating pictures of
Kinman and McDougall and a series of cards written to Kinman
from McDougall. 6  McDougall's employment was ultimately
terminated and her teaching certificate revoked.4 7
The court began its consideration of Kinman's hostile
environment sexual harassment claim under Title IX by listing the
prima facie elements of such a claim.4" Noting that one area of
contention between the parties was whether the sexual contact
between Kinman and McDougall was "unwelcome," the court
concluded that the question presented a material issue of fact for the
purpose of the summary judgment motion.4
The Kinman court then turned to the question of the
appropriate standard for institutional liability for situations such as
the one at bar.' Emphasizing the broad "divergence of views" in
the courts as to the proper standard for institutional liability for
sexual harassment under Title IXI' " and noting that many courts had
turned to Title VII principles of liability in considering similar issues
under Title IX, the court concluded that those principles should also
guide its determination of an institution's liability under Title IX.432
After considering the Supreme Court's dicta in Meritor Savings Bank
v. Vinson, the Kinman court held that a school may be liable for a
hostile environment if the school knew or should have known of the
harassment and failed to take appropriate remedial action.433
426. See id at 466.
427. See iUL
428. See id at 467-68. According to the court, in order to succeed on her claim,
Kinman had to show-
1) that she belongs to a protected group; 2) that she was subject to unwelcome
sexual harassment; 3) that the harassment was based on sex; 4) that the
harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the conditions of
her education and create an abusive educational environment; and 5) that some
basis for institutional liability has been established.
Id. at 467-68 (citing Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226,1232 (10th Cir. 1996)).
429. Id. at 468. The court did briefly acknowledge the troubling aspect of the "power
disparity" between the parties for the purposes of determining the "welcomeness" of the
relationship. See id ("To distinguish between an actual desire for a relationship on one
hand, and a mere acquiescence to tendered sexual advances on the other, it is necessary to
consider the power disparity between the individuals involved."). The court sidestepped
the potentially controversial issue by concluding that the question concerned "'difficult
problems of proof and turn[ed] largely on credibility determinations committed to the trier
of fact."' Id. (quoting Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,68 (1986)).
430. See Kinman, 94 F.3d at 468-69.
431. See id at 468.
432. See U at 469.
433. See id.
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(5) Intentional Discrimination
The only case in which a federal court adopted a standard of
institutional liability requiring a showing of intentional
discrimination in the context of hostile environment sexual
harassment perpetrated by a teacher was R.L.R. v. Prague Public
School District 1-103.' Fourteen-year-old R.L.M.R. was an eighth-
grade student when she had a sexual relationship with Albert
Thorpe, her basketball coach.435 As a result of the relationship,
R.L.M.R. and her parents brought a Title IX action against the
school district 3 6
The court's reasoning with respect to the plaintiffs' Title IX
claim took a disturbing twist. The court stated that the plaintiffs
could not prevail under Title IX without showing that the school
acted with intent to discriminate against R.L.M.R.437 and held that
the question of intent was "moot" because the plaintiffs "failed to
come forward with any facts showing the custom or policy,
acquiescence in, conscious disregard of, or failure to investigate or
discipline on the part of the School District." '38 According to the
court, without such a preliminary showing, the "question of intent is
really moot as the proof fails before that question is reached." 39
In another troubling portion of the opinion, the court addressed
the defendant's argument that the plaintiffs' claims should be
dismissed because they failed to establish that R.L.M.R.'s
relationship with Thorpe was unwelcome.' The court dismissed the
relevancy of the fact that the plaintiff was fourteen years old at the
time of the incident for purposes of gauging the "welcomeness" of
the teacher's advances."' Reasoning that the plaintiff could not
434. 838 F. Supp. 1526 (W.D. Okla. 1993).
435. See id. at 1527.
436. See id.
437. See id. at 1534. In support of its conclusion, the court cited Guardians Association
v. Civil Service, 463 U.S. 582, 607 n.27 (1983), a Title VI case. See P.LR., 838 F. Supp. at
1534. The court failed, however, to distinguish Guardians as being in the Title VI context.
See id. In addition, the R.L.R. court did not explain how Guardians was relevant to the
determination of a school's potential Title IX liability for hostile environment sexual
harassment perpetrated by one of its employees. See id.
438. R.L.R., 838 F. Supp. at 1534.
439. Id.
440. See id.
441. See iU ("Despite plaintiffs' argument that Oklahoma's statutory rape law
precludes her consent to Thorpe's advances, the Court finds that the criminality of
Thorpe's actions, standing alone, have no bearing on the School Board's liability."). At
least one commentator has criticized the requirement that a student plaintiff show that a
teacher's sexual advances were unwelcome in order to maintain a Title IX sexual
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maintain her Title IX action,'"2 the court ultimately granted the
defendant's motion for summary judgment.443
(6) Actual Knowledge of Harassment Required
In a series of three cases, the Fifth Circuit explicitly rejected
several of the standards of institutional liability described in the
above sections and adopted a far more stringent requirement for
institutional liability under Title IX for sexual harassment resulting
from a student's sexual abuse by a teacher.'6 In the first case, the
Fifth Circuit began by rejecting the adoption of a strict liability
standard for such cases but failed to endorse a specific alternative
standard. 5 In its next case, the Fifth Circuit adopted a particular
standard of liability and detailed its rationale for the stated
standard. 6 In the final case considered by the Fifth Circuit for the
purpose of determining a school's liability for the sexual abuse of a
student by a teacher, the court rejected another proposed standard
and applied its adopted standard. 7 For the purpose of exploring the
court's rationale for its treatment of institutional liability under Title
IX, a discussion of each case follows.
The first case in which the Fifth Circuit considered the proper
standard of institutional liability for a situation involving teacher-
student sexual abuse was Canutillo Independent School District v.
harassment action:
The burden of proving unwelcomeness can be an extremely onerous requirement
for adult women; for young girls, it is substantially worse. They may know that
what they experienced made them feel uncomfortable. They may know that they
wanted it to stop. However, they almost certainly won't know that what they
experienced was "sexual harassment." And they would be truly extraordinary to
know that the law requires them to expressly reject the harassment in order to
invoke its protection. Finally, in addition to knowledge, it would take
considerable courage for girls to challenge their harassers and the institutions
that protect them.
Bodnar, supra note 8, at 583-84.
442. See R.L.R, 838 F. Supp. at 1534. Even where the experience of sexual harassment
provides the plaintiff with a private right of action, the court still requires that the plaintiff
prove discriminatory intent. See id.
443. See id.
444. See Doe v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 1223,1226 (5th Cir. 1997); Rosa
H. v. San Elizario Iudep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648, 658 (5th Cir. 1997); Canutillo Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Leija, 101 F.3d 393, 400 (5th Cir. 1996).
445. See Leija, 101 F.3d at 401-02; see also infra notes 448-60 and accompanying text
(discussing Le ia).
446. See Rosa H., 106 F.3d at 658-61; see also infra notes 461-82 and accompanying text
(discussing Rosa H.).
447. See Lago Vista, 106 F.3d at 1225-26; see also infra notes 483-88 and accompanying
text (discussing Lago Vista).
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Leija.!" Rosemarie Leija was a second-grade student when she was
sexually abused by her gym teacher, Tony Perales" 9 According to
Leija, another student also was being sexually abused by Perales"
Leija and the other student informed Pam Mendoza, their
homeroom teacher, of the abuse.45 ' Mendoza spoke with each child
and advised them to avoid Perales. She also spoke to Perales about
the girls' accusations but never informed any school official about
the allegations." After Leija informed her mother of Perales's
actions, Mrs. Leija spoke with Mendoza at a parent-teacher
conference about the abuse. 3 After the conference, Mendoza
allegedly threatened Leija that she would be in "trouble" if she had
fabricated her complaint.' Not only did no school employee
respond to the complaints made, but Perales was not removed from
his teaching duties until the abuse was reported to law enforcement
officials.45 Leija subsequently filed suit against the school under
Title IX.
456
The Fifth Circuit articulated the specific issue as "whether the
liability standard under Title IX for teacher-student sexual abuse is
strict liability; and, if it is not, whether the notice to Mendoza, a
teacher, is sufficient to hold the school district liable."'  The Leija
court began by summarizing and describing the various standards
that had been applied by other courts,5 s and criticized the district
448. 101 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1996).
449. See id at 395. The district court summarized the abuse suffered by Leija as
follows:
For the most part, the abuse occurred while [Perales] was showing movies to Miss
Leija's class in a darkened classroom. Coach Perales would instruct her to come
to the back of his room and sit on his lap. He would then place his hands beneath
her undergarments and rub her chest, her buttocks, and between her legs. There
was no testimony suggesting penetration. At the rnimum, this happened eight
times; at the maximum, twenty times.
Leija v. Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist., 887 F. Supp. 947,949 (W.D. Tex. 1995), rev'd, 101 F.3d
393 (5th Cir. 1996).





455. See Leija v. Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist., 887 F. Supp. 947, 949 (W.D. Tex. 1995),
rev'd, 101 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1996). But see Leija, 101 F.3d. at 402 (suggesting that the
school district suspended Perales prior to any investigation by law enforcement officials).
456. See Leija, 101 F.3d at 395.
457. Id. at 396.
458. See iU at 397-98. In summarizing the standards, the Fifth Circuit utilized a
shorthand, describing one standard as a "Title VI" standard, the second standard as a
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court for deviating from the categories and holding that a school
district should be strictly liable for the sexual abuse of students by
teachers.'5  Declining to endorse a particular standard for
institutional liability under Title IX, the court stated that "it is not
necessary now to move beyond our rejection of strict liability and
adopt a liability standard for Title IX cases of the type at hand.
Leija's Title IX claim fails under each of the three types commonlyapplied.""6
However, the Fifth Circuit did adopt a standard of liability for
teacher-student sexual abuse cases in Rosa H. v. San Elizario
Independent School District.46' Deborah H. was a high school
freshman when she entered a sexual relationship with John
Contreras, a twenty-nine-year-old karate instructor employed by the
school."2 The Rosa H. court noted that the record was unclear with
"Title VIT" standard, and the third as a standard pursuant to the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958). See Leia, 101 F.3d at 397-98. The court went on to
describe each standard. Under the first standard, a school could be liable only if the
plaintiff could prove discriminatory intent. See id at 397. Under the second standard, a
school could be liable for hostile environment sexual harassment only upon a showing that
the school knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take appropriate
remedial action. See id. Under the third standard, the court reasoned that because sexual
abuse was always outside the scope of an employee's teaching duties, a school could be
liable only upon a showing that the school was somehow negligent or reckless in its
handling of the abuse. See Ud at 398.
459. See Leija, 101 F.3d at 398-99.
460. Id. at 400. The court applied each standard to the facts of the case. See id. at 400-
02. The court concluded that under the "Title VI" standard, the school could not be liable
even if Leija could prove the school had knowledge of the harassment, unless the school
was directly involved in the harassing actions. See id. at 400. With respect to the "Title
VIP' and agency standards of liability, the court concluded that both theories would allow
liability to lie upon a showing that the school had actual or constructive knowledge of the
harassment and failed to take appropriate action. See id In the most disturbing portion of
the court's opinion, the court considered whether Leija's report to her homeroom teacher
was sufficient to put the school on "notice" of the harassment for liability purposes. See id.
at 400-402. The court reasoned that, in the Title VII context, for an employer to have
actual notice, a person in "high management" must be informed of the harassment. See id.
at 400. Similarly, in the Title IX context, the court stated that a student must report her
sexual abuse to a school employee in a "supervisory" position. See id. at 401. The court
concluded that in the Title IX context, a school does not have actual knowledge of the
harassment "until someone with authority to take remedial action is notified." Id. at 402.
The court further noted that the proper authority might be found only in a member of the
school board. See i& Thus, the court concluded that-Leija's complaint to her homeroom
teacher was insufficient to put the school on notice of the sexual abuse. See id. With
respect to the constructive knowledge possibility, the court stated that "there was no
evidence that [Perales's] conduct was then so pervasive that a reasonable juror could
conclude that [the school district] 'should have known' of the abuse." Id.
461. 106 F.3d 648 (5th Cir. 1997).
462. See i. at 650. The relationship began when Deborah H. was enrolled in
Contreras's karate class:
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respect to the type of notice the school had of the relationship
between Contreras and Deborah H.' Deborah H. claimed she
informed a high school guidance counselor that she had been having
sex with Contreras, a fact the guidance counselor disputed.4" Rosa
H., Deborah's mother, realized that Contreras was having a sexual
relationship with her daughter when she overheard a sexually
explicit telephone conversation between the two.41 After school
officials were informed of the relationship, 4" they decided to closely
monitor Contreras's karate classes.467 The officials did not, however,
conduct a full investigation into the sexual threat posed by
Contreras, notify the school's Title IX coordinator that sexual abuse
had occurred, or report the behavior to the appropriate law
enforcement authorities.6' Rosa H. subsequently filed suit against
the school district on behalf of Deborah H., alleging a violation of
Title IX469
The Rosa H. court began its consideration of the claim by noting
that the Fifth Circuit had rejected a standard of strict liability for
situations involving teacher-student sexual abuse without endorsing
a particular theory of liability.47 Recognizing that the present case
required the court to adopt a specific standard of liability for such
cases,47' the court held:
After several weeks, Contreras took a special interest in Deborah .... He often
drove her home after class. He complimented her appearance, including not only
her hair, but also her breasts.... [M]ost of the physical contact occurred in
Contreras's car or at his home. Within weeks of Deborah's enrollment in the
karate class, Contreras initiated sexual intercourse. Contreras had sex with
Deborah at his house on a regular basis in December, January, and February,
often during the school day. When Deborah insisted that she would get in trouble
for missing school, Contreras assured her that the school did not require her to
attend so long as she was with him.
Id.
463. See id at 651.
464. See U
465. See id.
466. See id. Specifically, the school superintendent, the school principal, the high
school guidance counselor, and a high school social worker were informed of the situation.
See id.
467. See id
468. See id. Contreras continued to work at the school for another year until he was
terminated for a failure to produce photo identification for the school's personnel office.
See id.
469. See i.
470. See id. at 652 (citing Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Leija, 101 F.3d 393,398-400 (5th
Cir. 1996)).
471. See id. The court noted that "[t]his case ... compels us to decide which of the
three liability theories outlined in Leija-the agency theory, the Title VII theory, or the
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[A] school district can be liable for teacher-student sexual
harassment under Title IX only if a school official who had
actual knowledge of the abuse was invested by the school
board with the duty to supervise the employee and the
power to take action that would end such abuse and failed
to do so.472
The Fifth Circuit attempted to justify its adopted standard by
offering its rationale for rejecting other standards of liability and
detailing the meaning of the one it adopted.473 The Rosa H. court
first offered its reasoning for rejecting the applicability of agency
principles to the determination of institutional liability for teacher-
student sexual abuse cases. 474 In addition, the court rejected the use
of constructive knowledge as the standard for institutional liability.475
Finally, the Fifth Circuit dismissed the relevance of the standard
recently proposed by the OCR to the present case.476
The Rosa H. court concluded by offering further detail as to the
application of its adopted standard. In order to succeed, the plaintiff
would not have to show that the school had actual knowledge that
Contreras would sexually abuse a particular student, but would have
to show that the school district failed to act when it knew that
Contreras "posed a substantial risk of harassing students in
restrictive theory that requires actual, intentional discrimination-applies when a student
suffers sexual abuse at the hands of a public school teacher." Id.
472. Id. at 660.
473. See id. at 652-59.
474. See idL at 654-55. The court emphasized that liability premised on agency
principles was inherently inconsistent with a Spending Clause statute. See id at 654. The
court also noted that nothing in either the text of Title IX or its implementing regulations
supported the use of agency principles for the purposes of determining institutional
liability. See id. (discussing Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994), and 34 C.F.R. § 106.2(h)
(1995)). The court then summarized the decisions of other federal courts that rejected the
notion of a school's vicarious liability for sexual abuse perpetrated by a teacher, and
reasoned that nothing in the Supreme Court's decision in Franklin v. Gwinnet County
Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60 (1992), compelled the use of agency principles for such
situations. See Rosa H., 106 F.3d at 654-55.
475. See Rosa H., 106 F.3d at 655-58. According to the court, "importing this aspect of
Title VII law stretches Title IX beyond its language and purpose. Congress did not enact
Title IX in order to burden federally funded educational institutions with open-ended
negligence liability." Id. at 656.
476. See id. at 658. For a discussion of the standard recommended by the OCR, see
infra notes 734-38 and accompanying text. The Fifth Circuit stated that the guidelines
promulgated by the OCR would not be given retroactive effect, emphasizing the
contractual nature of Spending Clause legislation. See Rosa H., 106 F.3d. at 658. Further,
the Rosa H. court specifically refused to offer any guidance as to the effect the OCR
guidance document will have on the standard adopted in Rosa H. See id. ("We make no
comment on how these guidelines might affect cases in which a school district accepts Title
IX funds after the guidelines' promulgation date.").
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general." r Liability would not lie if a student failed to show that the
school district had actual knowledge of a substantial threat of sexual
harassment to the student.47 The Rosa H. court specified that a
school district can escape liability for situations involving teacher-
student sexual abuse if the school district can show" 'that [it] did not
know of the underlying facts indicating a sufficiently substantial
danger and that [it was] therefore unaware of a danger, or that [it]
knew the underlying facts but believed (albeit unsoundly) that the
risk to which the facts gave rise was insubstantial or nonexistent.' ,,4 -
Finally, in determining whether the school district was liable
under Title IX, the Fifth Circuit stated that only knowledge by key
individuals of specific instances of teacher-student sexual abuse
constituted the requisite notice for finding liability under Title IX.'
Liability would lie only if a school official with supervisory power
over the employee perpetrator had actual knowledge of the
harassment and failed to take action to end the abuse. 1 The court
recognized that its standard specifically omitted "the bulk of
employees, such as fellow teachers, coaches, and janitors, unless the
district has assigned them both the duty to supervise the employee
who has sexually abused a student and also the power to halt the
abuse. ' 8
The Fifth Circuit rejected another proposed standard of liability
and confirmed the standard of liability adopted above in Doe v.
Lago Vista Independent School District.41 Jane Doe was thirteen
years old when Frank Waldrop, a teacher at Lago Vista High School,
sexually abused her.' There was no evidence that any school
477. Rosa H., 106 F.3d at 659.
478. See id.
479. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 844 (1994)
(using the concept of "deliberate indifference" to determine whether a prisoner's Eighth
Amendment rights were violated by prison officials)). The Fifth Circuit reasoned that the
concept of deliberate indifference provided an appropriate analogy for the discussion of
school liability because the concept was premised on the difference between a harm
caused by intentional behavior and one resulting from negligence. See id.
480. See i. at 659-61.
481. See id. at 660.
482. Id.
483. 106 F.3d 1223,1226 (5th Cir. 1997).
484. See id. at 1224. The court summarized the abuse suffered by Doe:
Waldrop initiated sexual contact with [Doe] at her home in the spring of 1992.
Knowing she would be alone, he visited her under the pretext of returning a book
and proceeded to fondle her breasts and unzip her pants. During the summer,
Waldrop had sex on a regular basis with Doe, who was by then fifteen years old.
None of the encounters took place on school property. The relationship ended in
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official was aware of the abuse until after it had stopped.' The court
reiterated that both strict liability and agency liability premised on
constructive knowledge had been rejected in previous decisions."'
However, the Lago Vista court considered Doe's contention that the
school could be liable for teacher-student sexual abuse if the teacher
was aided in the commission of the abuse by virtue of the existence
of an agency relationship with the school, even though the abuse was
outside the scope of the teacher's employment.' The court rejected
the proposed standard of liability, noting that, pursuant to its
decision in Rosa H., "school districts are not liable in tort for
teacher-student harassment under Title IX unless an employee who
has been invested by the school board with supervisory power over
the offending employee actually knew of the abuse, had the power to
end the abuse, and failed to do so."''
(7) Reasonable Avenue of Complaint Available
The district court in Pallett v. Palmna4 adopted a unique
standard for institutional liability under Title IX for teacher-student
sexual harassment. The claims at issue in Pallett were filed by
Darleen Pallett, an undergraduate student at Iona College, and
Christine Kracunas, a graduate student at Iona College, who was also
employed by the college as Acting Director for Public Relations.
411
Both students claimed that they were sexually harassed by Professor
Palma during private meetings in his office.49 Both Pallett and
January of 1993, when a Lago Vista police officer happened to discover Waidrop
and Doe having sex.
Id.
485. See id. at 1225.
486. See id at 1225,1226.
487. See id. at 1225-26. The plaintiff's theory was premised on the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) (1958). See Lago Vista, 106 F.3d at 1225.
488. Lago Vista, 106 F.3d at 1226.
489. 914 F. Supp. 1018 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
490. See id. at 1019. Pallett's and Kracunas's claims had been consolidated. See id.
491. See id. at 1020-21. Pallett met privately with Professor Palma in his office to
protest a poor grade on a paper. See id at 1020. Pallett alleged that, during the
conversation:
[Professor Palma], in lewd and vulgar language, discussed in detail his own prior
sexual experiences, ordered her to read pornographic poetry which contained
extensive sexually explicit references and recitals regarding sexual intercourse,
inquired as to her own sexual experiences, and made vivid expressions of his own
imagination of her reactions to sexual intercourse with him and of having sexual
relations with her, recited the content of sexually oriented dreams he had
regarding another student named Laurie, and said that he could imagine her
naked and that in his opinion most men liked to fluck women.
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Kracunas reported the harassment to the dean.4n According to the
court, after learning of the incidents, the university made reasonable
efforts to gain the participation and cooperation of both plaintiffs in
investigating the incidents and terminating Professor Palma through
the necessary due process procedures.493
The key issue in the case was whether the university should be
liable for the harassment perpetrated by Palma.4 According to the
court, that question was 'answered by determining whether the
university responded properly once it learned of the harassment.4' It
seemed as though the court was going to adopt a Title VII standard
when it noted that under the relevant law of the Second Circuit an
educational institution may be liable for the sexual harassment of a
student "'under standards similar to those applied in cases under
Title VII' ,"96 The court pointed out, however, that the Second
Circuit had not addressed whether constructive notice should be
included in the Title IX standard.4
The Pallett court began its discussion of the university's
potential liability by rejecting the possibility that agency principles
could be used to hold the university liable.4  The court reasoned
that Palma lacked actual authority to act as he had and stated that
the alleged harassment was not furthered by apparent authority.4'
Id. Kracunas alleged that when she met with Professor Palma to pick up textual materials
required for class, "he made comments to her which amounted to sexual harassment." Id.
at 1021.
492. See id. at 1022. Pallett reported the May 1994 incident to the Dean in
approximately late September 1994 and filed a formal complaint with the university on
December 1, 1994. See id. Kracunas first reported the incident to the dean two days after
the harassment occurred but never formally filed a complaint with the university. See id.
at 1022-23.
493. See id. at 1023. The court noted that a university must be especially careful in
addressing sexual harassment situations when a tenured professor is involved. See id. at
1022.
494. See id at 1021.
495. See id.
496. Id. at 1024 (quoting Murray v. New York Univ. College of Dentistry, 57 F.3d 243,
249 (2d Cir. 1995)).
497. See id. The court stated that under Title VII, an employee's conduct can be
imputed to her employer when
(1) the employee is in a supervisory role and uses actual or apparent authority to
further the harassment or if the supervisor was otherwise aided in accomplishing
the harassment by the existence of an agency relationship; (2) the employer
provided no reasonable avenue of complaint; or (3) that the employer knew of
the complaint but did nothing about it.
Id.
498. See id.
499. See id. The court did not consider whether Palma was aided in the harassment
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The court then stated that a university may escape liability for
situations involving sexual harassment if the school provides
reasonable procedures through which students may complain, or the
school, with knowledge of the harassment, appropriately handles
those complaints.5" The court concluded that Iona College was not
liable for Palma's actions because Iona College had a policy against
sexual harassment and had implemented a complaint procedure of
which all students and faculty were informed;5 1 in addition, the
school reacted appropriately as soon as they learned of Palma's
actions."' Thus, the court granted the defendant's motion for
summary judgment with respect to the plaintiffs' Title IX claims."s
c. Trends in Employee Perpetrator/Student Victim Case Law
Many federal courts have addressed hostile environment sexual
harassment claims in the Title IX context since the Supreme Court's
opinion in Franklin."° One consistent holding that has emerged
from the large number of opinions regarding this form of sexual
harassment is that hostile environment sexual harassment is
actionable under Title IX when it involves harassment between a
teacher and a student. The only court to state that such a claim was
not actionable under Title IX in this context was the district court in
Bougher v. University of Pittsburgh.5" The Third Circuit, however,
declined to adopt that portion of the district court's opinion and
instead agreed only that the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action
under Title IX" In addition, the remaining courts that have
addressed the viability of hostile environment claims under Title IX
overwhelmingly have supported the proposition that such claims are
viable when the perpetrator is an employee of the school and the
victim is a student."w Finally, all the above cases that have been
through his position with the university. But cf. Saville v. Houston County Healthcare
Auth., 852 F. Supp. 1512, 1527 (M.D. Ala. 1994) (reasoning that institutional liability may
be premised on a finding that the harasser was aided by his agency relationship with the
school); Hastings v. Hancock, 842 F. Supp. 1315, 1319 (D. Kan. 1993) (addressing the
possibility that an institution could be liable for harassment perpetrated by a teacher if the
teacher was aided in the harassment because of his position with the school).
500. See Pallen, 914 F. Supp. at 1024.
501. See ia4 at 1025.
502. See L
503. See id.
504. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 504 U.S. 60 (1992).
505. 713 F. Supp. 139,145 (W.D. Pa. 1989), aff'd on other grounds, 882 F.2d 74 (3d Cir.
1989).
506. See Bougher v. University of Pittsburgh, 882 F.2d 74,77 (3d Cir. 1989).
507. See S.B.L v. Evans, 80 F.3d 307, 310 (8th Cir. 1996); Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer
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categorized according to the standard of liability adopted by the
court also have implicitly endorsed the viability of hostile
environment sexual harassment claims in the Title IX context.s°
Therefore, the clear weight of the authority shows that hostile
environment sexual harassment is actionable under Title IX when it
is perpetrated by an employee of the school and suffered by a
student.
As the above summary demonstrates, standards for institutional
liability have varied widely.5' As the cases have been categorized
within this Comment, there are at least seven different standards of
liability which have been applied to hostile environment sexual
harassment claims under Title IX. The first standard of liability,
adopted by one district court, stated that when a student experiences
hostile environment sexual harassment as a result of sexual abuse
suffered at the hands of his or her teacher, Title IX liability for the
teacher's actions will be imputed to the school through a strict
liability standard under Title IX.510  That case involved a sexual
relationship between a teacher and a student at the secondary level,
and may be so limited. 1' Moreover, because of the language in the
opinion, it is not clear that the strict liability standard for
institutional liability should apply to hostile environment sexual
harassment resulting from a sexual relationship between a student
and professor at the university level."1 2
Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 540 (1st Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1044 (1996); Does v.
Covington County Sch. Bd. of Educ., 930 F. Supp. 554, 567 (M.D. Ala. 1996); Doe v.
Methacton Sch. Dist., No. CIV.A.94-0244, 1995 WL 549089, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 12,
1995); Bustos v. Ilinois Inst. of Cosmetology, No. 93-5980C, 1994 WL 710830, at *2-*3
(N.D. 11. Dec. 15, 1994); Patricia H. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1288,
1293 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
508. See Doe v. Claiborne County, Tenn., 103 F.3d 495, 513 (6th Cir. 1996); Deborah
0. v. Lake Cent. Sch. Corp., 61 F.3d 905 (Table) (text of opinion available in No. 94-3804,
1995 WL 431414, at *4 (7th Cir. July 21, 1995)); Nelson v. Almont Community Sch., 931 F.
Supp. 1345, 1354 (E.D. Mich. 1996); Bolon v. Rolla Pub. Schs., 917 F. Supp. 1423, 1427
(E.D. Mo. 1996); Pallet, 914 F. Supp. at 1024; Kadiki v. Virginia Commonwealth Univ.,
892 F. Supp. 746, 750 (E.D. Va. 1995); Slaughter v. Waubonsee Community College, No.
94-2525C, 1995 WL 579296, at *2 (N.D. 11. Sept. 29, 1995); Saville v. Houston County
Healthcare Auth., 852 F. Supp. 1512, 1521 (M.D. Ala. 1994); Hastings v. Hancock, 842 F.
Supp. 1315,1318 (D. Kan. 1993); R.L.R. v. Prague Pub. Sch. Dist. 1-103, 838 F. Supp. 1526,
1534 (W.D. Okla. 1993).
509. See supra notes 315-503 and accompanying text; see also S.B.L., 80 F.3d at 310-12
(addressing a certified question with regard to the proper standard of institutional liability
because the standards adopted by various courts have varied).
510. See Bolon, 917 F. Supp. at 1429.
511. See id. at 1427.
512. See iU at 1428-29 (emphasizing fact that students are required to attend school as
supporting the school's duty to protect the children).
1997] 2119
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
The second standard of liability was adopted by one district
court that considered a school's liability for hostile environment
sexual harassment perpetrated by one of its employees through the
application of a Title VII standard of institutional liability.
5 m
Specifically, the court held that the school would be liable for hostile
environment sexual harassment perpetrated by one of its employees
if the plaintiff could show that the school knew or should have
known of the harassment and failed to take appropriate remedial
action.514 Additionally, according to the court, the school may be
liable if the plaintiff could satisfy the relevant agency rules." Aside
from the strict liability standard described above, this standard would
seem to offer a Title IX plaintiff the best opportunity to hold the
school liable for the harassment he or she suffered.
The third standard of liability, adopted by one district court and
one court of appeals, stated that the appropriate standard for
institutional liability under Title IX would allow a student plaintiff to
hold a school liable for the hostile environment sexual harassment he
or she suffered through the application of agency principles.51
Under this standard, a plaintiff would be successful if he or she could
show that the harasser was acting in a supervisory capacity or if the
harasser was aided in any way by his or her agency relationship with
the school. 17
The fourth standard of liability, adopted by three district courts
and two courts of appeals, essentially provided that a school will be
liable for a hostile environment created by one of its employees if the
school's actions in response to the situation were negligent."'
Specifically, these courts held that in order for a school to be liable,
the plaintiff must establish that the school knew or should have
known of the actions that created the hostile environment and failed
to take appropriate action to remedy the situation. This standard
has been adopted in cases involving sexual relationships between
513. See Saville, 852 F. Supp. at 1527-28.
514. See id. at 1528.
515. See id.
516. See Doe v. Claiborne County, Tenn., 103 F.3d 495, 514 (6th Cir. 1996); Hastings v.
Hancock, 842F. Supp. 1315,1318-20 (D. Kan. 1993).
517. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1), (2)(d) (1958).
518. See Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 94 F.3d 463, 469 (8th Cir. 1996); Deborah
0. v. Lake Cent. Sch. Corp., 61 F.3d 905 (Table) (text of opinion available in No. 94-3804,
1995 WL 431414, at *4 (7th Cir. July 21, 1995)); Nelson v. Almont Community Sch., 931 F.
Supp. 1345,1355 (E.D. Mich. 1996); Kadiki v. Virginia Commonwealth Univ., 892 F. Supp.
746, 753 (E.D. Va. 1995); Slaughter v. Waubonsee Community College, No. 94-2525C,
1995 WL 579296, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29,1995).
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teachers and students at the secondary level5 as well as actions
between professors and students at the post-secondary level. 2
The fifth standard, adopted by one district court addressing
hostile environment sexual harassment under Title IX in the teacher-
student context, required a showing of intentional discrimination for
the school to be liable for the harassment perpetrated by one of its
employees. 2' Under this standard, a school will be liable for the
hostile environment sexual harassment caused by one of its
employees only if the plaintiff can show that the harassment was
exacerbated by a school policy or custom, or that the school
acquiesced in, consciously disregarded, or failed to investigate or
discipline the behavior that gave rise to the harassment."
A sixth standard of institutional liability has been adopted by
the Fifth Circuit." Under this standard, a school will be liable for
sexual abuse perpetrated by one of its employees only if the school
failed to act when it had actual knowledge that an employee posed a
substantial threat of sexually abusing students in general." In
addition, in order for a school to be deemed to have actual
knowledge of the threat posed by a teacher, a school official with the
power to remedy the harassment must have actual knowledge of the
abuse.5" This standard is a very difficult one for a plaintiff to meet.
For example, in one Fifth Circuit case, the fact that a second-grader
informed her homeroom teacher of the sexual abuse she suffered at
the hands of her gym teacher was deemed insufficient in satisfying
the requisite standard of knowledge for purposes of institutional
liability.526 Given the' psychological damage done to a student who
experiences sexual abuse at the hands of her teacher," it seems
519. See Kinman, 94 F.3d at 465; Nelson, 931 F. Supp. at 1347; Deborah 0., 1995 WL
431414, at *1.
520. See Slaughter, 1995 WL 519296, at *1; Kadiki, 892 F. Supp. at 748.
521. See R.LR. v. Prague Pub. Sch. Dist. 1-103, 838 F. Supp. 1526, 1534 (W.D. Okla.
1993).
522. See i.
523. See Doe v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 1223, 1226 (5th Cir. 1997); Rosa
. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648, 659 (5th Cir. 1997).
524. See Rosa H., 106 F.3d at 659.
525. See id at 660.
526. See Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Leija, 191 F.3d 393,402 (5th Cir. 1996).
527. One commentator described the damage done to a student when he or she is
sexually abused by a teacher
Teachers are fiduciaries who hold the trust, intellectual development, and
academic advancement of their students in their hands. ... The educational
process itself is founded upon the development of dependent, trusting relations
between students and teachers.... Like incest, sexual harassment is an abuse of
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especially onerous to require that the traumatized student report the
behavior to a school employee at the top of the supervisory
hierarchy.
The final standard of institutional liability under Title IX for
hostile environment sexual harassment is arguably the most difficult
for a plaintiff to meet. Under this standard, a school can escape
liability for hostile environment sexual harassment perpetrated by
one of its employees by showing that the school had in place a
reasonable avenue through which students could complain of sexual
harassment and that the school appropriately handled the
complaints." This standard is difficult for a plaintiff to meet because
it essentially requires that the plaintiff take affirmative action in
reporting the behavior for the school to be liable. Unless the
plaintiff actually reports the harassment, the school has no liability
for the harassment, even if the school has actual knowledge of it.
A review of the literature pertaining to the appropriate standard
of liability for hostile environment sexual harassment perpetrated by
employees of an educational institution reveals the endorsement of
three different standards: one theory premised on strict liability,"'
another on agency principles,53 and a third on negligence. 3
Significantly, no commentator has advocated the standards adopted
by the Fifth Circuit or that adopted by the court in Pallett v. Palrna 3 "
Considering the disturbing prevalence of sexual harassment in
education 33 and the harmful impact of such harassment.534 it is
power, and its damage is compounded by the resulting feelings of confusion and
humiliation which encourage a victim to keep it a secret.
Students of all ages are exceptionally vulnerable to the advances and sexual
conduct of teachers, and are often incapable of either recognizing or objecting to
the impropriety of their teachers' behavior. Elementary school-age children are
taught to comply with the requests of parental authority figures, especially when
they have been conditioned to believe that such figures would not do anything to
harm them. These students will often not be coguitively capable of discerning the
impropriety of a teacher's conduct nor capable of objecting to such conduct.
Roth, supra note 11, at 509-10 (footnotes omitted).
528. See Pallett v. Palma, 914 F. Supp. 1018,1024 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
529. See Baker, supra note 18, at 305-06 (discussing the use of a strict liability standard
for sexual harassment perpetrated by school employees).
530. See Stacy, supra note 18, at 1365-70 (advocating the use of agency principles for
the determination of institutional liability for sexual harassment perpetrated by employees
of an educational institution).
531. See Roth, supra note 11, at 516-19 (discussing the use of a negligence standard for
the determination of liability for hostile environment sexual harassment).
532. See 914 F. Supp. 1018, 1024 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); see also supra notes 489-503 and
accompanying text (discussing the standard in Pallett).
533. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
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unlikely that the trend in American courts will be toward a standard
that will decrease the possibility of redressing such a widespread,
socially significant problem. Additionally, after the promulgation of
the regulations recently proposed by the OCR, it is likely that federal
courts hearing cases involving hostile environment sexual harassment
perpetrated by school employees will apply agency principles to the
determination of institutional liability. 35
3. Student Perpetrator/Student Victim
a. Viability of the Claim
The only federal court to hold that a hostile environment sexual
harassment claim resulting from peer sexual harassment is not
actionable under Title IX was the Federal Court for the Southern
District of Texas in Garza v. Galena Park Independent School
District.5 36 Rosa Garza alleged that the school district knew that her
daughter, Stacy Marie Ruiz, was being sexually harassed by a fellow
student and failed to react appropriately to the situation.37 The
Garza court held a hostile environment sexual harassment claim
cannot be maintained under Title IX " In addition, the court noted
that the viability of a hostile environment claim under Title IX for
peer sexual harassment was recognized by only one court, which held
that a school's liability must be premised on a finding of intentional
discrimination.539 Thus, the Garza court reasoned, even if hostile
environment sexual harassment was actionable in the present case,
the plaintiff's allegations that the district knew or should have known
of the harassment and failed to respond adequately were insufficient
to support an award of damages.' The court dismissed the
534. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
535. See infra notes 734-38 and accompanying text (describing the standard of liability
recently proposed by the OCR).
536. 914 F. Supp. 1437,1438 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
537. See id. at 1437-38.
538. See id. at 1438 (citing Bougher v. University of Pittsburgh, 713 F. Supp. 139, 145
(W.D. Pa.), aff'd on other grounds, 882 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1989)). It is interesting to note
that the Third Circuit in Bougher expressly refused to adopt the district court's holding
with respect to the viability of a hostile environment claim under Title IX. See Bougher v.
University of Pittsburgh, 882 F.2d 74, 77 (3d Cir. 1989); see also supra notes 505-06 and
accompanying text (describing the district and circuit courts' treatment of the issue in
Bougher). This fact, however, did not seem to be persuasive to the Garza court.
539. See Garza, 914 F. Supp at 1438 (citing Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F.
Supp. 1560,1575 (N.D. Cal. 1993)).
540. See id.
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plaintiff's Title IX claim. 1
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
addressed a situation involving hostile environment sexual
harassment resulting from peer sexual harassment in Seamons v.
Snow. 2  The district court that initially considered the case
described the incident that led to the Title IX claim as follows:' In
the fall of his junior year, Brian Seamons was the backup
quarterback on his high school football team.' During a locker-
room incident, Brian was taped naked to a towel rack and exposed to
the girl he had taken to the homecoming dance a few weeks earlier.'
Brian reported the incident to the principal.5" Shortly after Brian
reported the incident, the head football coach, Douglas Snow,
dismissed Brian from the football team?47 The day after Brian was
dismissed from the team, the superintendent of the school district
canceled the rest of the football team's season as a direct result of the
locker-room incident.' Brian subsequently moved from his parents'
house to reside with an uncle who lived in another county because he
could not tolerate the treatment he received at school. 9 Brian's
parents filed suit under Title IX, alleging that the school district was
liable for the creation and maintenance of a hostile educational
environment.55 The district court disposed of Brian's claim by
holding that a claim of hostile environment sexual harassment was
not a viable cause of action under Title IX. 51
The Tenth Circuit did not adopt the reasoning of the district
541. See id.
542. 84 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1996).
543. See Seamons v. Snow, 864 F. Supp. 1111, 1115-16 (D. Utah 1994), aff'd on other
grounds, 84 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 1996).







551. See id at 1118. The district court declined to apply relevant Title VII law. See id
In support of its position, the court noted that both Title IX and Title VI were enacted
pursuant to Congress's Spending Clause power. See id. And, the court reasoned,
legislation enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause was like a contract that requires
Congress to be unambiguous when conditioning the grant of federal money. See id. (citing
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Haderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)). Therefore, the court
concluded, because there was no cause of action for a hostile environment perpetuated
through a school district's negligence included in Title IX, such a cause of action could not
be properly imported from Title VII See i
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court and explicitly noted that Title IX protected a student from
hostile environment sexual harassment. 2 The court pointed out,
however, that a difference existed between a "hostile environment"
and a "sexually charged hostile environment." 3 Only the latter is
actionable under Title IX.' The court described the prima face
elements Brian needed to establish to succeed on his claim of hostile
environment sexual harassment. " After applying the standard to
the facts alleged by Brian, the court held that Brian failed to
establish that the harassment was based on sex. 6 In addition, the
court stated that it was unclear what liability the school would have
for a hostile educational environment created by a student's peers.
However, since Brian failed to establish a prima fade case of sexual
harassment, the Tenth Circuit did not have to address the
appropriate standard of institutional liability pertaining to such
situations.58
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania addressed the viability of a hostile environment claim
resulting from peer sexual harassment in Linson v. Trustees of the
University of Pennsylvania.59 Brian Linson was a graduate student in
Linguistics at the University of Pennsylvania when he allegedly was
subjected to peer sexual harassment by another male graduate
student.5 Linson informed the chairperson of the Graduate Group
in Linguistics, Donald Ringe, of the other graduate student's
actions. 6 ' Linson filed suit alleging that the school had violated Title
552. See Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1232 n.7 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing Franklin v.
Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60,75 (1992)).
553. Id. at 1232.
554. See id.
555. The court noted that Brian had to establish
(1) that he is a member of a protected group; (2) that he was subject to
unwelcome harassment; (3) that the harassment was based on sex; (4) that the
sexual harassment was severe or pervasive so as unreasonably to alter the
conditions of his education and create an abusive educational environment; and
(5) that some basis for institutional liability had been established.
Id. (citing Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186,1194 (11th Cir. 1996)).
556. See iU The court noted that Brian failed to show that the subject of his lawsuit,
the school's response to the locker room incident, was sexual in nature. See id. at 1232-33.
557. See Ui at 1232 n.7.
558. See id.
559. No. CIV. A. 95-3681,1996 WL 479532, *1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 21,1996).
560. See id at *1. Iinson alleged that Kenjiro Matsuda, another graduate student,
"engaged in repeated unwanted conduct toward Plaintiff, which included verbal
solicitations for sexual contact, unwanted touching of the private areas of Plaintiff's body,
strangling, and other nonconsensual touching." Id.
561. See i Matsuda complained to Ringe because .inson tampered with Matsuda's
1997] 2125
2126 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75
IX in its handling of his sexual harassment complaint."2
In considering Linson's claim, the court initially considered
whether a complaint involving peer sexual harassment was
actionable under Title IX."V The court noted that many other courts
had recognized the viability of claims for damages resulting from a
"sexually hostile educational environment,"" and concluded that a
school may be liable for damages resulting from a situation involving
peer sexual harassment "where intentional discrimination is
shown." 5  After recognizing the viability of Linson's claim, the court
concluded that the plaintiff had failed to allege sufficient facts to
support a finding of institutional liability because Linson "failed to
point to anything in the record indicating that the University's
alleged discriminatory actions were gender-motivated."
b. Standards of Liability
(1) Actual or Constructive Knowledge and the Failure to Take
Appropriate RemedialAction
In Murray v. New York University College of Dentistry,5 67 the
personal computer files. See id. When Ringe contacted I.inson for a response to
Matsuda's allegations, Linson informed Ringe of the sexual harassment to which he had
been subjected. See id.
562. See id at *2.
563. See id.
564. Id. (citing Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 74-75 (1992);
Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226,1232 n.7 (10th Cir. 1996); Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of
Educ., 74 F.3d 1186, 1193 (11th Cir. 1996); Murray v. New York Univ. College of
Dentistry, 57 F.3d 243, 249 (2d Cir. 1995); Bolon v. Rolla Pub. Schs., 917 F. Supp. 1423,
1429 (E.D. Mo. 1996); Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560, 1571 (N.D. Cal.
1993); Patricia H. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1288 (N.D. Cal. 1993)).
Ony three of the above cases specifically involve student-to-student sexual harassment
claims. See Seamons, 84 F.3d at 1232 n.7 (recognizing a student's Title IX cause of action
against a school district for damages suffered from a hostile educational environment
created by other students); Davis, 74 F.3d at 1193 ("Title IX encompasses a claim for
damages due to a sexually hostile educational environment created by a fellow student or
students when the supervising authorities knowingly fail to act to eliminate the
harassment." (footnote omitted)); Petaluma, 830 F. Supp. at 1573 (deferring to OCR
Letters of Finding, recognizing a cause of action for student-to-student sexual harassment).
565. Linson, 1996 WL 479532, at *3.
566. Id. at *4. The court did not offer much reasoning with respect to its adoption of a
particular standard of institutional liability, but it did note that the intent to discriminate
could be inferred from the school's failure to respond appropriately to plaintiff's
complaints. See id at *3 ("[A] plaintiff student could proceed against a school district on
the theory that its inaction (or insufficient action) in the face of complaints of student-to-
student sexual harassment was a result of an actual intent to discriminate against the
student on the basis of sex.").
567. 57 F.3d 243 (2d Cir. 1995).
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Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed a hostile
environment claim brought under Title IX. While Patricia Murray
was a second-year student in the New York University College of
Dentistry ("NYU"), she was subjected to sexual harassment by
Mitchell Davidson, a patient at the school's clinic!" Over the course
of several months, Davidson stared at Murray, commented
repeatedly on her appearance, asked her out for dates and made
professions of love to her.'6 Although Murray informed Ira Gulker,
a doctor at the school, of the harassment, she was told that she
should "'grow up' and deal with the problem herself." ' Murray
performed poorly during her second year and alleged that her
performance had been adversely affected by the harassment she had
suffered." After unsuccessfully appealing the school's
determination that she should repeat her second year, Murray filed
suit against the school under Title IX, alleging that the school had
violated Title IX by failing to remedy the hostile environment
created by the harassment once the school had notice of it. "
The Murray court noted that courts addressing Title IX sex
discrimination claims brought by employees generally have applied
Title VII standards to the issuer 3 However, no court had directly
addressed the extent to which Title VII standards should apply to a
claim brought by a student. ' The Murray court noted that the
Supreme Court endorsed the invocation of Title VII principles when
considering Title IX sexual harassment cases, and the court
concluded that an educational institution may be liable for the sexual
harassment of a student through application of standards similar to
those utilized under Title VII.
568. See id. at 245. Although the patient was not a "student" in the same sense as the
other perpetrators of sexual harassment in other cases in this section, discussion of this
case is relevant because it pertains to the standard of liability for a hostile environment
created by a non-employee of the institution. See id at 248-50. In this sense, it is
analogous to and indicative of how the Second Circuit is likely to treat peer sexual
harassment cases.
569. See id at 245.
570. Id.
571. See id. at 245-46.
572. See id. at 247.
573. See id. at 248 (citations omitted).
574. See iU.
575. See iU. at 249. The court reasoned:
The Court's citation of Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), a
Title VII case, in support of Franklin's central holding indicates that, in a Title IX
suit for gender discrimination based on sexual harassment of a student, an
educational institution may be held liable under standards similar to those
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The Murray court described the appropriate standard under
Title VI 6 and noted that with respect to harassment perpetrated by
a person other than a supervisor, such as a co-worker, the proper
standard of liability under Title VII is whether the employer knew or
should have known of the harassment and failed to take appropriate
action to remedy it.' It was not clear to the court whether the
school could be liable under Title IX through the constructive notice
aspect of the standard. 8 Without explicitly concluding whether the
constructive knowledge standard was applicable to the liability
determination under Title IX, the court held that the plaintiffs claim
should be dismissed because she had failed to allege facts that would
support the conclusion that the university had notice of the
harassment even under the more liberal standard of constructive
knowledge5 9  The court held that the district court properly
dismissed Murray's complaint for failure to state a claim."'
(2) Actual Knowledge or No Reasonable Avenue of Complaint
Available
The District Court for the Northern District of New York
addressed the appropriate standard for institutional liability resulting
from peer sexual harassment in Bruneau v. South Kortright Central
School District.51 Eva Bruneau was a sixth-grade student at
Kortright Central School District when she allegedly was subjected
to peer sexual harassment.5' Bruneau alleged that she informed
applied in cases under Title VIL
Id.
576. The court noted that in order to establish a prima facie case of hostile
environment sexual harassment, a plaintiff must allege "(1) that her workplace was
permeated with discriminatory intimidation that was sufficiently severe or pervasive to
alter the conditions of her work environment, and (2) that a specific basis exists for
imputing the conduct that created the hostile environment to the employer." Id. (citations
omitted).
577. See Ud
578. See id. at 250.
579. See id. The court concluded:
We think it unnecessary to decide here to what extent we would apply a
constructive-notice standard in cases under either Title VII or Title IX, however,
for we conclude that, even assuming a broad application of that standard, and
drawing all reasonable inferences in Murray's favor, the complaint fails to allege
that even NYU's agents knew or should have known of the continued harassment
in the present case.
Id.
580. See i. at 251.
581. 935 F. Supp. 162 (N.D.N.Y. 1996).
582. See id. at 166. According to Bruneau, male students often called her and other
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both her sixth-grade teacher, William Parker, and an assistant
superintendent of the school, Lynda Race, of the harassmentsn In
addition, Bruneau's mother alleged that she also specifically told
Parker and Race of the sexual harassment!'
The Bruneau court began by considering the plaintiff's
contention that the substantive law from Title VII ought to govern
the plaintiff's hostile environment claim under Title IX and held that
the substantive law from Title VII should apply to the case at bar."
The court, however, qualified its holding by noting that there was a
limit to the extent to which Title VII law ought to guide Title IX
jurisprudence."6 After considering the manner in which other courts
had utilized Title VII as a guide,- the court concluded that one area
in which Title VII principles should be modified in the Title IX
context was in the area of institutional liabilitysrs The Bruneau court
noted that Title VII permits a finding of institutional liability for
hostile environment sexual harassment when the employer has actual
or constructive notice of the harassment and fails to take appropriate
remedial action! " The court reasoned that the constructive notice
standard was not appropriate in the Title IX context because
"[a]lthough an employee is an agent of an employer, a student, of an
educational institution is not, per se, an agent of that institution. '
The Bruneau court ultimately concluded that a school would not
be liable for peer sexual harassment unless the school had actual
notice of the harassment but refrained from action, or provided no
girls vulgar names such as "'lesbian,' 'prostitute,' 'retard,' 'scum,' 'bitch,' 'whore,' and
'ugly dog faced bitch."' Id. In addition, Brunean alleged that the boys subjected her and
female classmates to physical harassment, such as "snapping [their] bras, running their
fingers down the girls' backs, stuffing paper down the girls' blouses, cutting the girls' hair,
grabbing the girls' breasts, spitting, shoving, hitting and kicking." Id.
583. See id. at 166-67.
584. See id. at 167.
585. See id. at 168-69.
586. See id. at 169-70.
587. See id. at 170-71.
588. See i. at 174.
589. See i at 172 (citing Van Zant v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 80 F.3d 708,715 (2d
Cir. 1996); EEOC v. A. Sam & Sons Produce Co., 872 F. Supp. 29,34 (W.D.N.Y. 1994)).
590. Id. at 173. The court emphasized the lack of an agency relationship between the
school and one of its students and noted:
In order for agency principles to attach between a student and their school there
must be some manifestation of consent by the student to the school that the
student shall act on the school's behalf and subject to the school's control, as well
as, consent from the school to the student's actions.
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reasonable avenue of complaint.91 After acknowledging that there
were genuine issues of material fact with regard to whether the
school had actual knowledge of the harassment, the court concluded
that it could not find as a matter of law that the school lacked the
requisite notice for liability." Consequently, the Bruneau court
denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment.93
(3) Direct Proof of "Intentional" Discrimination
The first court to consider the issue of a school's liability for a
hostile environment created through peer sexual harassment was the
United States District Court for the Northern District of California
in Doe v. Petaluma City School District.5" Jane Doe alleged that she
was sexually harassed by her peers throughout the seventh and
eighth grades." Doe also alleged that the school failed to take
appropriate action after being informed of the harassment.96 Doe
eventually transferred schools and completed her education at a
private girls' school.5" As a result of the above facts, Doe filed suit
against the school for allegedly violating Title IX.98
The Petaluma court noted that no federal court had addressed
whether peer sexual harassment was actionable under Title IX"
However, the court observed that the OCR clearly held the opinion
that an action for student-to-student sexual harassment may be
maintained under Title IX,6° and reasoned that the findings of the
OCR should be persuasive in interpreting the causes of action under
591. See id. at 177.
592. See id.
593. See id.
594. 830 F. Supp. 1560 (N.D. Cal. 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 54 F.3d 1447 (9th. Cir.
1995). The Ninth Circuit addressed one issue from the district court's decision in Doe v,
Petaluma City School District, 54 F.3d 1447 (9th Cir. 1995). The Court of Appeals
decision, however, pertained only to the district court's handling of the plaintiff's claim
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A discussion of that issue is outside the scope of this Comment.
595. See Petaluma, 830 F. Supp. at 1564. Some of Doe's specific allegations included
that students repeatedly made comments to her regarding sex with hot dogs. See id. at
1564-66. She stated that she was called a "hot dog bitch," "slut," and "hoe" by other girls.
Id. at 1565. In addition, after Doe reported the harassment to school officials, she was
threatened repeatedly by other students. See i. at 1564-65.
596. See id. at 1563,1564.
597. See id. at 1566.
598. See id.
599. See id. at 1573. The court's decision in Garza v. Galena Park Independent School
District, 914 F. Supp. 1437 (S.D. Tex. 1994), occurred after the Petaluma decision. For a
discussion of the Garza decision, see supra notes 53641 and accompanying text.
600. See Petaluma, 830 F. Supp. at 1573.
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Title IX' The court began its analysis by acknowledging that the
Supreme Court recognized an action for hostile environment sexual
harassment in the Title VII contextsn and that the Court indicated
that Title IX is to be interpreted broadly.' The court also pointed
out that the First Circuit had recognized the viability of hostile
environment sexual harassment under Title IX, although not in the
context of peer sexual harassment.6" In addition, the court
considered that both the First and the Tenth Circuits applied the
substantive law from Title VII in order to analyze sex discrimination
claims under Title IX.6 The court also noted that at least one court
recognized the viability of hostile environment sexual harassment
when the claim was caused by a school employee's behavior. 6 With
these considerations, the Petaluma court ultimately held that hostile
environment sexual harassment resulting from peer sexual
harassment is actionable under Title IX.6
The Petaluma court also addressed the standard for institutional
liability for such claims.' The court stated, as a preliminary matter,
that there was no authority for the extent of the private judicial
remedies that are available under Title IX. As a result, the court
began its analysis with the observation that Title IX was based on
Title VI and "is to be interpreted in a similar manner., 61 0 The court
noted that in order to obtain compensatory relief under Title VI, a
plaintiff must show discriminatory intent; a showing of
discriminatory effect is insufficient.611 After briefly addressing the
applicability of a "knew or should have known" standard for
liability, the court concluded that it did not properly apply to
601. See id According to the court, "[w]hile Letters of Finding are not due the
deference of formal regulations, some deference is due to them as they express the opinion
of an agency charged with implementing Title IX and its regulations." Id.
602. See id. at 1571 (citing Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986)).
603. See i& (citing North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512,521 (1982)).
604. See id. (citing Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 901 (1st Cir.
1988)).
605. See id. (citing Lipset, 864 F.2d at 897; Mabry v. State Bd. of Community Colleges
& Occupational Educ., 813 F.2d 311, 316 n.6 (10th Cir. 1987)).
606. See id. at 1572 (citing Patricia H. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1288,
1297-98 (N.D. Cal. 1993)).
607. See id. at 1575.
608. See id.
609. See hi at 1573.
610. Id. (citing Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694-96 (1979)).
611. See i. (citing Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Conm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 607 n. 27
(1983)).
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student-to-student hostile environment harassment under Title IX.612
In order to receive monetary damages, a plaintiff must show that a
school intentionally discriminated against the victim of the
harassment on the basis of sex.6Y Such a standard required the
plaintiff to show that the school's action or inaction in response to
the complaint of peer sexual harassment resulted from "actual intent
to discriminate against the student on the basis of sex."614 The court
dismissed the plaintiff's claim with leave to amend to reflect the
theory of liability adopted by the court.6U
In Rowinsky v. Bryan Independent School District,616 the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit followed the lead of the Petaluma
court with respect to its adoption of a standard for institutional
liability for peer sexual harassment under Title IX.617 Janet Doe was
an eighth-grade student at Sam Rayburn Middle School when she
was subjected to sexual harassment by male students while riding the
school bus." Although Janet consistently complained to the bus
driver about the harassment, after he failed to stop the action, she
stopped reporting the incidents. 19 School officials also were
informed of some of the physical assaults."' In response to the
reports, the school suspended one of the offenders from riding the
bus for three days,62' but Janet was sexually harassed by another boy
612. Id. at 1575-76. According to the court, the implication of the Supreme Court's
decision in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60 (1992), was that the
remedies under Title IX are not coextensive with the remedies under Title VII. See
Petaluma, 830 F. Supp. at 1575 (citing Franklin, 503 U.S. at 60, 65 n.4). In Franklin, the
Court recognized that damages under Title IX may be awarded only upon a showing of
intentional discrimination by the school. See Franklin, 503 U.S. at 74-75. The Petaluma
court reasoned that a finding that the school is liable because it "knew or should have
known" of the harassment would not be the same as finding that the school "intentionally
discriminated" against the student. Petaluma, 830 F. Supp. at 1576. Therefore, in order to
comply with the Supreme Court's holdings in Franklin and Guardians, the "knew or should
have known" standard had to be rejected. Id.
613. See Petaluma, 830 F. Supp. at 1576.
614. Id.
615. See id.
616. 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 165 (1996).
617. See iU at 1008 ("[T]itle IX does not impose such liability, absent allegations that
the school district itself directly discriminated based on sex.").
618. See ad at 1008-09. G.S., a male student, grabbed Janet's genital area and her
breasts. See id. at 1008. In addition, G.S. verbally harassed Janet by saying such things to
her as "'When are you going to let me fuck you?', 'What bra size are you wearing?', and
'What size panties are you wearing?"' Id. La, another male student, placed his hand up
Janet's skirt. See iU. at 1009.
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in one of her classes.6" When Janet's mother, Debra Rowinsky, met
with the superintendent of the school to discuss the harassment, Ms.
Rowinsky was informed that it was the school's position that the
situations had been handled appropriately and that no further action
would be taken by the school.6" As a result, Ms. Rowinsky filed suit
under Title IX alleging that the school was liable for the hostile
environment sexual harassment her daughter experienced.6
The Fifth Circuit stated that the issue in the case was whether
the school could be liable for a hostile environment created by "a
party other than the grant recipient or its agents." 6' The court
considered the text of Title IX and, concluding that the statute
offered no definitive answer to the issue,626 turned to the scope and
structure of the Act itself, its legislative history, and the
interpretations of the agency charged with executing the statute6
With respect to the scope of Title IX, the court emphasized that Title
IX was enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause.6' With that
observation as its premise, the court reasoned that "[i]mposing
liability for the acts of third parties would be incompatible with the
purpose of a spending condition, because grant recipients have little
control over the multitude of third parties who could conceivably
violate the prohibitions of Title IX"''  In addition, according to the
Rowinsky court, the legislative history of Title IX supported the
conclusion that schools should not be liable for the acts of its
622. See id. at 1009. F.F., another male student, reached up Janet's shirt and
unfastened her bra. See iti When the vice-principal was informed of the action, he
suspended F.F. from school for the rest of the day, and the day thereafter. See id
623. See id. Mrs. Rowinsky was not advised of Title IX or of the school's sexual
harassment policy. See id.
624. See id. at 1010.
625. Id.
626. See ia at 1012.
627. See id.
628. See id. at 1012-13. The court acknowledged that the Supreme Court had never
explicitly recognized that Title IX was enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause. See iU at
1012 n.14. The court noted that it was possible that Title IX was enacted pursuant to
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. Only case law suggested that because
Title IX was modeled after Title VI, which was passed pursuant to the Spending Clause,
Title IX also must have been passed pursuant to the Spending Clause. See i&
629. Id. at 1013 (footnote omitted). It is important to note that most of the court's
reasoning in this section stemmed from a basic misunderstanding of the action for which
damages were being sought under Title IX in situations such as the one in Rowinsky.
Damages were not being sought simply because the plaintiff was harassed by a fellow
student. Rather, the damages were being sought because of the school's failure to
adequately respond to the situation. It was the school that failed to adequately remedy the
harassment once it had knowledge of it. See iU at 1023-24 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
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students in creating a hostile sexual environment for other
students.60
Finally, the court discussed the Office of Civil Rights's
interpretations of the statute' and quoted from a Policy
Memorandum issued by the OCR: "'Sexual harassment consists of
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature, imposed on the basis
of sex, by an employee or agent of the recipient, that denies, limits,
provides different, or conditions the provision of aid, benefits,
services or treatment protected under title IX.' " The Rowinsky
court noted that the implementing regulations of Title IX discuss
only the acts of the grant recipients. 3 The court dismissed the OCR
Letters of Finding that addressed peer sexual harassment by stating
that the letters should be "accorded little weight," particularly
because the Policy Memorandum was more consistent with prior
OCR determinations,6' but also because Letters of Finding do not
warrant the same amount of deference due a statute interpreted by
its implementing agency.05
Ultimately, the Rowinsky court held that in order for a school to
be liable for a hostile environment resulting from peer sexual
harassment, a plaintiff must show "that the school district responded
to sexual harassment differently based on sex." 6 Such a standard
may be met by showing that the school treated the sexual harassment
of one sex less seriously than it treated the sexual harassment of the
other sex or ignored the sexual harassment of one sex while
addressing the sexual harassment of the other sex."7 The court
concluded that Rowinsky failed to demonstrate facts that supported
such a finding and consequently affirmed the district court's dismissal
630. See id. at 1013 ("Throughout the legislative history, both supporters and
opponents of the amendment focused exclusively on acts by the grant recipients.").
631. See ia at 1014-16.
632. Id. at 1015 (quoting OCR Policy Memorandum from Antonio J. Califa, Director of
Litigation, Enforcement and Policy Service, to Regional Civil Rights Directors (Aug. 31,
1981 (emphasis added)).'
633. See i (citing 34 C.F.R. § 106.31 (1995)).
634. See i ("The Policy Memorandum deserves more deference because it represents
a deliberate policy statement by the agency and is consistent with past agency
interpretations.").
635. See id. The court emphasized the context in which the Letters of Finding are
written. According to the court, the purpose of the letters is to compel voluntary
compliance with the Act, and as a result, "pressures to settle" have a significant effect on
their content. Id.
636. Id. at 1016.
637. See id
[Vol. 752134
1997] SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN EDUCATION
of her claim.68
(4) Intentional Discrimination as Inferred from Totality of the
Circumstances
The Federal Court for the Western District of Missouri adopted
a slightly different standard in Bosley v. Kearney R-1 School
Distrkt.69 Jennifer Bosley was a minor student in the Kearney R-1
School District when she allegedly was sexually harassed by fellow
students.6" Jennifer's mother reported the harassment to the OCR,
which investigated the incidents and determined that each one had
been handled properly by the school." As a result of the
harassment, Mrs. Bosley eventually withdrew her children from the
school and home schooled them."' She also filed suit on behalf of
her daughter, alleging that the school was liable for violating Title
IX.
6 4 3
As a preliminary matter, the Bosley court noted that in order to
succeed in her Title IX action, Jennifer would have to show "that
defendant's failure to take adequate remedial action in response to
her complaints of sexual harassment by her peers was the result of
intentional discrimination based on her sex.""4  The court
acknowledged that the identification of discriminatory conduct is
difficult and specified that "in the context of the claims in this case,
plaintiff must show that the school district selected a particular
course of action in responding to her complaints of sexual
harassment at least in part 'because of' plaintiff's sex." 64
The court then discussed in greater detail the appropriate
standard for institutional liability for peer sexual harassment under
Title IX.w The court pointed out that under the relevant Title VII
law, discriminatory intent can be inferred from the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the harassment. 7  Specifically, under
Title VII, discriminatory intent could be derived from "'the
cumulative evidence of action and inaction which objectively
638. See i.
639. 904 F. Supp. 1006 (W.D. Mo. 1995).
640. See id. at 1015.
641. See id
642. See id. at 1015-16.
643. See id at 1012-13.
644. Id. at 1020.
645. Id. at 1021.
646. See id. at 1021-22.
647. See id. at 1021.
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manifests discriminatory intent.' "" Next, the court discussed why
the relevant law from Title VII regarding the establishment of
discriminatory intent should apply to sexual harassment claims under
Title IX.69 The Bosley court concluded that "[t]he standards
developed under Title VII to protect employees from sex
discrimination by employers are adaptable to protect persons
participating in federally supported educational programs from sex
discrimination by the educational institution receiving federal
financial aid."' 0 Thus, the court held that "[o]nce a school district
becomes aware of sexual harassment, it must promptly take remedial
action which is reasonably calculated to end the harassment."' 1
In Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education,62 the Eleventh
Circuit addressed both the viability of a hostile environment sexual
harassment claim resulting from peer sexual harassment.. and the
proper standard for institutional liability.- LaShonda D. was a fifth-
grade student when she was sexually harassed by G.F., a male
classmate.05 G.F.'s actions were so severe that he pled guilty to
sexual battery.66 In spite of the fact that LaShonda reported all the
incidents to her teachers and her mother, the school took no action
to remedy G.F.'s behavior.w As a result of G.F.'s harassment and
the school's failure to respond to LaShonda's complaints,
648. Id. at 1020 (quoting Dowdell v. City of Apoka, Fla., 698 F.2d 1181, 1185 (11th Cir.
1983)).
649. See id. at 1021-23.
650. Id. at 1023.
651. Id.
652. 74 F.3d 1186 (11th Cir. 1996).
653. See id. at 1193.
654. See id. at 1194.
655. See id at 1188. G.F. attempted to fondle LaShonda and directly used offensive
language against her. See id at 1188-89. The court described specific instances of G.F.'s
conduct:
In December... G.F. attempted to touch LaShonda's breasts and vaginal area,
telling her, "I want to get in bed with you," and "I want to feel your boobs." Two
similar incidents occurred in January 1993. In February, G.F. placed a doorstop
in his pants and behaved in a sexually suggestive manner toward LaShonda.
Other incidents occurred later in February and in March. In April, G.F. rubbed
against LaShonda in a sexually suggestive manner.
Id. at 1189.
656. See id.
657. See iU Some of the school's responses to LaShonda's and her mother's complaints
included her classroom teacher's refusal to allow LaShonda to report G.F.'s behavior to
the principal; her teacher's refusal to change LaShonda's seating assignment, which was
located next to G.F.'s assigned seat; the principal's questioning of LaShonda-why "'was
[she] the only one complaining' "; and the failure of school officials to remove or discipline
G.F. in any way for his behavior. See id.
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LaShonda's mother, Aurelia Davis, filed a lawsuit against the school
alleging that their actions in handling the situation violated Title
IX." The district court dismissed the Title IX claim, reasoning that
the school had not played a part in LaShonda's harassment because
peer sexual harassment cannot properly be considered a "school
program or activity" within the meaning of Title IX.' The Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, however, reached a different
conclusion.""
The Eleventh Circuit categorized the issue before it as "whether
the Board's alleged failure to take action to stop G.F.'s sexual
harassment of LaShonda 'excluded [her] from participation in, ...
denied [her] the benefits of, or ... subjected [her] to discrimination
under' the Monroe County educational system because of her sex.""'
In addressing whether the substantive law from Title VII ought to
apply to sexual harassment claims brought under Title IX,"2 the
court considered Supreme Court precedent involving the
interpretation of Title IX"' and lower court cases involving sex
discrimination claims brought under Title IX.6" The court concluded
that Title VII principles ought to apply to the case,"6 and held that
"Title IX encompasses a claim for damages due to a sexually hostile
educational environment created by a fellow student or students
when the supervising authorities knowingly fail to act to eliminate
658. See id. at 1188.
659. See Aurelia D. v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 862 F. Supp. 363, 367 (M.D. Ga.
1994), rev'd sub nom. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186, 1195 (11th Cir.
1996).
660. See Davis, 74 F.3d at 1188,1195.
661. Id. at 1189 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1988)).
662. See i& at 1189-92.
663. See id- at 1190. The Davis court noted that Title IX is to be construed broadly, see
id. (citing North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512,521 (1982)), that a private right
of action is available under Title IX, see ih (citing Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441
U.S. 677,717 (1979)), and that monetary damages are allowed for violation of Title IX, see
id. (citing Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60,76 (1992)).
664. See id. at 1190-92. The court noted that "courts have regularly applied Title VII
principles" to the review of sex discrimination claims brought by both teachers and
students under Title IX. Id. at 1190-91. The court also pointed out that several lower
courts have interpreted the Franklin decision as authorizing the application of substantive
Title VII law to Title IX claims for sexual harassment. See id. at 1191-92 (discussing
Murray v. New York Univ. College of Dentistry, 57 F.3d 243, 249 (2d Cir. 1995); Doe v.
Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560, 1571-75 (N.D. Cal. 1993)).
665. See id. at 1192 ("[S]uch application is supported by Franklin, Title IX's legislative
history and the Supreme Court's mandate that we read Title IX broadly, as well as by




The court emphasized that Davis was suing the school not
because of G.F.'s conduct, but rather because of the school's legally
actionable lack of reaction to his conduct. 7 As in the applicable
Title VII law, an educational institution is responsible for
maintaining a harassment-free environment for its students, which
includes taking responsibility for harassment stemming from other
students as well as from school employees.6" The court summarized
the elements required for the establishment of a prima facie case of
hostile environment sexual harassment"9 and clarified the standard
of proof required with respect to the severity of the environment by
summarizing the standard set forth by the Supreme Court in
Harris67' With respect to the facts of the case, the court concluded
that the first four elements of the cause of action (which deal with
the harassment itself) had been sufficiently alleged to survive the
defendant's motion for summary judgment.671
The court then considered the appropriate standard for the
school's institutional liability and reasoned that the school could be
liable for G.F.'s actions if the evidence revealed that the school
knowingly failed to remedy the hostile environment.67 Further,
LaShonda could show that the school had knowledge of the hostile
environment by producing evidence that she complained to a "higher
level manager" about G.F.'s conduct, or that the conduct was
pervasive, in which case it would support an inference that "higher
level management" knew of the harassment.673 The court noted that
666. Id. at 1193.
667. See id.
668. See iUd at 1193-94. The court emphasized that a sexually hostile environment
caused by students has the same effect as one caused by employees: it denies the student
the full benefit of her education, which violates the guarantee of Title IX. See id. at 1194.
669. See id. According to the Davis court, in order to establish a prima facie case of
hostile environment sexual harassment stemming from peer sexual harassment, a plaintiff
must establish:
(1) that she is a member of a protected group; (2) that she was subject to
unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) that the harassment was based on sex; (4) that
the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the conditions
of her education and create an abusive educational environment; and (5) that
some basis for institutional liability has been established.
Id.
670. See id. For a description of the standard adopted by the Harris Court, see supra
notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
671. See Davis, 74 F.3d at 1194-95.
672. See id at 1194.
673. See id at 1195. The court implicitly adopted the "knew or should have known"
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LaShonda reported incidents of harassment to the school authorities
on at least three different occasions.64 In addition, Davis alleged
that in spite of the knowledge of the situation, the school failed to
take any action to redress the problem. 5 The court held that Davis's
allegations were sufficient to raise genuine issues of material fact
with respect to institutional liability and reversed the district court's
dismissal of the case. 
6
Still another federal court addressed a hostile environment
claim resulting from peer sexual harassment in Burrow v. Postville
Community School District.67 Lisa Burrow was a sophomore at
Postville Community High School when she was allegedly subjected
to a hostile environment because of sexual harassment by her
peers." Lisa's parents repeatedly reported the incidents to the
superintendent of the school and the principal.679 Mr. and Mrs.
Burrow obtained an attorney who spoke to the superintendent and
the principal about Lisa's situation.' Lisa also discussed the
situation with a teacher and a guidance counselor at the school. 1'
While several school employees made promises that the situation
would be handled, nothing was ever done to change the students'
behavior.6 Officials from the school admitted that, at the time of
Lisa's harassment, the school did not have a sexual harassment
policy in place and that several of the incidents reported by Lisa
were never investigated by the school.6 Eventually, a lawsuit was
filed alleging that the school's failure to remedy Lisa's situation




677. 929 F. Supp. 1193 (N.D. Iowa 1996).
678. See id- at 1196-97. The court summarized the behavior to which Lisa was allegedly
subjected:
[S]tudents repeatedly called Lisa vulgar names of a sexual nature and yelled
sexual obscenities at her, such as "slut," "whore," "bitch," "skank," and "fuckin'
tramp;" students repeatedly threw food and spit wads at Lisa, pushed her into her
locker, elbowed her and intentionally ran into her in the hallway; a male student
repeatedly kicked her between her legs in a sexually offensive manner, students
stole her book bag and wrote sexual obscenities and threats on her books, her







683. See id at 1197-98.
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violated Title IX.
The Burrow court recognized that there was a split in the circuit
courts regarding the appropriate standard for institutional liability
for situations involving peer sexual harassment.6 The court noted
that in the Eleventh Circuit, a school could be liable for failing to
take prompt remedial action in response to a hostile environment
created by students if the school knew or should have known of the
harassment. In contrast, in the Fifth Circuit, a school could be
found liable for peer sexual harassment only if a plaintiff could show
a disparity in the way the school handled sexual harassment
complaints based on the victim's sex.' The Burrow court also
considered the standards adopted by the district courts that had
addressed the issue of institutional liability, noting that most district
courts seemed to require a showing of intentional discrimination.'
Moreover, the Bosley court added that under the standard adopted
by the district courts, intentional discrimination can be inferred from
the pervasiveness of the behavior or from evidence that the school
failed to stop the harassment even when it had actual knowledge of
such harassment.'
The Burrow court concluded that in order to support a finding
of institutional liability, Lisa must establish an "intent to
discriminate" on the part of the school district." The requisite intent
684. See iL at 1196.
685. See iUL at 1200.
686. See id. at 1201 (discussing Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, 74 F.3d
1186, 1195 (11th Cir. 1996)). The court also noted that the Davis standard of school
liability for peer sexual harassment was endorsed, in dicta, by the Tenth Circuit in
Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1232-33 (10th Cir. 1996), but the Seamons court never
reached the issue of the school's liability, dismissing the plaintiff's claim because the
harassment suffered by the plaintiff was not sexual in nature. See Burrow, 929 F. Supp. at
1202 (discussing Seamons). In addition, the court noted that the Ninth Circuit also
discussed the issue of institutional liability without explicitly adopting a standard in Doe v.
Petaluma City School District, 54 F.3d 1447,1452 (9th Cir. 1994). See Burrow, 929 F. Supp.
at 1203 n.7. The Burrow court noted that the Ninth Circuit stated, in dicta, that a school
official might not be entitled to immunity if the official failed to remedy a hostile
environment that he or she knew or should have known about. See i& However, because
the district court's disposition of the claim against the school had not been appealed, the
Ninth Circuit escaped having to adopt a standard for institutional liability. See id.
687. See Burrow, 929 F. Supp. at 1201-02 (discussing Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch.
Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1016 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 165 (1996)).
688. See id at 1203-04 (citing Bosley v. Kearney R-1 Sch. Dist., 904 F. Supp. 1006, 1020
(W.D. Mo. 1995); Oona R.-S. v. Santa Rosa City Sch., 890 F. Supp. 1452, 1466 (N.D. Cal.
1995); Petaluma, 830 F. Supp. at 1575).
689. See id. at 1204 (citing Bosley, 904 F. Supp. at 1021; Oona R-S., 890 F. Supp. at
1466; Petaluma, 830 F. Supp. at 1575).
690. Id. at 1205.
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could be established
through either direct or indirect evidence, and ... that in
the absence of direct evidence, an intent to discriminate on
the part of the school district may be inferred by the finder
of fact from the totality of relevant evidence, including the
school's failure to prevent or stop the sexual harassment
despite actual knowledge of the sexually harassing behavior
of students over whom the school exercised some degree of
control.691
The court held that Lisa alleged facts sufficient to allow a trier of fact
to infer that the school district intentionally discriminated against
her.69
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Iowa adopted the Burrow standard in Wright v. Mason City
Community School District.69 Heather Wright was raped by a
former boyfriend in junior high school and pressed charges.6" As a
result, she was "unmercifully tormented" by other students at her
high school.6" Heather filed suit against the school district, alleging
that the school was liable for failing to adequately respond to the
hostile environment to which she was subjected.696
691. Id. In applying the standard to the facts of the case, the court summarized the
evidence in Lisa's case which supported the inference that the school intentionally
discriminated against her, including
evidence that the school district knowingly failed to respond appropriately to
peer sexual harassment of Lisa despite numerous reports by Lisa, her Parents,
her attorney, various teachers and the OCR; evidence that the school district
knowingly failed to implement appropriate sexual harassment policies and
grievance procedures; evidence that the school district tolerated the harassment
of Lisa by failing to promptly investigate and/or punish students for peer sexual
harassment; evidence that school officials characterized the sexually harassing
conduct as students "picking on each other," evidence that the school district
failed to remove obscenities and threats scratched onto Lisa's school locker and
the school bathroom walls for several months despite numerous requests from
Lisa and her Parents; evidence that a member of the school board is the father of
one of the students who allegedly participated in the harassment of Lisa;
evidence that the school district failed to inquire into Lisa's increasing tardiness
and absences from school; and evidence that the school district chose to remove
Lisa from the hostile sexual environment and granted her request to graduate
early, rather than attempting to eliminate the hostile environment.
Id.
692. See U
693. 940 F. Supp. 1412 (N.D. Iowa 1996).
694. See id. at 1414.
695. Id. According to the court, Heather was called vulgar names, was the subject of
humiliating graffiti, and was harassed physically. See id.
696. See U
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In considering the issue of institutional liability, the Wright court
noted that the subject had been the cause of conflicting opinions in
the appellate courts.69 The court then analyzed the standards
adopted by the Eleventh Circuit in Davis v. Monroe County Board of
Education6' and the Fifth Circuit in Rowinsky v. Bryan Independent
School District.69 Ultimately, the holdings of both Davis and
Rowinsky were rejected in favor of the standard adopted by the
court in Burrow v. Postville Community School District.
70
The Wright court reasoned that the Burrow standard was a
modified version of the Davis standard. More specifically, while the
Davis standard permitted a finding of institutional liability to be
premised on a showing that the school had been negligent in its
handling of a student's complaint of peer sexual harassment, the
Burrow standard required a showing that the school's failure to
respond appropriately to the complaint was intentional.7"' According
to the Wright court, for a school to be liable for peer sexual
harassment, a plaintiff must show "that the educational institution
knew of the harassment and intentionally failed to take the proper
remedial measures because of the plaintiffs sex."'7n The Wright
697. See id. at 1416. The court recognized the "enormous social implications" of the
issue before it and implied that the decision was one best left to Congress. Id. at 1414
("[T]his court wishes that Congress would step in and simply tell us whether it intended to
make school districts responsible for the payment of damages to students under these
circumstances."). Because no legislative action was forthcoming, the court attempted to
determine Congress's intent and to identify the correct standard for evaluating
institutional liability under Title IX. See id.
698. 74 F.3d 1186 (11th Cir. 1996). For a discussion of the Davis standard and the
Eleventh Circuit opinion, see supra notes 652-76 and accompanying text. The Wright court
summarized the Davis standard as one that "imposes liability on a school board for a
hostile educational environment created by a student's peers when the school board knows
or should know of the harassment and fails to take prompt action to remedy the situation."
Wright, 940 F. Supp. at 1417. The court described the Davis standard as one that was
premised on negligence. See id at 1417.
699. 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 165 (1996). For a discussion of
the standard adopted by the Rowinsky court and a description of the court's opinion, see
supra notes 616-38 and accompanying text. The Wright court summarized the Rowinsky
standard of liability as one where "a plaintiff 'must demonstrate that the school district
responded to sexual harassment claims differently based on sex.'" Wight, 940 F. Supp. at
1418 (quoting Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1016).
700. See Wright, 940 F. Supp. at 1419 (requiring intentional failure by the institution to
appropriately redress the sexually discriminating behavior, and discussing Burrow v.
Postville Community School District, 929 F. Supp. 1193, 1205-06 (N.D. Iowa 1996)); see
also supra notes 677-92 and accompanying text (discussing Burrow).
701. See Wright, 940 F. Supp. at 1419-20.
702. Id. at 1420.
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court then applied the standard to the facts7° and concluded that the
school's actions in response to the complaint did not rise to the level
of recklessness or intentional discrimination. As a result, the facts
were not sufficient to sustain a finding of institutional liability./
c. Trends in Student Perpetrator/Student Victim Case Law
A review of the above decisions reveals that hostile environment
sexual harassment stemming from peer sexual harassment has been
considered a viable cause of action by the majority of courts that
have addressed the issue.706 The courts, however, have split in regard
to the proper standard of institutional liability for situations
involving peer sexual harassment. The various standards that have
been adopted can be described as follows.
The Fifth Circuit and one district court adopted a standard of
liability under which a school is liable for a hostile educational
environment resulting from peer sexual harassment only if a plaintiff
can demonstrate that the school reacted to the plaintiff's complaint
with the intention to discriminate against that particular plaintiff
because of the plaintiff's sex.7" This standard causes some concern.
First, because of the prevalence of sexual harassment perpetrated
against girls, it is possible that a school may have to address sexual
harassment complaints brought only by girls.78 For a female plaintiff
who attends that school, a standard requiring her to show how the
school handles similar complaints brought by boys seems to pose an




706. See Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1232 (10th Cir. 1996); Rowinsky v. Bryan
Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1008 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 165 (1996);
Murray v. New York Univ. College of Dentistry, 57 F.3d 243, 248 (2d Cir. 1995); Linson v.
Trustees of the Univ. of Pa., No. CIV.A.95-3681, 1996 WL 479532, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug.
21, 1996); Burrow v. Postville Community Sch. Dist., 929 F. Supp. 1193, 1200 (N.D. Iowa
1996); Bosley v. Kearney R-1 Sch. Dist., 904 F. Supp. 1006, 1020 (W.D. Mo. 1995); Doe v.
Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560, 1571 (N.D. Cal. 1993). But see Garza v.
Galena Park Indep. Seh. Dist., 914 F. Supp. 1437, 1438 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (holding that
hostile environment sexual harassment is not actionable by students under Title IX).
707. See Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1016; Petaluma, 830 F. Supp. at 1576.
708. One commentator has noted that a recent study conducted by the American
Association of University Women ("AAUW") for the purpose of determining the extent
of sexual harassment in United States school systems revealed that "[although] both girls
and boys experience sexual harassment in school, more girls reported such harassment
than did boys. In addition, girls report being harassed more often than boys." See Davis,
Reading, Writing, supra note 22 at 1125; see also Sherer, supra note 17, at 2128 ("[Y]oung
women are much more likely to be the victim of sexual harassment than young men.").
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Fifth Circuit, it also would be possible for a school to escape liability
for peer sexual harassment by refusing to respond to complaints of
sexual harassment made by both boys and girls, because as long as a
school refuses to address complaints of either sex, the school will
succeed in treating all peer sexual harassment allegations equally,
regardless of the sex of the complainant, and thus will escape
liability.
The Second Circuit adopted a second standard of institutional
liability, holding that a Title VII standard should apply to peer
sexual harassment under Title IX. Specifically, when a hostile
environment is created by a third party-a person not affiliated with
the educational institution-the school will be liable for the hostile
environment if the plaintiff can prove that the school knew or should
have known of the harassment and failed to take appropriate
remedial action."' It is important to note, however, that the Second
Circuit declined to hold that a school will be liable for its failure to
remedy a hostile environment if the school had only constructive
knowledge of the harassment. 1
One district court within the Second Circuit took advantage of
the Second Circuit's reluctance to endorse a constructive knowledge
standard and instead adopted a more stringent standard requiring a
plaintiff to show that the school had actual notice of the peer sexual
harassment and failed to react appropriately to the situation. 7 This
standard, however, also allows institutional liability when the school
"provided no reasonable avenue of complaint." 3
The Eleventh Circuit, along with two district courts, adopted the
final standard of liability, which holds a school liable for the hostile
environment caused by peer sexual harassment when a plaintiff can
show that the school intentionally discriminated against her in its
709. See Murray v. New York Univ. College of Dentistry, 57 F.3d 243, 250 (2d Cir.
1995).
710. See id. at 249-50. As previously mentioned, the Second Circuit's analysis in
Murray is applicable to peer harassment because it states that a school may be liable for a
hostile environment created by someone other than an employee; thus, it is indicative of
the kind of analysis the Second Circuit would follow in student-to-student sexual
harassment cases. See supra note 568.
711. See Murray, 57 F.3d at 250. The court disposed of the case by determining that the
plaintiff had failed to meet even a constructive knowledge standard. See id. The court
reasoned that if the plaintiff could not meet a constructive knowledge standard, she would
also be unable to meet a standard requiring that the school have actual knowledge of the
harassment. See id.
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treatment of her complaint.714 The school's intention to discriminate
can be inferred from the way it handles the complaint.7  Under this
standard, a plaintiff may recover damages resulting from peer sexual
harassment if the plaintiff can demonstrate successfully that the
school knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to
take appropriate remedial action.716
Many commentators have addressed the issue of peer sexual
harassment for the specific purpose of advocating or criticizing
various standards of institutional liability.7 7 A review of the articles
reveals that authors consistently advocate that an educational
institution should be liable for peer sexual harassment if it knew or
should have known of the harassment and failed to take appropriate
remedial action.718 A comion theme in these articles is that the
damage resulting from hostile environment sexual harassment in
educational contexts is at least as harmful to its victims as is hostile
environment sexual harassment in the employment context.719 The
standard adopted by these commentators and by the majority of the
above courts does not hold educational institutions strictly liable for
peer sexual harassment; rather, the standard requires that the school
have some kind of notice of the harassment before liability may be
found .7 " At the same time, the standard prevents a school from
714. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186, 1193 (11th Cir. 1996);
Burrow v. Postville Community Sch. Dist., 929 F. Supp. 1193, 1205-06 (N.D. Iowa 1996);
Bosley v. Kearney R-1 Sch. Dist., 904 F. Supp. 1006,1023 (W.D. Mo. 1995).
715. See Davis, 74 F.3d at 1193; Burrow, 929 F. Supp. at 1205; Bosley, 904 F. Supp. at
1023.
716. See Davis, 74 F.3d at 1193; Burrow, 929 F. Supp. at 1205; Bosley, 904 F. Supp. at
1023. This standard seems to be slightly different than that adopted by the Murray court
in that a school's liability may be premised on its constructive notice of the harassment.
717. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 18, at 220-21 (discussing differences in the standards of
liability adopted by the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits); Nixon, supra note 17, at 251-257
(discussing the Davis standard of liability adopted by the Eleventh Circuit); Recent Case,
110 HARV. L REV. 787,790-92 (1997) (criticizing the standard of liability adopted by the
Fifth Circuit).
718. See, e.g., Bodnar, supra note 8, at 585; Eriksson, supra note 8, at 1815; Elizabeth J.
Gant, Comment, Applying Title VII "Hostile Work Environment" Analysis to Title IX of
the Education Amnendments of 1972-An Avenue of Relief for Victims of Student-to-Student
Sexual Harassment in the Schools, 98 DICK. L REv. 489,506 (1994); Miller, supra note 10,
at 718; Sherer, supra note 17, at 2157, 2164-65.
719. See Gant, supra note 718, at 512 (explaining how sexual harassment in schools
yields results similar to sexual harassment in employment); Miller, supra note 10, at 721
("[A] hostile environment may be more detrimental in the academic setting under Title IX
than in the workplace."); Sherer, supra note 17, at 2123 (analogizing the damage suffered
by sexual harassment victims in the educational context to that suffered by victims in the
employment context).
720. See Erksson, supra note 8, at 1815 ("This standard satisfies the notice
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escaping liability by closing its eyes to pervasive peer sexual
harassment. 2
Peer sexual harassment can have a significant effect on a
student's access to educational opportunity.71 If Title IX is to be
effective in guaranteeing equal educational opportunity to students
regardless of their sex, the law must offer a viable remedy to students
who are deprived of that equal educational opportunity when they
are victimized by peer sexual harassment.7' A "knew or should have
known" standard offers a plaintiff an opportunity to hold a school
liable for the damage suffered as a result of sexual harassment.2
Despite the contrary holding by the Fifth Circuit, it is likely that
federal courts will begin to adopt the standard described in the above
paragraph. It is this standard that was adopted by the OCR in the
recently proposed regulations pertaining to sexual harassment in
education.'z
III. CONCLUSION
This Comment has summarized the different standards for
institutional liability under Title IX for sexual harassment in
education. The cases were analyzed within a framework depicting
the types of people involved in the harassment. While that
requirement because schools would be liable only if they intended to discriminate or if,
despite their awareness that sexual harassment was a pervasive problem, they did nothing
to remedy the situation."); Sherer, supra note 17, at 2165 ("The school's knowledge may
be shown through complaints that were lodged with the school or by demonstrating that
the harassment was so pervasive that the school's awareness may be inferred." (footnotes
omitted)).
721. See Eriksson, supra note 8, at 1816 ("Courts could infer intent from the school's
blatant and reckless disregard for the well-being of victims of harassment."); Sherer, supra
note 17, at 2164 ("Although it is unrealistic to hold a school accountable for every isolated
incident of sexual harassment, it is not an unfair burden on a school to take measures to
prevent a sexually hostile atmosphere from pervading a school that both males and
females attend.").
722. See Sherer, supra note 17, at 2153 ("Peer sexual harassment can impair academic
progress and inhibit the attainment of goals so that a young women is effectively limited in
her educational and career opportunities and, consequently, economic potential.").
723. See Eriksson, supra note 8, at 1816 (pointing out that without a viable mechanism
by which they could hold schools liable, victims of peer sexual harassment would not be
compensated and schools would have no incentive to prohibit harassing conduct); Gant,
supra note 718, at 514 ("Holding schools accountable for the conduct of students will
promote the equal opportunities for women that Title IX was enacted to protect.").
724. See Sherer, supra note 17, at 2164 ("Under this proposal, the burden is placed on
the school to discourage and eliminate sexual harassment. This responsibility is consonant
with a school's duty under Title IX to provide equal educational opportunities.").
725. See infra notes 739-41 and accompanying text (describing the standard recently
proposed by the OCR for institutional liability for peer sexual harassment).
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categorization was intended to provide some clarity to the discussion
of institutional liability, it actually served to illuminate the division in
the federal court system with regard to the proper standard for
institutional liability under Title IX within each category. The
description of the law in the section describing sexual harassment
under Title IX in the employment context remains an accurate
description of the status of the law today.726 However, the
description of the law in the other sections, including the quid pro
quo section, may be fundamentally affected by action taken by the
Office for Civil Rights at the end of 1996.
On October 4, 1996, the Office of Civil Rights issued a Request
for Comments regarding the "clarity and completeness" of a
guidance notice entitled "Appendix One-Sexual Harassment
Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees"
("Appendix One")." Also included was a second appendix entitled
"Appendix Two-Sexual Harassment Guidance: Peer Sexual
Harassment" ("Appendix Two").72 Both appendices summarized
the standards used by the OCR in evaluating claims of sexual
harassment under Title IX in their respective contexts." The OCR
issued Appendix One for the purpose of soliciting comments on the
standards contained within it.7"0 According to the OCR, "[o]nce the
comments are assessed, OCR plans to publish a single document in
the Federal Register combining the guidance found in Appendix One
and Appendix Two."731
The effect the standards will have on the status of the law with
respect to the standards of liability under Title IX is not clear. A
number of courts have noted the relevance of the OCR's
interpretation of the issue of sexual harassment of Title IX.732 A
726. See supra notes 155-244 and accompanying text.
727. See Office for Civil Rights Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students
by School Employees, 61 Fed. Reg. 52,172 (proposed Oct. 4, 1996). The purpose of
Appendix One is "to inform educational institutions that receive Federal financial
assistance regarding the standards that OCR follows, and that institutions should follow,
when investigating allegations that Title IX has been violated because of sexual
harassment by employees." Id.
728. See id. at 52,175.
729. See id. at 52,172, 52,175.
730. See id at 52,172 ("The Assistant Secretary solicits from all interested parties
written comments on the clarity and completeness of this Guidance, which is appended to
the notice as Appendix One.").
731. Id.
732. See, e.g., Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1014-16 (5th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 165 (1996). The Rowinsky court emphasized and quoted
from a Policy Memorandum issued by the OCR in 1981 that addressed sexual harassment
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policy statement by the OCR, however, will not have the effect of
overturning the relevant case law.' 3 Instead, it is likely that future
courts will give weight to the OCR's interpretation of the issue of
institutional liability while still considering other relevant
interpretations of the law. Therefore, a brief summary of the
standard proposed by the OCR is warranted.
With respect to sexual harassment of students by school
employees, the OCR noted in Appendix One that "[s]exual
harassment of students by a school employee is a form of prohibited
sex discrimination."' The OCR also stated that both quid pro quo
and hostile environment sexual harassment are actionable under
Title IX.73 Finally, the OCR reasoned that an educational
institution's liability for any type of sexual harassment by its
employees should be analyzed using agency principles.736 In cases of
quid pro quo harassment, the application of agency principles will
almost always lead to institutional liability.3 7 With respect to hostile
environment sexual harassment caused by a school's employees, the
situation should be analyzed to determine whether the employee
acted with apparent authority or was aided in the harassment by his
or her position within the school.738
With respect to peer sexual harassment, the OCR stated in
Appendix Two that "[p]eer sexual harassment is a form of prohibited
sex discrimination where the harassing conduct creates a hostile
environment." '739 Consequently, a school will be liable for the
existence of a hostile environment if "the school knows ('has notice')
of the harassment, and ... the school fails to take immediate and
appropriate steps to remedy it.""74 The OCR emphasized that the
perpetrated by employees and agents of the school. See id at 1015 (quoting OCR Policy
Memorandum from Antonio J. Califa, Director of Litigation, Enforcement and Policy
Service, to Regional Civil Rights Directors (Aug. 31, 1981)).
733. Even formal regulations passed by the agency charged with implementing the law
are not binding on the courts. Several courts have, however, noted that such regulations
are to be accorded weight when interpreting the statute to which they pertain. See, e.g., id.
at 1015.
734. Office for Civil Rights Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by
School Employees, 61 Fed. Reg. at 52,172.
735. See id.
736. See id. at 52,172-73.
737. See iU. at 52,172.
738. See id.
739. Id. at 52,175.
740. Id. at 52,176. In another section of the guidance draft, the OCR specified that "a
school will have notice when it actually 'knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care, should
have known' about the harassment." Id. at 52,177.
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school is not liable for the actions of its students in creating the
hostile environment but is liable for the school's own failure to
remedy the harassment once the school has notice of it.74'
As previously noted, when a school is faced with a sexual
harassment situation, the appropriate response to avoid a potential
lawsuit is not clear. A review of the case law in the area
demonstrates the difficulty of ascertaining the appropriate response.
In recent years, numerous publications have been aimed toward
assisting schools in determining the best manner in which to react to
the problem of sexual harassment in our schools.742 A school
interested in avoiding liability for such situations should review some
of the literature and adopt one of the recommended policies.
It is through education that the future of our society is
determined. As at least one commentator has noted, "[a]
nondiscriminatory environment is essential to maximum intellectual
growth and is therefore an integral part of the educational benefits
that a student receives. A sexually abusive environment inhibits, if
not prevents, the harassed student from developing her full
intellectual potential and receiving the most from the academic
program. ' 74" Protecting those in our educational systems from sexual
harassment should be of primary concern to every educational
institution.
DAWN A. ELLISON
741. See id. at 52,177-78.
742. See generally AUDREY COHAN Er AL., SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND SEXUAL
ABUSa A HANDBOOK FOR TEACHERS AND ADMNSTRATORS 21-75 (1996) (providing
guidelines for the prevention and adequate response to sexual harassment in education);
SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON CAMPUS: A GUIDE FOR ADMINISTRATORS, FACULTY, AND
STUDENTS (Bernice R. Sandier & Robert J. Shoop eds., 1997) (consisting of several
articles discussing various aspects of sexual harassment on campus); SHOOP & EDWARDS,
supra note 9 (describing the problem of sexual harassment in education and several
programs and curricula designed to respond to the problem).
743. Ronna Greff Schneider, Sexual Harassment and Higher Education, 65 TEX. L
REV. 525, 551 (1987) (footnote omitted).
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